Every fourth country in the world has experienced regression in the field of women's rights, according to the latest UN Women 2024 report, and in the European Union, about 50 million women continue to experience high levels of sexual and physical violence - both at home and at work, as well as in public spaces.

We speak with Doctor of Sociology, Professor at the University of Warsaw, Elżbieta Korolczuk, about the situation of women's rights in the world, Poland and Ukraine, as well as about what should be done to protect and support women's rights, which are once again under threat.

The Influence of the Church

Olga Pakosh: Professor, what does the regression of women's rights mean?

‍Elżbieta Korolczuk: It means that in many countries, the process of equalising opportunities has stalled, and in some, the situation regarding existing rights has even worsened.‍

Of course, it has never been the case that all participants in public life, even in liberal countries, accepted gender equality

There have always been groups opposing women's rights - reproductive rights, the right to abortion, contraception or women's equality in political life.

But in democratic countries, there was a general consensus that we should strive for the full participation of women in social and political life. Groups opposing this remained on the margins of public life. Today, anti-gender views are moving to the centre of public discussion and - depending on the country - take various forms.

For example, in Afghanistan, where in different periods of the twentieth century laws were introduced to improve the situation of women, today women have no rights whatsoever. Fundamentalists have ensured that women cannot work, leave the house alone or study. They cannot participate in public or political life, and most of them also experience violence - there is data showing that this may concern up to 85 per cent of Afghan women.

Meanwhile, in the United States, where for many years the political mainstream shared the belief that women's rights were an obvious part of democracy, there is now an assault on both democracy and women's rights. Both are connected to the development of anti-gender and conservative movements, which often resonate with organised religions, such as Christianity and Islam, as well as Orthodox Judaism, which has also never been a friend to women.

- And what about Poland? It has been almost two years since the change of government. Why, despite previous promises, has no action been taken to at least partially regulate the issue of abortion?

- Firstly, because the current political class - and this applies not only to Poland but also to many other countries - is significantly more conservative than the majority of society. Secondly, the issue of women's rights and minority rights remains under the strong influence of religious institutions.

In Poland, we are observing a distinct cultural conflict: the country is rapidly secularising - the younger generation is moving away from institutional religion, and often from faith altogether. At the same time, a significant portion of voters, predominantly older people, remains deeply religious. The Church as a political institution still plays an enormous role, both at the national level and locally. Bishops often effectively participate in local political life. The economic power of the Church also carries great weight - it remains one of the largest property owners in the country.

- Could a change of president influence anything?

- Can we trust politicians? This is a question many people are asking themselves today. Promises were already made two years ago, during the parliamentary elections. However, as research shows, a significant portion of young women who voted for the current coalition in 2023 now feels disappointed and disillusioned. During the campaign, mobilisation efforts were directed specifically at them, notably through promises regarding reproductive rights, financial support concerning issues related to abortion, equality for the LGBT community and so on. At present, these promises remain unfulfilled. What will change after the presidential elections - we shall see.

I fear we are dealing with the ignoring of female voters: at first, something is promised to them to secure their votes, and later, the promises are not fulfilled

Such a strategy not only alienates specific groups of voters but also generally undermines trust in democracy as a political system. The question is to what extent the politicians themselves realise this and whether they understand the long-term consequences of such actions.

As a sociologist, I do not have excessive expectations. However, as a citizen, I hope that the ruling parties will eventually awaken and that the change of president will lead at least to the resolution of such basic issues as the abortion ban or inequality in LGBT rights.

In Poland, a victim is not obliged to prove that she said «no» to the rapist

- What is the current situation regarding women's rights in Ukraine?

- War, like any crisis, always negatively affects society. On the one hand, of course, it affects men, as they predominantly die at the frontline or bear other severe consequences related to military service. On the other hand, the burden of daily survival falls squarely on the shoulders of women. This concerns not only professional work but also activities connected with maintaining the lives of families, communities and the general everyday functioning of people. Moreover, many women serve in the Ukrainian army, carrying, in essence, a double burden.

War also means the suspension of normal political struggle, which likewise complicates the ability of minorities to defend their rights. Individual rights, as well as the rights of particular groups, are pushed into the background in the face of the harsh reality of resisting Russian aggression.

Nevertheless, it is noticeable that politically, Ukraine is striving for integration with Europe, and this opens opportunities for the implementation of equal rights solutions. For example, one can compare Ukraine and Georgia - two post-Soviet states that started from similar positions. Ukraine resolutely chose the path of European integration, which, incidentally, became one of the factors of the military conflict, and in this context, adopted many decisions, such as the ratification of the Istanbul Convention and the protection of the rights of women and minorities. Georgia, by contrast, has moved in the opposite direction. It has drawn closer to Russia - notably through religious issues, restrictions on the activities of non-governmental organisations and the strengthened influence of the Orthodox Church.

The Georgian government is moving towards restricting the rights of minorities, particularly LGBT people, which is part of a broader process of narrowing the rights of civil society and the space for grassroots movements. This indicates that we are dealing not only with ideological or cultural differences, the attitude towards equality is also an element of the geopolitical choice made by states. It was the same in the case of Poland and other countries that joined the EU - this process was linked to the acceptance of at least some obligations in the field of equality. And this undoubtedly matters for the specific decisions taken by the state, although the results do not always meet expectations.

- What laws or legal mechanisms are lacking in Ukraine to support women's rights? Is the problem solely due to the crisis caused by the war?

- I am not a specialist in Ukrainian affairs - it is worth asking Ukrainian women themselves about this. However, I think the situation is complicated. On the one hand, it is worth asking: how open are state institutions to the voices of minorities, including women? How much do they actually represent groups that are in a vulnerable position in society?

On the other hand, the problem also lies in the way existing norms are implemented. For example, when it comes to protection from violence, one of the most fundamental issues. If such protection does not exist, it is clear that female citizens do not have equal rights.

If they are not protected in their own home or on the street, there is no point in talking about equal opportunities in politics or other fields

And here the question arises: is a state that is undergoing such a deep crisis - military, economic, infrastructural - capable of effectively guaranteeing women the protection from violence? I believe we must demand this, but at the same time, we should understand that it is an extremely difficult task.

- And what about Poland? Is Polish legislation effective in the context of protecting women?

- Yes, in many areas there are quite good legal standards, but often they are not properly implemented. An example can be the changes introduced in February this year - regarding the definition of rape.

According to the new provisions, rape is any violation of sexual boundaries without clear consent. That is, theoretically, now the victim is not obliged to prove that she said «no» - instead, the perpetrator must prove that he obtained consent

At the same time, we do not have any large-scale information campaign on this matter. Most people do not even know that anything has changed. There are no relevant educational programmes. There are not enough training sessions for the police and prosecutors that would allow for the effective implementation of the new standards.

Such matters should be on the front pages of newspapers

«Women's rights are not given once and for all»

- The United States was once an example in the fight for women's rights and the implementation of these rights. What about now? Are the suffragettes turning in their graves?

- I hope that the United States will become not only an example of how what seemed to have been achieved can be destroyed, but also teach us how to truly maintain it. It is worth emphasising that, compared to Poland, Ukraine and most Eastern European countries, women's rights in the USA were guaranteed quite late, at a time when most women in Eastern Europe were already working and had a certain degree of financial independence.

In Poland, women gained the right to abortion in 1953, while in the USA, the federal right to terminate a pregnancy was introduced only in the mid-1970s.

Although in the early 1960s and 1970s women were fighting for access to legal abortions, over the last five decades, the USA has created the image of a country where the rights of minorities and women are highly developed

However, this struggle for equality was always tense, and opponents of equal rights never stood aside.

Today, the main difference is that part of the political elite has become extremely conservative, and the system of rights protection at the federal level is beginning to collapse. This particularly concerns decisions of the Supreme Court, which has overturned provisions that guaranteed the right to abortion at the federal level, notably the ruling in Roe v. Wade.

These changes show how important it is to constantly monitor adherence to the principles of equality. Women's rights are not given once and for all. This also demonstrates the link between the rights of women and minorities and democracy.

On the one hand, in undemocratic countries, the erosion of women's rights is very clearly visible, as women are usually the first group to lose their rights. When a rigid power hierarchy is created, women generally end up at the bottom.

On the other hand, criticism of women's rights is often used as a pretext for attacks on democratic values and institutions. Attacks on gender equality today are a tool in the hands of anti-democratic movements, which mobilise society by stirring up fear and convincing people that both gender equality and democracy itself have gone too far. An example is Trump's campaign against Kamala Harris, who was portrayed as a spokesperson for the transgender community, and topics related to funding gender reassignment surgeries in prisons were used to mobilise voters and at the same time to ridicule liberal democracy.

The strategy of right-wing populists is to ridicule the topics of equality, portraying them as absurd and as a threat to women themselves, while at the same time inciting society against democracy as such

- What can we, ordinary women, now do in Poland and Ukraine to protect our rights?

- The answer has already been given to us by the suffragettes: no one will grant us rights for free, we must fight for them. And once we have gained them, we must defend them.

It is a bit like marriage. Usually, if we take on all the obligations but do not demand what is ours, the other side will not help and will not voluntarily grant us our rights

The same applies to political life.

