«Trump is ready to give Russia everything it wants». Keir Giles on the risks of the new American policy towards Moscow

Kaja Puto: History shows that war is an opportunity for the emancipation of women. During the Second World War, European women began to work in industries previously dominated by men, such as railways and the military sector. Are we witnessing something similar in Ukraine today?

Liliya Faskhutdinova: Undoubtedly. Sectors where men previously dominated are now lacking workforce, and more and more women are being employed in them. This is due to the fact that many men are fighting on the frontlines, and thousands have already died there. Some have also refused to work because they are hiding from mobilisation.

You can increasingly see women behind the wheel of a bus or truck, in a mine or on a construction site. However, I would not call this emancipation. Women in Ukraine have been economically active since Soviet times, as employment was mandatory then. After the collapse of the USSR, wages became too low to survive on one income. Therefore, I see it differently: the war has made society more open to women taking on more diverse roles in the labour market.

It also works the other way around, because some men have taken up jobs in sectors dominated by women, such as education. This protects them from conscription, as teachers are considered critically important to the state and are not subject to mobilisation. Perhaps this is not the noblest motivation, but likely some of these teachers will remain in the profession after the war. This could have a positive impact on the gender balance among staff in Ukrainian schools.

And what about politics? Women play a huge role in the Ukrainian volunteer community, which supports the army and state institutions. This community enjoys public trust, which may translate into political success after the war. Are new female leaders already emerging?

Undoubtedly, after the war, new faces will appear in politics, and among them will be volunteers. However, I am not certain that they will be primarily women. Society is aware of the enormous contribution they make to volunteering - helping to raise funds for military equipment, medical supplies and so on. A certain image of the female volunteer has been entrenched in the collective imagination: an older woman weaving camouflage nets for soldiers. However, she usually remains unnamed. In my view, the most recognisable volunteers are men. They are the ones most often awarded and interviewed, and whose faces are known.

Recently, I asked my acquaintances whether they could name any female volunteers. Almost no one could. But everyone knows Serhiy Prytula or Vasyl Baidak. War or no war - it is harder for women to be recognised. Nevertheless, the trend of female activism in Ukrainian politics is on the rise. In the 2000s, women accounted for less than 10 per cent of parliamentarians, now it is over 20 per cent. This may be helped by the quotas introduced in 2019 in electoral lists. We have not had the opportunity to verify this, as no elections have taken place since the Russian invasion, except for local government elections.

Quotas were introduced to bring Ukrainian legislation closer to EU standards in the field of women's rights. Is this argument still convincing for Ukrainian society?

Yes. Ukrainians generally have an idealistic view of the West and want to be part of it. This makes it easier to promote progressive values. Tolerance towards LGBTQI+ people is growing - for many Ukrainians, it seems, precisely because they want to be Europeans. They do not want to resemble Russians, who persecute homosexuals and at the same time decriminalise domestic violence.

We have discussed positive trends that give hope for progress in the field of Ukrainian women's rights. Unfortunately, war also brings dangers in this area.

What do you mean?

There is a risk that when men return from war, they will be so revered that women will be expected to forgive them everything, to show gratitude, to bear them children, even more so than before. In the traditional image, a woman is a protectress, a caring goddess, a martyr who patiently endures all the hardships of family life.

In my parents’ generation, many women supported their husbands even if they abused alcohol. They called their decisions care and responsibility

In Poland, this is the «matka Polka», who «carries her cross». Fortunately, this model is receding into the past.

In Ukraine, it had also begun to fade. But then the war came, and everything became more complicated. Men returning from war find it difficult to reintegrate into reality. They have seen death and cruelty, many suffer from post-traumatic stress disorder, some are prone to violence.

To this are added broken bonds. Long months on the frontline mean that you often feel a stronger connection with your comrades in the trenches than with your family. After returning, this can ruin your relationship with your wife. Mistrust and jealousy arise, suspicions such as: «You cheated while I was gone». I know cases where men at the start of the war wanted their women to go abroad, but now treat them as traitors.

It is hard for me to talk about this. I am infinitely grateful to all the soldiers who are defending my country. If they behave inappropriately as a result of their experiences - I know it is not their fault. My heart breaks when I think about what they have endured.

This is the fault of Russia, which invaded your country.

Yes, it is the fault of the aggressor. But we, Ukraine, cannot allow their suffering to cause additional suffering for women and children. We all suffer, men and women, and many of us will have psychological problems for the rest of our lives.

The war will also leave its mark on future generations. The task of the Ukrainian state, as well as Ukrainian society, is to mitigate these terrible consequences

Are you not afraid that such a campaign may be perceived negatively? Already during the war, Ukrzaliznytsia introduced women-only compartments on night trains. This provoked the outrage of many men: «We are risking our lives for you, and you make us out to be predators?»

Of course, it will be met with resistance. Not only from men, but also from women, especially those whose husbands are fighting or have already returned from the front. Many problems in the army are already very difficult to talk about - gratitude to soldiers makes them taboo topics. However, if we truly want to be a European rule-of-law state, we must learn to find solutions for these uncomfortable problems.

What problems do you mean?

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For example, sexual harassment in the army. I am not saying this is a widespread issue, but such cases do occur, and they must be condemned. When, at the beginning of the Russian invasion, a victim of such violence publicly shared her experience, some people responded very critically. They accused her of discrediting the Ukrainian armed forces and implied that women join the army to find a boyfriend. Fortunately, after three years of full-scale war, it has become somewhat easier to talk about problems. We no longer censor ourselves as we did at the beginning.

How can the state help veterans?

Helping veterans is one part - they need psychological support, as well as comprehensive programmes to facilitate their reintegration into civilian life. For some, it would be good to receive a grant to start their own business (such programmes already exist), while others need help with employment. We must not allow war veterans to sit idle at home. This also applies to those who became disabled on the frontlines.

However, support is also needed for families. When a soldier returns from war, they bear a huge burden. They do not know what to expect or how to respond. Moreover, I believe a campaign should be directed specifically at women along the lines of: «You have the right to leave, even if your husband is a hero». Nothing justifies living with an abuser.

Nevertheless, the position of Ukrainian servicewomen has generally improved since 2014...

Yes, absolutely. Previously, they could hardly hold combat positions. They fought on the frontlines, but were officially, for example, cooks. Today, such cases are exceptions. Ukrainian servicewomen are appreciated on a symbolic level too - Defender of Ukraine Day, celebrated on 1 October, has been renamed Defender and Defendress of Ukraine Day. The Ministry of Defence acknowledges the contribution of servicewomen to the country’s defence, and stories like «beautiful women make our service more pleasant» are, fortunately, heard less and less in the media. However, it is still difficult for women in the army to be promoted to leadership positions.

A serious problem also concerns homosexual relationships among servicewomen. They are not recognised by the Ukrainian state. When your partner is wounded or taken prisoner, you will not be informed. When she dies, you cannot see her body.

When a biological mother dies, her partner has no rights to the child. This also applies to homosexual military personnel, except that more children are raised in lesbian partnerships

Alright, but ultimately it is men in the army who face greater discrimination - unlike women, they are forcibly conscripted. Thus, they are deprived of their right to life and health, the fundamental human right...

I often hear this narrative from foreigners. It annoys me just as much as when our defenders are told that «killing people is wrong». Of course, it is wrong, but what are we supposed to do? For those who are not confronted daily with a threat to life, it is easy to theorise and criticise our decisions, and harder to offer alternatives. Surrender to Russia? Send everyone to the frontlines? Draw lots to decide which parent ends up in the army? How will we protect children and the elderly then? Who will work to keep the economy going?

Women, unlike men, were legally allowed to leave Ukraine.