It is about voting, supporting organisations that help women, as well as those who take it to the streets - people who mobilise. It is about supporting specific women who act for others. Even if we ourselves are not ready to engage, we can support them. It is about supporting specific female politicians, as well as holding them accountable. It is about checking what they are doing, on what basis, and expressing our opinion. This is something we must never renounce. Whether on Facebook, in public discussions or at the workplace.

We still live in a good place where our voice has weight

We are not in Afghanistan - we are in a place where we have a voice, and we can use it.

We must make an effort, get used to the fact that political activity is simply part of our lives, not a marginal thing that appears only, for example, during elections, or does not appear at all. Because then we voluntarily give up the possibility of changing the world.

There are women who oppose the right to abortion. Of course, they have the right to do so. But unfortunately, they act neither in their own interest nor in the interest of their sisters, friends, or daughters. No one is forcing anyone to have an abortion. But in a world where women are forbidden to do so, it is ordinary women who will pay for this ban with their lives, health, and mental well-being. And we simply should not agree to such a world.

Over the past week, former President Donald Trump has mentioned various figures regarding the military aid the United States has provided to Ukraine over three years of war. He has cited amounts such as $500 billion and $350 billion.

According to estimates by the "Economists for Ukraine" group, the military aid transferred by the U.S. to Ukraine amounts to $18.3 billion. An additional $32.6 billion represents direct budgetary support in the form of reimbursements, which was distributed, among other means, through the World Bank. Meanwhile, the U.S. government has assessed the total volume of its military aid to Ukraine at $65.9 billion.

— We analyzed a vast amount of publicly available data and identified the reasons for discrepancies in the reported figures, — explains Anastassia Fedyk. — When considering only military aid, our experts assessed all the equipment and technology Ukraine was set to receive, taking into account their condition, age, and usability. It makes a significant difference whether equipment was newly manufactured by American companies last year or if it had been out of use for over a decade and was marked for decommissioning. Evaluating all such equipment at the same value is incorrect.

For instance, while the U.S. Department of Defense reports that it has transferred $31 billion worth of weapons and ammunition to Ukraine (under the Presidential Drawdown Authority, which allows the U.S. president to provide military aid from Pentagon stockpiles without congressional approval), the majority of this equipment was outdated and no longer in use by the U.S. Armed Forces. According to expert estimates, the actual value of this aid is around $12.5 billion.

Another crucial aspect to consider when calculating expenses is how much the United States has gained in profit or other benefits by providing aid to Ukraine.

— We plan to analyze this aspect in detail in our next study and evaluate the specific economic benefits the U.S. has gained from military and financial support to Ukraine. This includes increased profits for the defense industry and new contracts for American companies, — notes Anastassia Fedyk.

Scholars from the University of California, Berkeley, the Stockholm School of Economics, Minerva University, and the AI for Good Foundation worked on the report for approximately two months. "The main goal of this study is to prevent disinformation and the spread of false data regarding U.S. aid to Ukraine. It also aims to demonstrate, using concrete figures, that European countries and the United Kingdom have provided Ukraine with equipment, weapons, and other types of aid in proportions comparable to the U.S. contribution," Fedyk explains. Notably, the European Union estimates the total volume of its financial, military, and humanitarian assistance at $145 billion, while the United Kingdom has provided nearly $16 billion.

Why, then, does former U.S. President Donald Trump exaggerate the aid figures so drastically? According to Anastassia Fedyk, this may be an attempt to negotiate more favorable terms in upcoming resource agreements or a strategy to discredit the previous administration by portraying its policies as unprofessional and wasteful. Specifically, Trump may be trying to create the impression that his predecessors neglected American citizens while allegedly spending "enormous" amounts to support Ukraine, which is suffering from the war with Russia.

— That is why it was important for us to present accurate data — specific amounts, figures, and facts — to show the real state of affairs. We wanted to prove that American citizens were not deprived of access to social or government services due to aid to Ukraine, explains Anastassia Fedyk.

On the contrary, many people gained jobs, and companies involved in the production and supply of aid expanded their manufacturing capacities and contributed to budget revenues

In her opinion, the results of this analysis will also be useful for Ukraine, as they will allow for negotiations on equal terms, provide a better understanding of the real value of the aid received, and prevent manipulations regarding its scale.

The researchers from "Economists for Ukraine" also analyzed allegations of corruption and possible embezzlement of funds coming from the U.S.

They found that the level of corruption associated with the use of American aid is among the lowest compared to all other countries that have received support from the United States

— Accusations of corruption can harm Ukraine’s reputation as an aid recipient. However, thorough audits indicate that Ukraine has handled the provided funds responsibly. Moreover, budgetary assistance was granted in the form of expense reimbursements based on receipts. This should be emphasized to prevent the formation of a negative image, which some try to impose, notes Professor Fedyk.

In her view, American citizens' attitudes toward Ukraine have not deteriorated, but many still do not fully understand the actual scale of aid provided to Ukraine. Americans continue to support Ukraine and consider their assistance important and beneficial. Therefore, it is crucial to spread truthful information to avoid misunderstandings, even when high-ranking officials fuel such misunderstandings.

Economists for Ukraine is a non-partisan economic think-tank, part of the AI for Good Foundation, a US 501(c)(3) Public Charity whose mission is to promote economic and community resilience. The Economists for Ukraine network includes more than 400 economists representing the world’s leading academic, scientific, and economic institutions.

Three years of war is, without exaggeration, a true struggle for all nations. Some are ready to stand side by side with Ukraine until victory, some have begun to momentarily doubt what to do next, and some have completely lost faith. Yet there are those who never cease to do good for the benefit of Ukraine and the entire free world. Thousands of Ukrainian and Polish women make invaluable contributions to the triumph of democracy every day. Despite the exhaustion of three years of war, they continue their relentless work for the sake of a brighter future. And we, the international magazine Sestry.eu, tell the stories of these incredible women who change the world for the better every day.

In 2024, the editorial team of Sestry.eu established a special award, «Portraits of sisterhood», to honour women who, through their active civic stance and willingness to sacrifice, do everything possible to help those who need it most.

<span class="teaser"><img src="https://cdn.prod.website-files.com/64ae8bc0e4312cd55033950d/65cc6e8f39be6e9d65fcf154_Sestry.eu_Portretysiostrzenstwa250mini.avif">«We are all not competing but cooperating». Sestry.eu has announced the winners of the «Portraits of sisterhood» award</span>

This year, the award ceremony will take place on March 4th 2025 in Warsaw. The Honourable Chapter has selected 12 nominees. From these, the laureates of the «Portraits of sisterhood» award will be chosen - a Ukrainian and a Polish woman as the embodiment of close mutual support and cooperation in Polish-Ukrainian dialogue, as well as an example of true sisterhood.

Honourable committee of the «Portraits of sisterhood» award:

• Dominika Kulczyk, entrepreneur, President of the Kulczyk Foundation
• Agnieszka Holland, Polish film director
• Kateryna Bodnar, wife of the Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of Ukraine to the Republic of Poland
• Natalka Panchenko, leader of «Euromaidan-Warsaw», chairperson of the Stand with Ukraine Foundation
• Adriana Porowska, Minister for Civil Society Affairs
• Myroslava Keryk, President of the Board of the «Ukrainian House» Foundation, Warsaw
• Myroslava Gongadze, head of broadcasting for Voice of America in Eastern Europe
• Bianka Zalewska, Polish journalist
• Elwira Niewiera, Polish film director
• Kateryna Glazkova, Executive Director of the Union of Ukrainian Entrepreneurs
• Joanna Mosiej, Editor in Chief of Sestry.eu
• Maria Górska, Editor in Chief of Sława TV

Nominees for the «Portraits of sisterhood» Award, Poland:

Agnieszka Zach, Polish volunteer

Before the full-scale war in Ukraine, Agnieszka Zach worked as a guide in Poland’s largest nature reserve - Biebrza National Park. She was raising four children and building a house. On February 24th 2022, her life changed drastically. She decided to dedicate herself to helping Ukrainians. In one of her homes, she sheltered women with children fleeing the war. Later, she began travelling to Ukraine as a volunteer. For nearly three years, Agnieszka has been delivering humanitarian aid to the military on the frontlines. Regardless of the weather conditions, she walks barefoot - earning her the nicknames «Barefoot» or «Witch».

Anna Lazar, curator, art historian, translator

Anna Lazar is a Polish curator, art historian, literary translator, and public figure who has been building cultural bridges between Poland and Ukraine for many years. She is a member of the Women’s Archive of the Institute of Literary Research of the Polish Academy of Sciences and the Polish section of AICA. She graduated in Ukrainian and Polish philology, as well as in art history, from the University of Warsaw. For seven years, she served as Deputy Director of the Polish Institute in Kyiv. In her interdisciplinary projects, Lazar combines contemporary art with historical and social reflection. Her translation portfolio includes both classical and modern works of Ukrainian literature.

Anna is also engaged in voluntary work. Her activities bring together artists, writers, and thinkers from both countries, broadening the context of Ukrainian culture.

Monika Andruszewska, war correspondent and volunteer

Polish war correspondent and volunteer Monika Andruszewska has lived in Ukraine since the Revolution of Dignity. In 2014, she joined volunteers travelling to eastern Ukraine. In her reports, she actively covered everything that was happening on the frontline. She witnessed combat operations in the Donetsk airport area. When the full-scale war began, Monika Andruszewska risked her life to evacuate 30 Ukrainians from under shelling in Irpin, near Kyiv.

Monika is now actively involved in voluntary work and, in collaboration with the Lemkin Centre (Warsaw), is collecting evidence of Russian war crimes in Ukraine. For her achievements, she has been awarded Poland’s Gold Cross of Merit, the Stand With Ukraine Awards, and the Polish Journalists Association award for her report «Bierz ciało, póki dają» (from Polish: «Take the body while they are still giving it»), dedicated to Ukrainian mothers searching for their sons who have gone missing in the war.

Anna Dąbrowska, president of the Homo Faber association

Anna Dąbrowska is the President of the Lublin-based Homo Faber association and Co-Chair of the Migration Consortium. She works on issues concerning the impact of migration on local communities and develops integration policies at the city level. She is also a co-founder of «Baobab» - a social meeting space for communities in Lublin.

Olga Piasecka-Nieć - psychologist, president of the «Kocham Dębniki» foundation

Founder and President of the «Kocham Dębniki» («I Love Dębniki») foundation. Today, the foundation supports over 1300 Ukrainian families. In February 2022, she put her life and career on hold to stand with Ukrainian women and families seeking refuge from the war in Poland.

Olga strives to help Ukrainian women and their children rebuild their shattered lives. She believes that the ability to turn crisis into strength and growth depends on a supportive environment and community: «What I actively aspire to achieve is for this experience to be passed on. And it is happening! Women returning to Ukraine take with them what they have learned here and incorporate it into their lives. They build new communities around them, using the knowledge they have gained here».

Anna Suśka-Jakubowska

Since 2013, Anna Jakubowska has worked at the Camillian Mission for Social Assistance, coordinating a project to prepare apartments for the homeless. Following the outbreak of the full-scale invasion, she was responsible for temporary accommodation for refugees at the social boarding house «Saint Lazarus» and helped refugee families settle into rented flats.

Nominees for the «Portraits of sisterhood» Award, Ukraine:

Yuliia «Taira» Paievska - servicewoman, paramedic

Yuliia Paievska, known by the callsign «Taira», provided medical aid to participants of the Revolution of Dignity. As the leader of the volunteer paramedic unit «Taira’s Angels», she conducted tactical medical training on the frontline from 2014 to 2018. On March 16th 2022, during the defence of Mariupol, she was captured by Russian forces and was released on June 17th 2022.

In 2023, Yuliia Paievska became a laureate of the International Women of Courage award. The US State Department honoured her with the title of «The World’s Bravest Woman». Additionally, she received an award at the «Invictus Games» in Germany. She has been decorated with the President of Ukraine’s distinction «For Humanitarian Participation in the Anti-Terrorist Operation» and the «People’s Hero of Ukraine» order. Currently, Taira has joined the 13th Brigade of the National Guard of Ukraine, «Khartia».

Olena Apchel - film director, servicewoman

Olena Apchel is a theatre scholar, director and volunteer. She actively participated in the Revolution of Dignity - both at the Kyiv and Kharkiv Maidans. From 2021 to 2022, she headed the social programmes department at Warsaw’s «Nowy Teatr». During this time, she became one of the active members of the Ukrainian volunteer community in Poland. In the Autumn of 2022, she moved to Berlin, where she worked as co-director of Theatertreffen, the largest theatre festival in the German-speaking world.

After three years abroad, Olena Apchel returned to Ukraine. In May 2024, she joined the Armed Forces of Ukraine.

Mariana Mamonova - former Kremlin captive, psychotherapist, founder of a charity foundation

Mariana Mamonova joined the military in 2018, where she met her future husband, a National Guard service member. In the spring of 2022, the military medic was captured while three months pregnant. She was exchanged just three days before giving birth.

Following her release, Mamonova founded a charity foundation to assist women who have survived Russian captivity. Helping these women has become not just her job but her life's mission: «The goal of our foundation is to support women who have endured captivity. To help them rehabilitate - mentally, physically, and spiritually». The foundation also provides assistance to pregnant wives of service members, pregnant veterans, and pregnant women who have lost their husbands in the war.

Olga Rudnieva - CEO of Superhumans Center

Olga Rudnieva is the CEO and co-founder of the Superhumans Center, a clinic providing psychological assistance, prosthetics, reconstructive surgery, and rehabilitation for people affected by war. From the first days of the war, she led the largest logistics hub in Europe - HelpUkraine Center, created in partnership with Nova Poshta, Rozetka, and the TIS terminal.

From 2004 to August 2022, she served as the director of the Olena Pinchuk Foundation and was the coordinator of the sexual education space, Dialog Hub. She is also a co-founder of Veteran Hub, a centre providing comprehensive services for veterans.

Under Olga’s leadership, some of the most extensive media campaigns and charitable concerts have taken place, including performances by Elton John, Queen, and Paul McCartney. Over the past seven years, she has consistently been listed among Ukraine’s most successful women by NV and Ukrainska Pravda. In 2024, Olga was included in the BBC’s Top 100 Women of the Year.

Oleksandra Mezinova - director and founder of the «Sirius» animal shelter

Oleksandra Mezinova manages the «Sirius» shelter in Fedorivka, near Kyiv. Before the war, it was home to 3500 animals. Currently, the shelter houses just over 3200 - despite military personnel and volunteers constantly bringing in rescued cats, dogs, and other animals. Each month, the shelter takes in around 50 to 60 animals, many from frontline areas and combat zones. The shelter is involved in rescuing, treating, sterilising, and rehoming animals, as well as conducting educational and awareness-raising work. Additionally, «Sirius» supports low-income pet owners, mini-shelters, and their caretakers, who are often elderly people.

This year, the shelter marks its 25th anniversary. Over this time, more than 13 thousand animals have been rescued, with over 10 thousand finding loving homes. In 2023, «Sirius» received the honorary award «Choice of the Country». In 2022, its founder, Oleksandra Mezinova, was awarded the Order of Princess Olga.

Liudmyla Huseinova - human rights defender, head of the NGO «Numo, Sestry!»

Since the beginning of the occupation, from 2014 to her arrest in 2019, Liudmyla Huseinova cared for children from a disbanded orphanage in the occupied Novoazovsk district. She brought them clothes, as well as Ukrainian books and postcards from free Ukrainian territory. She also assisted Ukrainian soldiers defending Mariupol at the time. She received a signed Ukrainian flag from them, which she managed to smuggle into the occupied territory and hide. The flag was not discovered during a search and remains hidden to this day.

Following her arrest in 2019, she was taken to «Isolation» and later transferred to the Donetsk detention centre. On October 17th 2022, Huseinova was released as part of a «women’s exchange». She now focuses on defending the rights of those affected by conflict-related sexual violence, former civilian prisoners, and supporting women who are still in captivity or under occupation. On 6 December, she founded and took leadership of the NGO «Numo, Sestry!», which unites women who have survived captivity, conflict-related sexual violence, torture, and other consequences of Russia’s war against Ukraine.

Partners of the «Portraits of sisterhood» award:

• Ambasada Ukrainy w Rzeczpospolitej Polskiej
• Patronat Honorowy Prezydenta Miasta Sopot
• Kulczyk Foundation
• Przemysław Krych
• Ulatowski Family Foundation
• Federacja Przedsiębiorców Polskich
• Fundacja PKO BP
• Foundation Kredo
• Fundacja Edukacja dla Demokracji
• Polsko-Amerykańska Fundacja Wolności
• Wspieramy Ukrainę
• Żabka
• YES
• Nova Post
• TVP Info
• Biełsat TV
• PAP
• Onet
• Espreso TV
• NV.ua
• New Eastern Europe
• СУП

We also encourage our readers to take part in the voting and choose the leader who deserves the special «Portraits of sisterhood» Readers' Award. To vote, simply follow this link. Voting will be open until February 22nd 2025.

«Rainbow» symbolism for the enemy is a signal for humiliation, mockery, violence and murder»

- Before the full-scale invasion, I was a co-founder and director of the organisation «Insha» in Kherson, - says Maryna Usmanova. - Since 2014, it has been protecting the rights of women and LGBT community representatives. We organised informative events, training sessions for police and local authorities and advocated for the opening of a shelter for victims of domestic violence.

During the occupation, we evacuated people from the Kherson region. We managed to evacuate over 300 people: LGBT community representatives, activists, journalists and military wives. Those for whom staying meant death

The charity organisation «Insha» and the team of the NGO «Projector» jointly documented war crimes against LGBT+ individuals on the then-occupied and later liberated territory of the Kherson region. Instances of brutal abuse by Russian soldiers were recorded. «Rainbow» symbols on phones or tattoos were signals for humiliation, mockery, violence and murder.