This, in turn, is a huge challenge for the Ukrainian sisterhood. Tension has arisen between the women who left and those who stayed. Some of us blame each other: «You abandoned your country in its time of need, you ran away, you betrayed us». Or: «You stayed, you are ruining your children’s lives».

This is very sad to me. I believe everyone has the right to make the decision they think is best for their family. It is a tragic choice, because every decision is wrong in some way. This tension harms Ukraine because some refugee women may not want to return home because of it. I know women who left, and their families stopped speaking to them.

And will they be accepted back?

I think that when the war ends, this tension will subside, and people will begin to live new lives. But for many refugee women, this will be a reason not to return to Ukraine.

Are you not afraid that the negative impact of the war on the rights of Ukrainian women will outweigh the positive?

I do not know. I am an optimist, I hope the positive will prevail. But I assess the chances as fifty-fifty.

How has the war changed you as a feminist?

Before the full-scale war began, I would have said that above all, I am a woman. Nothing was more important to me in terms of my identity. Today I say that I am Ukrainian. War unites nationality more than anything else. If you do not know war, you will never understand it.

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Liliya «Lilya» Faskhutdinova is a feminist and human rights activist with ten years of experience in civil society, anti-discrimination programmes and gender equality advocacy. She received a bachelor's degree in philology from the Sorbonne and a master's degree in human rights from the University of Padua. She has worked with Syrian refugees in Turkey, internally displaced persons in Ukraine, people living with HIV, LGBTQI+ individuals and women. She currently lives in Lviv, where she is working on a women’s empowerment project at an international humanitarian organisation.

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On May 20th, the European Union adopted its largest and most ambitious package of sanctions against Russia - the seventeenth to date. It targets the deployment of the Russian Federation’s «shadow fleet», which helps circumvent the oil embargo, as well as strengthening restrictions on Russian energy companies and blocking the assets of Kremlin allies in various countries. At the same time, the eighteenth package is already being prepared, which may include a ban on the import of Russian gas and uranium, and the use of frozen Russian assets for the reconstruction of Ukraine.

These sanctions are a key instrument of pressure on the Kremlin, yet their effectiveness, coordination with partners and consequences for European unity remain open questions. Ondřej Kolář, Member of the European Parliament from the Czech Republic, answered the most important of these in an exclusive interview with Sestry.

Sanctions against Russia: EU unity challenges and the position of the USA

Maryna Stepanenko: Mr Kolář, what do you believe is the main advantage of the seventeenth EU sanctions package in combating the circumvention of the Russian oil embargo? Can this package seriously complicate the activities of the so-called «shadow fleet»?

Ondřej Kolář: This is a complex issue. The fact that this is already the seventeenth sanctions package indicates that the policy is not working as effectively as it should. We allow too many exceptions, lack proper enforcement, and are unable to stop large-scale sanctions from being circumvented not only by individual companies but also by entire third countries. Sanctions do matter, but we must implement and enforce them much better.

With this seventeenth package, I hope we have finally recognised how serious the problem is, especially when it comes to the «shadow fleet», which Russia uses very effectively to bypass restrictions. I am glad that the EU is following the example of the United Kingdom on this issue, although it is disappointing that it took us about six months just to start discussing this step.

The EU is moving too slowly. Russia makes decisions quickly and decisively, while we lag behind. This must change - we must be the ones who set the agenda

I welcome this package and the fact that we have finally focused on what truly matters, such as the export of fossil fuels, on which Russia is heavily dependent. The more we block this flow, the better it is for us and for Ukraine. But we must act faster and more precisely. We cannot afford to continue playing catch-up.

You mentioned sanctions circumvention, and the seventeenth package targets not only Russian companies but also their partners in countries such as China and the UAE. You also said that the EU often reacts rather than sets the agenda. Do you see a realistic path for the EU to stay one step ahead of Russia? Is there a way to truly block all the loopholes it uses to bypass sanctions?