According to the NGO «Projector» report, Russian soldiers deliberately sought out LGBT community members. For example, there is evidence that Russian soldiers forced men to undress, checked smartphones for same-sex dating apps and severely beat them for it. Aleksandr was detained at a checkpoint by Russian soldiers, pushed into their van and taken to a temporary detention facility just because he was part of the LGBT+ community. He was beaten initially in the facility. Then a red dress was brought, and he was forced to wear it. In this dress, he was taken to an interrogation with an FSB officer. Aleksandr’s answers displeased the Russians, so he was added to a list and kept under arrest. According to him, being on this list «allowed» the guards to beat him, torture him with electric shocks, force him to eat the Ukrainian flag and more. Sexual violence was common in the facility. Medical care was not provided, detainees were fed once a day, and access to a shower was granted only to those who «deserved» it. To get permission for a shower, guards forced detainees into sexual acts. Aleksandr was held captive for 64 days. He was released but ordered to sing the Russian anthem every morning for ten days in a row while being watched from another building with binoculars to ensure compliance.

And there are countless such examples.

- Now the «Insha» organisation is still active, and part of the community still lives in Kherson, - continues Maryna Usmanova. - For instance, we received a grant for an initiative to provide the city with bicycles. Kherson currently has problems with public transport, and walking around the city is unsafe. So we purchased bicycles, brought them to Kherson and distributed them to those in need. Another initiative of ours is the evacuation of art objects. We managed to save many valuable exhibits.

But staying in Kherson was far too dangerous for me, and I had to leave. In the city, I was a public activist. I was invited to appear on television and radio. At the same time, the registered address of our organisation was effectively my home. It was not difficult to find me as an LGBT activist. Moreover, before the full-scale invasion, an advocacy campaign for the crisis centre was conducted, and billboards featuring, among others, my face were displayed throughout the city. If you googled «Kherson LGBT», the system would provide plenty of information about me.

As I later learned, they were looking for me. So, if I had not left, I probably would not be speaking with you now.

«Everyone needs their own community. Especially Ukrainians at this time»

- We ended up in Berlin «via Australia». In the sense that a Kherson activist we knew, who had moved to Australia long ago, helped us find people in Berlin willing to assist us.

We were housed in an anarchist commune. There were seven of us, plus a cat and a Malamute dog. All of us lived in one room for eight months. But it was far from the worst option, and we are very grateful. Anarchists are saints (laughs, - Edit.).

Once we adapted, we began meeting with other activists. One day, along with Loki von Dorn, we decided that we wanted to establish our own organisation.

Now, the Kwitne Queer community comprises over 100 people. We are the only organisation for queer Ukrainians in Western Europe. We meet approximately once a week to discuss plans, organise discussions, lectures, mutual support groups, play «Mafia» and celebrate holidays together. Everyone needs their own community, especially Ukrainians at this time.

After all, you might come to a supposedly friendly place, and then you are confronted with unfriendly questions about politics as a Ukrainian: «Why is your Zelensky fighting with Russia?» And often, these questions are not from Russians but from people from Kazakhstan or Azerbaijan. It is clear that after such questions, it is difficult to consider such a community your own.

One of our important projects is «Your Friendly Interpreter». Each of us occasionally needs to visit doctors, government institutions, job centres and so on. However, Ukrainians still largely do not know German. How then can one explain to a gynaecologist, for example, that despite someone having a beard, they have female reproductive organs? There are many issues where it is impossible to be effective without an interpreter.

In Germany, there are charity foundations that provide free interpreters, such as the «Caritas» organisation. But. First of all, it is a religious organisation. Secondly, they mostly provide Ukrainians with Russian interpreters. Because there are many of them. And you cannot choose your own interpreter because it is a free service.

Imagine a transgender person going to a gynaecologist accompanied by a homophobic, Ukrainophobic elderly woman interpreter. I once went to a therapist in the company of just such a person. She told me that «all Ukrainians are Banderites» and so on, following the well-known Russian narratives

That is why we came up with a solution: a person goes to the doctor, calls our Ukrainian interpreter via Telegram from there, and they translate on speakerphone. We already have five specialists, and experience shows that this option is much more comfortable than what local charity foundations offer. This service is very popular with us.

One of my dreams and goals is to have my own shelter or social apartment - a queer hostel. Berlin has a huge housing problem. From time to time, people find themselves on the streets. They need a safe place to get through difficult times or a gap between housing contracts.

Every year, we participate in the Berlin Pride, one of the largest in Europe. Ukrainian Ambassador to Germany Oleksii Makeiev joins the Ukrainian column, delivers a speech, and last year, the Mayor of Berlin Kai Wegner spoke from our float.

Does Berlin have problems with homophobia? At the legislative level, everything is excellent. But on the level of personal communication - not always. Germans have already learned that homophobia is bad, that it makes you appear at least uneducated. But in Berlin, Germans have long been less than half the population. Many people from other countries bring their homophobia with them.

«I chose Berlin because I felt safe here»

Another co-founder of Kwitne Queer, Loki von Dorn, a non-binary person, human rights advocate, activist and actor, shares:

- Even before the full-scale invasion, I broke my leg - and the fracture was quite serious, with fragments. When the war began, because of my leg, I could not join the Territorial Defence or even a volunteer headquarters - they would not take me. In March, I finally had surgery, and an implant was placed to fix the bone. Fighter jets were flying over the city of Dnipro at that time. I lay there thinking I would not even have time to hide if the Russians started bombing.

At the end of May, I decided to leave. I went to Germany because I had many acquaintances there, although, in the end, it was new acquaintances who helped me. I chose Berlin because it is the most welcoming to queer people. Here I felt safe. Berlin reminds me of my favourite cities in Ukraine: a bit of Dnipro, a bit of Odesa, and a bit of Kyiv.

I had no money, did not know the language, and the documents took a long time to process. My housing was only for a month. In six months, I changed the roof over my head eight times. Sometimes I slept on the floor. Despite this, I adapted quickly and immediately started looking for activities.

It is hard for creative professionals to find work in Berlin. Because here, every other person is an «artist». You are not competitive here due to the vast number of people like you

As a professional activist, I sought opportunities primarily in this direction. I had known Maryna Usmanova from Ukraine. In Berlin, I attended events she organised for the Ukrainian queer community. And one day at the end of 2022, we decided to create an organisation for Ukrainians who found themselves here because of the war.

In February 2023, we began the process of registering Kwitne Queer. We wrote the charter, submitted the documents, and only in August 2024 did we receive official non-profit organisation status. Until then, we worked as volunteers. Registering your non-profit organisation in Germany is not easy at all. For example, we are still waiting for our account to be set up, without which we cannot receive grants or spend grant money.

Our main mission is to support equal opportunities and inclusion for queer Ukrainians in Germany, facilitating their interaction. We all need support. Because sometimes you cannot predict the criterion by which you will be discriminated against: whether for being queer, a refugee or Ukrainian.

Recently, we were formally accepted into the Alliance of Ukrainian Organisations. Interestingly, the Ukrainian Orthodox Church is among the members of this alliance. They were not against it. Along with other organisations in the Alliance, we share a space where we can host our events.

At the time of this article's publication, the Kwitne Queer organisation officially opened an account in a German bank, received a grant from one of Berlin's district centres, and launched an official website. So, new initiatives lie ahead.

The West had all the tools to foresee Russia's war against Ukraine - and chose to ignore them. Even before 2014, analysis reached NATO's highest offices: the annexation of Crimea, the threat to Mariupol, the Russian Federation's dominance in the Black Sea. The forecasts were accurate, but most member states opted for the illusion of partnership with the Kremlin.

Are changes still possible? What is required to achieve them? And can NATO remain an effective security alliance in a new era of threats? These and other questions were addressed in an interview with Sestry by Dr Stefanie Babst - one of the most influential security strategists in Europe, who worked at NATO for over 20 years, including as Head of the Strategic Foresight Team. Today, she is an independent analyst, the author of a book on the West's «blind spots» in its strategy toward Russia, and an active participant in international discussions on war, peace and security.

Ukraine, Russia and the strategic miscalculations of the West

Maryna Stepanenko: You led NATO's Strategic Foresight Team. How do you assess the West's ability to foresee Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine? Were there signals that were simply not heard, or perhaps deliberately ignored?

‍Stefanie Babst: There were many warnings that went unheeded. Allow me to explain. In international relations, it is crucial to accurately assess the mindset, capabilities and intentions of another actor. NATO failed to do this with Russia. As the Head of Strategic Foresight at the Alliance, I issued the first serious warning in 2013 - a few months before the annexation of Crimea. I presented an analysis outlining Russia's malicious intentions and its military preparations against Ukraine.

It was reviewed by the Secretary General and discussed with member states, but no action was taken

Some countries - the Baltic States and Poland - took the analysis seriously. Others - notably Germany, the United States and the United Kingdom - preferred to maintain the NATO-Russia partnership. From 2014 onwards, we intensified our analysis, forecasting actions such as the seizure of Mariupol, dominance in the Black Sea and the use of Donbas as a staging ground. These forecasts were presented at the highest levels, including the NATO Council, but were ultimately dismissed.

In 2015 and 2016, we broadened our focus to include China and its ties with Russia, offering future scenarios and forecasting so-called «black swans» - high-impact events that are hard to predict, seem unlikely but could have serious consequences if they occur. Again, many perceived this only as «intellectual exercises». Thus, NATO possessed the tools of foresight - and chose to ignore them. And that comes at a very high cost.

In your work, you call for a review of the West's strategy toward Russia. In your view, what «blind spots» remain in Western approaches - particularly regarding support for Ukraine?

Three years ago, I called for a powerful, multifaceted deterrence strategy to help Ukraine not just freeze the war but win it. I invoked George Kennan's Cold War approach, urging the use of all available instruments - economic, diplomatic and military - to push Russia out of Ukraine. But apart from some Baltic and Northern European countries, no one took this seriously.

NATO and the EU still lack a defined end goal. If Ukraine's victory were the objective, a corresponding strategy would have been developed

Instead, Western leaders underestimated Ukraine's resilience and failed to act decisively even after Russia crossed countless red lines. President Biden, despite his commitment to Ukraine, framed his approach around what the United States would not do: we will not provoke Russia, we will not give Ukrainians long-range weapons, we will not do this or that. This is not a strategy. Now, with Trump’s return, many European governments are passively hoping for a US-Russian agreement that merely freezes the war - something I believe is dangerous both for Ukraine and Europe.

My main criticism is the lack of political will in the West. Too many still see this as Russia's war against Ukrainians. But it is our war too

Stefanie, why do you think Europe failed to prepare effectively for Trump’s presidency?

Planning within NATO and European governments is often difficult, as politicians typically focus on short-term goals, usually only a month ahead. In times of emergency, particularly due to Washington's unpredictability, Europe must abandon crisis management mode and stop reacting to every event, such as a new tweet.

Europe must be firm with the United States, clearly communicating that their actions - including threats to countries like Canada and Denmark, withholding intelligence from Ukraine and halting cyber operations against Russia - are unacceptable. These decisions had deadly consequences, and member states should not be afraid to hold the United States accountable for violating the fundamental principles of the Washington Treaty.

Mark Rutte, the NATO Secretary General, recently visited Florida to meet President Trump, hoping to impress him with defence spending figures. He praised Trump’s leadership and even claimed that Trump had «broken the deadlock» in relations with Russia. However, this is detached from the reality of ongoing Russian attacks.

If the NATO Secretary General lacks a clear message, the best approach is silence, focusing on supporting member states and protecting them from any threat. We do not have time for empty words and political games.

Europeans must remain immune to American political theatre, focusing on strengthening defence capability and supporting Ukraine’s defence industry so it can resist Russian aggression

Migration and war

Germany is no longer the EU leader in asylum requests from South American and Middle Eastern refugees. At the same time, in the first quarter of 2025, applications from Ukrainians rose by 84 per cent. What does this indicate?

It is entirely understandable that many Ukrainians have chosen to leave their country for personal and professional reasons - this is natural, and no one should be blamed for it. But this migration has political consequences in Germany, particularly when far-right parties exploit it by portraying Ukrainian refugees as a burden on the social system, regardless of their skills or motivation. These sentiments are especially strong in eastern Germany, where parties like AfD and certain left-wing populist movements have gained support.

What concerns me is the lack of strong counteraction from the federal government in Berlin - clearer messaging and political leadership are needed

If more Ukrainians arrive, I hope the next government will take a positive stance, recognising that many of them can significantly contribute to the German workforce. This would mean reducing bureaucracy, accelerating integration and facilitating their employment. Whether this happens remains to be seen.

Continuing on this topic, in recent weeks, some districts in Germany have publicly declared that they can no longer accommodate Ukrainian refugees due to overburdened social systems. How do you assess these sentiments?

It is true that local communities across Germany still face difficulties in accommodating refugees - an issue that arose after Chancellor Merkel’s decision to open the borders, leading to a large influx of refugees from Syria, Afghanistan and other countries. Many municipalities remain overwhelmed by demands for housing, language training and integration support. However, Ukrainian refugees do not pose the same challenges.

Ukrainians generally integrate well, bring strong skills and education and do not contribute to social tensions

In contrast, some refugees from the Middle East struggle to adapt to liberal democratic norms, which fuels far-right narratives, particularly in eastern Germany. Parties like AfD and figures such as Sahra Wagenknecht exploit this, promoting anti-Ukrainian, pro-concession rhetoric that ignores the reality of Russian occupation.

Unfortunately, mainstream democratic parties are not doing enough to push them back. With growing support from American right-wing populists, such as those connected to Trump or Musk, this polarisation may deepen further, posing a serious threat to democratic cohesion in Europe.

Europe on the brink of war

Amid full-scale war in Ukraine, initiatives have emerged in Poland and Germany to prepare schoolchildren for emergencies. Does this indicate a deeper shift in Europe's security culture, where defence is no longer solely the army's responsibility, but that of the entire society?

Although some defence-related courses have begun in Germany, they remain insufficient, and the wider public remains largely unprepared - both mentally and physically - to play a defensive role.

Serious debates are now underway about reinstating military conscription, but surveys show that two-thirds of people aged 20 to 30 would refuse to serve, with many saying they would rather emigrate than defend the country.

This reflects a deeper issue: decades of political messaging have conditioned Germans to believe they live in peace, surrounded by allies, and need not prepare for conflict

As a result, Germany also lacks bunkers for emergencies, civil defence training and basic resilience measures for the population. Changing this mindset will require strong political leadership. Without it, the Bundeswehr will remain under-equipped and unable to contribute significantly to efforts such as a potential coalition in Ukraine.

We see civil defence becoming part of public policy, from educating children to testing alarm systems. Is Europe beginning to think seriously about its own resilience in the face of potential escalation beyond Ukraine?

Undoubtedly. Some countries, such as Finland, Sweden, Poland and the Baltic States, have prioritised both military capability and societal resilience in recent years. In cities such as Riga and Warsaw, the Russian threat is well understood. However, countries like Germany, Belgium, Portugal, France and others still view Russia’s war against Ukraine as a regional issue.

Fortunately, leaders such as Kaja Kallas are advocating for a long-term strategy against Russia. Since the start of Russia’s full-scale invasion, I have argued that we must prepare for a protracted conflict, as long as Putin’s regime remains in power, Russia will continue to pose a threat to Ukraine and the whole of Europe.

Strategic vision

Given your views on NATO's evolution and the need for a new coalition, potentially the so-called «coalition of the willing», how do you envisage its structure? What strategic or institutional frameworks will be important to effectively counter Russian aggression, considering internal challenges within NATO, particularly due to the influence of populist leaders, including Trump?

During my time at NATO, I was proud of my team’s ability to anticipate challenges before they emerged, especially regarding NATO’s enlargement. I was actively involved in the admission of new members, including the Baltic States, Slovenia and Slovakia.

One of the moments I had hoped to witness was seeing Ukraine’s flag at NATO headquarters, but I no longer believe that is a realistic goal

Instead, I believe Ukraine should focus on building a new coalition with like-minded countries, rather than pursuing NATO membership. The Alliance, particularly under the influence of destructive politics, is becoming increasingly divided.

If I were advising President Zelensky, I would recommend not wasting energy on NATO accession but rather focusing on strengthening a broader, more flexible alliance to counter Russian aggression. This would allow us to move beyond the status quo and prepare for the future.

Considering the current dynamics within NATO, how long do you think the Alliance can maintain its current structure before significant changes become inevitable? Do you have a timeframe in mind?

When President Trump was elected, I predicted he would undermine the rules-based order, and we are already seeing significant damage done to NATO, especially concerning the US commitments. European countries have started discussing enhancing the European pillar within NATO, planning to prepare for a potential US withdrawal within five to ten years. However, I believe that timeframe is overly optimistic - we may have only five to ten months before we witness new disruptions.

Looking back, it is clear NATO missed the opportunity to prepare for these challenges. In 2016, I prepared a document for the Secretary General outlining potential harm Trump could cause, but it was dismissed at the time. The issues I raised remain relevant today, and NATO's bureaucracy is too risk-averse to plan for unforeseen scenarios.

If the Alliance fails to act, it risks becoming a reactive organisation that merely responds to Trump’s tweets instead of proactively working toward the future

I hope that countries such as France, the United Kingdom and Northern European states will cooperate with Ukraine to create a new joint alliance capable of better confronting future challenges.

Cover photo: MANDEL NGAN/AFP/East News

This project is co-financed by the Polish-American Freedom Foundation under the «Support Ukraine» programme, implemented by the Education for Democracy Foundation

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<frame>"More knowledge, less fear" is the slogan of our new publication series. Safety is based on facts, verified information, and solid arguments. The more we know, the better we will be prepared for the future. <frame>

Is Poland ready for a crisis? In an era of geopolitical uncertainty, the war in Ukraine, and rising tensions across Europe, education and societal organisation are crucial. By welcoming over a million Ukrainian refugees, Poland has not only gained new residents but also unique knowledge and experience from people who have learned civil protection under the harshest conditions—under bombs and rocket fire. This is capital that must not be wasted. 

The new law on civil protection and civil defence, in force since January 1, is a concrete response to real threats. At the same time, it offers an opportunity for deeper integration, allowing Poles and Ukrainians living in Poland to prepare together for crises. 

Poland has learned from the tragic events of recent years. The new law emphasises three key areas: modernising and constructing shelters and hiding places, improving alarm and notification systems, and launching widespread civic education to ensure every citizen has basic knowledge of how to act during a crisis. The context of the war in Ukraine makes this even more urgent.

Many Ukrainians living in Poland have priceless experience in civil protection - whether as survivors, organisers, or leaders of evacuation and shelter operations.

This is an opportunity Poland must not miss. When war strikes, no system is ever fully ready. What matters then is how effectively we can use what we already have.

What can serve as a shelter? A practical approach to civil protection begins with this question. Knowledge—that is our first "shelter"!

According to the new law, every basement, underground garage, or tunnel can serve as a hiding place. It’s worth taking a moment to look around and ask yourself, "What would I do in case of danger?" 

It’s better to know in advance than to scramble during chaos. 

Here, the experience of Ukrainians in Poland becomes invaluable. Those who have survived bomb alerts can share practical knowledge with Poles, including how to organise life in shelters, secure water and food supplies, address the psychological aspects of survival, and utilise mobile alert apps that have become critical tools in Ukraine. This is not theory. These are real-life experiences from people who face the consequences of war every single day.
Their testimony is more valuable than any textbook could be. 

Education in this field is the key to safety. Poland must harness the knowledge of Ukrainians and launch a wide educational campaign as soon as possible. 
According to the new law, local governments and fire services will play a central role in civil protection. However, in practice, the system will only function effectively if hundreds of thousands of people are involved. 

Ukrainians who have faced real threats can become instructors, educators, and leaders of this change. NGOS are already playing a significant role in organising training for both Ukrainians and Poles. 

This will benefit everyone. Polish municipalities urgently need practitioners who understand the realities of crises.

Every citizen on the front lines.

The new law places local governments in charge of implementing the civil protection system, meaning the battle for the effectiveness of this law will be fought where Poles and Ukrainians live nearby. It is essential to acknowledge that women played a vital role in Ukraine’s civil protection efforts, from rescue workers and volunteers to leaders of humanitarian organisations. They ensured survival amid chaos. 

In Poland, too, women can become the driving force behind such changes, joining local governments, NGOS, and educational teams. 

Is Poland ready for a crisis and civil protection?

Poland is better prepared today than it was a few years ago. The new law represents a significant step forward, but infrastructure alone will not be sufficient.

What will truly matter is the genuine engagement of citizens in education and crisis response, the effective application of Ukrainian experience, and practical cooperation among local governments, NGOS, and the central government.

Today, Poland is in a better situation than a few years ago. The new law is an important step, but one infrastructure is not enough. The real involvement of citizens in training and the elimination of the consequences of emergencies, the wise use of Ukrainians' experience and effective cooperation between local governments, organizations and the government will be crucial.

This isn’t a Hollywood disaster movie scenario. It’s reality—a reality we must understand and prepare for.  In the 21st century, security isn’t just about armies; it’s about conscious, organised societies. And building them starts with education—education based on facts, not fearmongering. 

Security is our shared responsibility.

It’s not just the domain of the state. It’s not something the government can "provide" like a service.  It’s something we build and give to each other.  Of course, institutions, regulations, alarm systems, and shelters are vital. But what truly determines survival during a crisis is people—their relationships, willingness to help, ability to act under stress, and the awareness that, in challenging moments, we are not alone. 
Every one of us is part of the security system—from the teacher who teaches first aid, to the neighbour who knows the nearest shelter location, to the volunteer who helps newly arrived refugees adjust to a new reality. 

The strength of a nation lies in the strength of its society—and society is strong when its members know they can count on one another. 

In the past, those who realised that the best defence wasn’t walls or bunkers, but well-prepared, united people, were the ones who prevailed.  In Ukraine, social mobilisation saved thousands of lives.  In Poland, we have a chance to learn from this experience before a crisis forces us to.

Negotiations in Riyadh, agreements on navigation in the Black Sea, and now the White House's attempts to achieve a truce by April 20th - all these steps create the illusion of diplomatic progress. But is this truly a step towards peace or another political manoeuvre?

Russia, despite its promises, continues to attack Ukraine’s energy infrastructure. The West, meanwhile, is considering easing sanctions against the Russian agricultural sector, even though Moscow has made no concessions. All this is happening against the backdrop of the Trump administration’s attempts to use the war for its own geopolitical game.

Does the White House have a clear strategy, or is it merely an attempt to secure a «success» before Easter? Is diplomacy turning into a tool for weakening sanctions that ultimately benefits the Kremlin? This is the subject of an exclusive interview with John Bolton - American Republican politician, diplomat and former National Security Advisor to Donald Trump (2018-2019).

The negotiation process

‍Maryna Stepanenko: Last week, we saw another round of negotiations in Riyadh. How would you assess their progress?

‍John Bolton: Certain agreements were reached regarding a ceasefire in the Black Sea in terms of the conditions under which commercial vessels may freely cross the Black Sea without being attacked. Commercial vessels must not be used for military purposes. And I believe we have generally returned to what was being discussed with Turkey back in 2022.

This may be progress, but I believe Russia is as interested in this as Ukraine, so that they can transport part of their agricultural products. I do not believe this necessarily guarantees progress in ceasing hostilities on land or towards a more comprehensive ceasefire, let alone a final settlement.

We witnessed Russia breaking its promise to stop strikes on Ukrainian energy infrastructure. Moreover, the attacks have not only continued but intensified. Now we have agreements aimed at ensuring safe navigation in the Black Sea and preventing the use of commercial vessels for military purposes. How can the United States guarantee that Russia will honour any agreements, given its history of violating international commitments?

I do not believe any guarantees exist. That is precisely why President Zelenskyy is so adamant about security guarantees - he understands Russia’s track record all too well.

An agreement can be reached on almost anything, but a Russian signature will not prevent a third invasion if Moscow decides to launch it

Many of these errors were made in 2014, ultimately leading to Russia’s second invasion. But the damage has been done, and the idea that the simple signing of a document ensures lasting peace and stability is fundamentally flawed - especially if the agreement leaves certain territories in Russian hands, making it inherently inadequate.

The United States announced its intention to support the resumption of Russian exports of agricultural products and fertilisers, including by lowering maritime insurance costs and improving access to ports and payment systems. Does this not contradict existing sanctions policy, particularly given the lack of Russian concessions toward achieving real peace?

Yes, I believe this reflects a relaxation of sanctions that provides Russia with more economic opportunities than it previously had, without any clear justification. Ukraine has been relatively successful in exporting its agricultural products from Odesa via the Dardanelles and the Bosphorus.

I am not certain it will truly benefit from this agreement. It offers certain assurances that vessels will not become targets, but ultimately, the real beneficiary of the Black Sea deal may very well be Russia.

Does this initiative not set a precedent whereby Moscow can use diplomatic negotiations as a tool to ease sanctions without altering its aggressive policies?

Russia's short-term diplomatic strategy is quite clear: to lift as many restrictions and as much pressure as possible while continuing to wage war, particularly as they believe the battlefield dynamics favour them.

Their primary objective is to ease the economic pressure they are facing. Although this pressure has not been as severe as it could have been, it is still significant enough to prompt them to seek relief

The real question is why the United States should provide such relief if Russia is not changing its behaviour. If they are not making meaningful concessions on a ceasefire or demonstrating genuine intent to end the war, then there is no justification for reducing pressure. Thus far, they have shown no signs of doing either.

Peace by Easter

The White House is seeking to broker a ceasefire agreement by April 20th, which this year coincides with Easter for both Catholics and Orthodox Christians. In your opinion, does the Trump administration have a specific strategy for this?

No, I do not believe there is a specific strategy. At best, Trump has moved from claiming he could resolve the war in a single day to postponing the timeline to April. By Easter, there may be a declaration of progress so that he can claim success, but I would be very surprised if a comprehensive ceasefire were achieved by then.

As I see it, the Kremlin does not consider a ceasefire to be in its interests. They are willing to humour Trump because they have already secured major concessions from him on long-term matters - no full restoration of Ukraine’s sovereignty and territorial integrity, no NATO membership and no NATO security guarantees. The Russians do not wish to risk losing these advantages. Therefore, while they may engage in negotiations, there is no real indication that they intend to alter their long-term objectives.

US Special Representative Steve Witkoff identified the greatest obstacle to resolving the war in Ukraine as the status of Crimea and the four regions of mainland Ukraine occupied by Russia, calling them the «elephant in the room» in peace negotiations. Are there realistic scenarios for reclaiming these territories? What diplomatic, military or economic instruments might support this aim?

I believe there are alternatives, but they will likely involve a protracted war. The key issue is whether Ukraine can continue to fight if the United States again suspends military assistance. That is the leverage Trump possesses.

As for Witkoff, I believe he is frequently influenced by Russian propaganda, and what you have just mentioned is a prime example of that

The four regions and Crimea were not some internal issue - they were the targets of unprovoked Russian aggression both in 2014 and 2022. If anything, they are Russia’s problem, not Ukraine’s.

US National Security Advisor Mike Waltz proposed the idea of beginning negotiations to freeze front lines «where they currently stand». What consequences might this have?

Well, I am very concerned. One of the main issues I have with a ceasefire is that if it is declared along the current lines of contact and negotiations begin in Geneva, Vienna or even Riyadh, that line of ceasefire could quickly become a de facto border.

The longer the negotiations drag on, the more Russia will work to consolidate its presence - establishing administrative structures, integrating the occupied territories into its governance system and treating them as though they are part of Russia.

Eventually, they will claim that returning these territories is impossible. That is why I believe a ceasefire in this context poses a serious risk for Ukraine

Trump and Putin - a reset in relations

Russia speaks frequently of resetting relations with the United States. Is this realistic? What are the long-term security implications for the United States and NATO of Trump's growing trust in Putin?

Putin manipulates Trump with remarkable ease, relying on his KGB training and clear understanding of Russia’s strategic interests. Unlike him, Trump appears not to recognise any significant American interests in this situation.

He is willing to abandon Ukraine’s position because it simply does not matter to him

Trump sees his relationship with Putin as personal, believing that if he gets along with the Russian leader, then US-Russian relations must be strong. But Putin does not view it that way. This overly simplistic and naive approach to foreign policy - where everything is reduced to personal dynamics - is precisely what Putin exploits to achieve his own goals at Ukraine’s expense.

Recently, Bild published a rather dramatic report suggesting that Russia might invade Lithuanian territory as early as this autumn. How realistic is this scenario?

From a military standpoint, Russia could attempt such an operation, perhaps to secure a corridor to the Kaliningrad exclave. However, I do not think it is likely. Putin is eyeing several other parts of the former Soviet Union - Central Asia, the Caucasus and Moldova - where he might see opportunities to reassert Russian control.

If a ceasefire were reached in Ukraine, I believe he would prioritise these regions over the far riskier step of a direct invasion of NATO territory

However, if Trump continues to weaken NATO, Putin may eventually decide the risk is worth taking.

How would a potential US retreat from active European engagement under Trump affect the regional balance of power, and could the EU compensate for this security vacuum?

I believe that a US withdrawal from NATO would be a catastrophic mistake for both the United States and Europe.

Even a significant weakening of the Alliance would have serious consequences. Putin understands this well

He knows Trump is only in office for four years, and he may see this as an opportunity. Encouraging Trump to take steps that weaken or even dismantle NATO could bring long-term benefits for Russia. But Putin also realises that this window will not last forever - he cannot count on more than four years. That is why he is trying to manipulate Trump, seeking through diplomacy and political influence to achieve what the Russian military has so far failed to accomplish in Ukraine.

Given the current tensions in relations between Canada and the US - something few could have predicted - do you believe Canada might strengthen its cooperation with Europe to form a NATO-like alliance without the United States, in order to enhance European security?

Canada may attempt to do so, but it would be a serious mistake - for Canada, for Europe and for all interested parties. If the United States withdraws from NATO or if Europe effectively pushes the United States out, it will be a major blunder. Despite the damage that Trump has already caused and may yet cause, we must take a long-term perspective. He has 46 months left in office, but security relations between Europe and the United States will endure for decades. During the Cold War, one of Russia’s key objectives was to divide the West, but it never succeeded.

We now risk doing this to ourselves. It is absolutely vital to avoid that

It will not be easy with Trump, but we must remain focused on the long-term objective.

Trump’s approval ratings and another scandal in his administration

Although Trump's approval rating is at a personal high, it still remains below the 50 per cent threshold, and a slight majority of voters (51 per cent) currently disapprove of his performance. How focused is the American public on the White House's policy regarding Ukraine? Is there potential for public pressure on Trump to continue military support for Kyiv?

I still believe that is possible. Trump's approval ratings are declining, but for years, people have noted that he has what is often referred to as a «high floor and low ceiling» - meaning his ratings tend to remain within a narrow range.

At the same time, although Trump is the newly elected president, he is also a «lame duck» president, as he cannot run for a third term. This means his approval ratings could fall even further during a second term than they did during the first.

It is unclear how events will unfold, but for now, his ratings are gradually declining. If tariff uncertainty continues to affect the economy, this trend may persist.

Mr Bolton, during Donald Trump's first term, you served as his National Security Advisor. What was your initial reaction when you learned about the scandal involving the addition of The Atlantic’s editor-in-chief Jeffrey Goldberg to a closed chat where the topic of a US military strike on Yemen was discussed? What does such a precedent signify?

It was truly shocking. I cannot imagine why anyone would even consider using an unsecured, non-government communication channel. Signal is unlikely to replace the highly secure network that the US government has spent vast sums to develop over many years. No one has offered a reasonable explanation for this - because, frankly, I do not believe one exists. This is a serious issue for the Trump administration. We shall have to wait and see whether it dissipates or not.

But one thing is clear - when high-ranking American officials act so recklessly, it only encourages America’s adversaries to intensify their espionage efforts

During our conversation, you emphasised that Trump’s time in office is limited to four years and that he will eventually leave the White House. Do you believe JD Vance might be a contender to succeed him in the future? What would such a figure in the White House mean for America, the world and global security?

It is far from certain that he will even receive the Republican nomination. His chances will largely depend on how popular the Trump administration is two to two-and-a-half years from now. If the economy slips into recession due to tariffs, it will damage anyone associated with Trump's presidency.

Meanwhile, although the Democratic Party has shown little momentum in the four months since the election, it may field a strong candidate in 2028. There are no guarantees that Vance will win the nomination or become president.

Historically, only two vice presidents have been elected president immediately after their vice-presidential terms: George H. W. Bush in 1988 and, before him, Martin Van Buren in the early 19th century. It is a rare occurrence. Some vice presidents have won presidential elections later in their careers, but direct successors to the president they served with are extremely rare.

This project is co-financed by the Polish-American Freedom Foundation under the «Support Ukraine» programme, implemented by the Education for Democracy Foundation

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A herald of apocalypse or a much-needed disruptor of the current world order? Donald Trump spent his first three weeks as US president in turbo mode. Dozens of decisions and executive orders, even more statements and extended interviews - he has dominated the global news space and is ready for decisive action.

The absolute priority of the new Administration is ending the war in Ukraine. Is a swift peace possible, and how long-lasting might it be? Senior fellow and adviser at the Centre for European Policy Analysis (CEPA), British writer and journalist Edward Lucas answered these and other questions in an exclusive interview with Sestry.

A spring truce

Maryna Stepanenko: According to The Independent, Donald Trump wants to end the war in Ukraine by spring. How realistic is such a plan?

Edward Lucas: I do not think even Trump himself seriously believes he can end the war by spring. He may be able to initiate some negotiations. Perhaps he will manage to alter the current parameters of the war, but he will not end it.

The US president has repeatedly stated that he will exert pressure on Moscow, including through sanctions, should the Kremlin refuse to negotiate. We can see that the first threat - lowering the price of oil - has already begun to materialise. Trump said that reducing prices would affect Putin’s ability to finance the war. How effective could this approach be, considering Russia’s ability to diversify its energy exports, for example, to China or India?

A collapse in oil prices is a good idea in terms of increasing economic pressure on Putin. However, I doubt that it will be a decisive factor. I think the Russian economy has demonstrated remarkable resilience, both in terms of physical endurance against Ukrainian attacks on infrastructure and in terms of its export stability, import substitution capability, and overall ability to cope with sanctions. Thus, I would be surprised if low oil prices forced Putin to the negotiating table in a weak position. Nevertheless, I still consider it a good move.

Do you believe that Trump’s «carrot-and-stick» strategy - combining pressure on Moscow with open offers of negotiations - could force Putin to make concessions?

It is possible if you have the right sticks and the right carrots, but I am not an optimist.

I believe there is a significant risk of wishful thinking. It is entirely possible that Putin will irritate Trump to such an extent that the latter will return to supporting Ukraine with all the necessary weaponry, apply real pressure on Russia, and deal the Kremlin a decisive defeat on the battlefield. We would all be delighted by this, but I think the chances of it happening are rather low.

It is more likely that America will huff and puff but will not fundamentally change the situation. I think it is quite probable that Trump will tell the Europeans: «If you are so concerned about Ukraine, then fix the situation yourselves». Meaning they will have to provide more money and weapons instead of coming to the United States expecting Washington to solve all their problems.

This fully aligns with Trump’s worldview. He needs one major deal in the coming months because he wants to receive the Nobel Peace Prize. And this could be a deal that at least temporarily halts Russia’s war against Ukraine

However, it could also be a deal between the Israelis and major Arab states, particularly Saudi Arabia. Thus, he is searching for a large-scale agreement, but it does not necessarily have to involve Ukraine. And I believe that a peace deal concerning Ukraine will be much harder to achieve than one in the Middle East.

So, if the new Administration fails to make progress in resolving the war in Ukraine in the coming months, what are the most likely scenarios? Could Washington lose interest? 

If Trump does not consider European security important for America and believes that Europeans should handle it themselves, then Ukraine, as a key issue of European security, may fall out of his agenda.

Europeans will have to make considerable efforts to convince Trump of Europe’s importance, as he perceives it rather negatively and seeks to exert pressure for economic and business reasons

Could one imagine Trump addressing Congress to request another 100 billion dollars for Ukraine? It is not impossible, but it is unlikely. Therefore, large volumes of American aid for Ukraine this year seem unrealistic. 

At the same time, Putin believes he has the advantage on the battlefield and that the West is losing unity. He sees a gradual decline in morale in Ukraine and is not inclined to negotiate. If he is convinced he can win by military means, why would he agree to talks? 

Coincidentally, in Putin’s recent statements, we hear that Russia is supposedly ready for negotiations. The Russian president is also flattering Trump, speaking about his «good relations» with the current US president. What signals is Moscow thus sending to the White House? 

I do not consider Putin an idiot. And he knows it is important not to offend Trump. Of course, he will say he is ready for negotiations. 

However, I do not believe that Russia currently sees a need for serious negotiations. I suspect that Putin will sit at the negotiating table and say: «We want a demilitarised Ukraine. We want guarantees that you will never join NATO». And another two or three demands, including the incorporation of temporarily occupied territories into Russia. 

Would Trump consider this unacceptable? Perhaps not. Would Ukrainians consider it unacceptable? Almost certainly. Would Europeans be willing to support Ukrainians in their continued resistance? Possibly. But I am not sure.

But I believe that this is the most likely scenario. From Ukraine’s perspective, we will see quite an unreasonable negotiating position from Putin. And this is not the same as the beginning of real negotiations

What can Ukraine do?

Trump has said he is ready to meet with Putin at any time. Is there a risk that Ukraine’s fate could be decided behind Kyiv’s back? 

There is always a risk of another Yalta (referring to the Yalta Conference of 1945, when the leaders of the USA (Roosevelt), the UK (Churchill) and the USSR (Stalin) determined the post-war world order, effectively dividing Europe into spheres of influence, leading to Soviet control over Eastern Europe, - Edit.). Trump may want to humiliate Europe and declare that he has decided everything, forcing others to accept his deal.

To prevent this, Ukraine and Europe must act as one entity and clearly state that they will not accept an agreement between Trump and Putin

Even if the US steps aside, Ukraine must demonstrate that it will continue to fight. This alone will strengthen its negotiating position. However, there are two realities: diplomatic manoeuvres and the situation on the battlefield. What happens at the negotiating table depends on events at the front. 

Ukraine is rightly asking its partners to guarantee its security to prevent another Russian attack should an agreement on a ceasefire be reached. Given the painful experience of the Budapest Memorandum, what should new guarantees for Ukraine look like, and what could ensure their real enforcement?

This is the key question: is a genuine truce possible, and how can Ukraine’s security and development be ensured? This requires strong military and security guarantees, but paper agreements do not work. NATO is not ready to accept Ukraine, and the deployment of 40-60 thousand troops to monitor the truce seems unrealistic. 

An alternative could be providing Ukraine with high-tech weaponry - for example, Taurus or Tomahawk missiles. But is the West truly ready to allow Ukraine to use them at its own discretion? This is a major question. 

My pessimistic forecast is that there will be a truce, but without reliable security. Russia will test these guarantees, they will prove weak, and the situation will eventually become even worse

The «Axis of Evil»

As soon as Trump concludes a peace agreement, a race between Russia and the West to prepare their armies for the next conflict will begin, - writes The Times, citing sources. Given the economic sanctions and the depletion of resources due to the prolonged war against Ukraine, will Russia be capable of competing with the West in modernising its armed forces? Could the Kremlin find support from a «new axis of aggressors» for this?

It is worth remembering that, ultimately, Russia has an economy comparable to or slightly smaller than Italy’s. And they have paid a terrible price for the first three years of the war. However, predictions of Russia’s economic collapse have turned out to be wishful thinking. 

Putin still has many options, both in terms of economic resilience and mobilisation. And as long as Russians believe this is an existential struggle for their country’s future, they will endure pain and sacrifices. Moreover, I think Putin sees that the West is still very weak, and he now has a great opportunity to capitalise on military successes in Ukraine, advance further, and possibly return after a ceasefire to completely eradicate the remnants of Ukrainian resistance, taking advantage of these, I fear, weak security guarantees.

He also has an opportunity to toy with NATO and the weakness of the Alliance’s northeastern flank, particularly in the Baltic states, where we still lack proper defences. There are plans, but no adequate defence capabilities. This is a very tempting target.

And it is not difficult to imagine that by the end of this year or next - Putin could secure a massive victory in Ukraine and dismantle NATO, making the economic and other pains caused by such a victory worthwhile.

Could a scenario arise in which Trump pressures China to, in turn, influence Russia into signing a deal with Ukraine?

China has a unique ability both to pressure and support Russia. But is Beijing interested in US mediation, after which Trump would take all the credit? Perhaps, if Beijing secures its own benefits.

However, China has no experience in international diplomacy that would suggest an ability to broker major deals. It prefers when Western countries ask it to influence Russia - this gives Beijing additional leverage

Given the trade disputes between the US and China, it is unlikely that Xi Jinping will consider providing Trump with a geopolitical favour regarding Ukraine a priority. 

Is there a tool for long-term containment of Russia? 

The only long-term hope is the transformation of Russia from an empire into a peaceful state. If this happens, resolving other problems will become significantly easier. However, as long as Russia remains imperial, the threats will not disappear.

NATO is no longer an effective response - it is too large, slow, and divided. Coalitions of countries that understand the threat and are ready to contain Russia in different regions are needed. This process should have begun 10-15 years ago. Now we are late, and perhaps even too late.

‍Do you believe that a coalition of willing countries could provide security guarantees for Ukraine? If NATO is not an option, could countries such as the United Kingdom, Germany and France collaborate by deploying their troops in Ukraine to prevent further Russian aggression? 

A coalition of allies could theoretically deploy troops in Ukraine as a deterrent force, but what happens when the time comes to actually use it? Are the United Kingdom, France, Germany, and Poland ready to go to war with Russia over an Odesa blockade or a new offensive? 

It is doubtful. To make guarantees truly reliable, 100 thousand troops would be needed, similar to West Germany during the Cold War. Europe does not have such resources - even 50 or 10 thousand would be hard to find. 

European allies and NATO simply lack the capacity to mobilise the massive forces necessary to defend Ukraine. They could protect Ukraine through modern weaponry.

Theoretically, nuclear weapons could be placed on the frontline in Ukraine as a guarantee

However, this is associated with enormous political challenges, and I am not sure they are ready for such a level of risk. Without sufficient strength and willingness to take risks, providing truly effective security guarantees is extremely difficult. 

The future of Putin’s Russia

Russia propagates the narrative that its economy is immune to Western sanctions. The EU claims this is untrue. How do you assess the situation inside Russia? How much longer can Moscow sustain its war against Ukraine under current sanctions pressure? 

We tend to engage in wishful thinking when speaking about Russia. It has managed to mobilise its resources, even at a tremendous cost to its own future. The economy is suffering serious blows, financial system problems are accumulating, including a rise in bad loans in the private sector. Yet, despite this, Russia continues to wage war. 

We want it to collapse, so we are inclined to believe it is already happening. However, Russia continues to find ways to sustain the war: it receives drones from Iran, recruits troops from North Korea, and circumvents sanctions through China. Moreover, it still has unused resources. 

Future generations of Russians will be forced to pay for Putin’s imperial ventures. But at the moment, Russia is not backed into a corner. It is likely to endure for at least another one or two years, and even if the situation becomes critical, the Kremlin will find ways to adapt.

Has the West exhausted its imagination regarding sanctions? Are there still powerful tools that have not yet been applied? 

Of course. We have not even used all available options. The West is looking for sanctions that will strike Russia without causing pain to itself. That is why we restrict pipeline oil and gas imports but not liquefied natural gas. We block crude oil supplies but not petroleum products. As a result, sanctions create difficulties for Russia but also open up a business model for those who help circumvent them - from Russians to businessmen in Dubai. 

I would impose strict secondary sanctions, particularly against the «shadow fleet», bankers, lawyers and accountants who facilitate the evasion of restrictions. For example, I would strip them of visa-free entry to the US, Europe, and Britain. If you are a lawyer or trader in Dubai engaged in sanction evasion schemes, then to travel to the West, you will now have to queue at consulates alongside students, nannies, and asylum seekers.

A comfortable life for such people must come to an end

There are still many possibilities, but political will is lacking. And Putin sees this. Ultimately, the West has grown tired, frightened, and distracted - and Ukraine is paying the price. This fills me with both sorrow and anger. 

What might Russia’s economy look like in 5-10 years if international isolation continues? 

In the long term, Russia is increasingly turning into a dependent vassal of China. Chinese companies are buying up assets for next to nothing, investing in strategic sectors, and Russia’s economy is becoming ever more oriented towards exports to China. Trade and investment ties between the countries are only strengthening. In the end, Russia risks becoming a raw material appendage of the Chinese Communist Party - hardly the future Putin promised his citizens.

Cover photo: Deposit/East News 

The project is co-financed by the Polish-American Freedom Foundation under the «Support Ukraine» programme, implemented by the «Education for Democracy» Foundation

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