I am afraid not. In order to close all avenues of evasion, the EU would have to persuade the entire world to stop cooperating with Russia, and that is simply impossible. Countries such as North Korea, Iran and many from the BRICS group still maintain ties with Moscow, helping it to create the image of a nation merely defending itself and aspiring to a «normal life». This is dangerous, and we cannot accept it. Our only real instruments here are diplomacy and international trade.

The main mistake of the United States was the abandonment of USAID - this created gaps now being filled by other countries such as China and Russia

The EU lacks equivalent resources to intervene fully, but we cannot yield these spaces. We must compete, demonstrate that we are the better partner, and discard the notion that our colonial past makes us unwelcome. What China is doing in many places is simply a new form of colonialism.

We shall not defeat Russia on the battlefield as Nazi Germany was defeated in the Second World War. Therefore, we must use all the other tools at our disposal. Diplomacy and trade are areas where we can stay a step ahead.

Following the negotiations in Istanbul, the European Union is preparing its eighteenth package of sanctions targeting the Russian energy sector, financial system and «shadow fleet». Do you believe the EU is ready to act independently of the United States' position, particularly given the calls by the newly appointed Chief of Staff to the German Chancellor, Thorsten Frei, for tougher measures, including a ban on the import of Russian gas and uranium?

I would very much like greater independence from Russia because, if we do not achieve it fully, we shall only let ourselves down. Independence from the United States, however, is more complicated. We are still heavily dependent on Washington in matters of defence, security and trade. The United States has been our principal partner for eighty years. Nonetheless, everything changes.

We cannot afford to react to everything Donald Trump says. The chaos following his inauguration is colossal. In the morning, he says one thing, by lunchtime another, and in the evening he denies both statements. European leaders have realised that it is better to be patient and not to chase after every change in his rhetoric.

The main thing now is to stand on our own feet. This means being proactive and projecting the EU on a global scale. For too long, the EU has been focused on internal development - enlargement and domestic matters, which was important, but we have neglected our global role. Europe has always been a global player, and it must remain one if it is to succeed.

Europe is highly attractive - people seek a better life here because of our unparalleled social security system and quality of life. However, we cannot take this for granted. We must defend it ourselves.

Dependence on the United States is no longer acceptable. They must remain our closest partner, not our guardian

President Trump, in a private conversation with European leaders, acknowledged that Putin was not ready to end the war, but simultaneously refused new sanctions, instead proposing peace talks at the Vatican. How do you assess such a stance by the United States?

Donald Trump is a naïve man who does not understand what is happening. He has been deceived many times by Putin, and he does not even realise it. He cannot evaluate his mistakes because he simply does not acknowledge them. One cannot play poker with one’s cards face up, yet that is exactly what he is doing - showing his hand to Russia, announcing his plans, sending to Moscow unqualified people with no experience.

When he tells European leaders that he forced Putin to join negotiations with Ukraine, a week after those negotiations already took place in Istanbul - it is the same as saying: «I have been asleep for three years».

It is madness. He does not know what he is doing, what he is saying to the world or to his allies

European leaders now realise that they have a clown for a partner. I hope they have enough patience and the necessary tools to calmly and clearly explain to Trump that he is wrong, that he is making matters worse, not better. And that the Russians are playing him. They must make him understand that Russia is not interested in compromise. Unfortunately, we must admit that the current President of the United States is utterly confused and of no help whatsoever.

The United States Congress has introduced the Sanctioning Russia Act, which provides for a 500% tariff on imports from countries that purchase Russian oil and for the expansion of sanctions against Russian sovereign debt. Can Congress, even without support from the Trump administration, independently advance this initiative?

I would be pleased if it were successfully implemented. However, observing how Donald Trump treats American democracy, I am very pessimistic. He does not care about Congress, the Senate or the courts - only about himself and his propaganda.

It does not matter what Congress decides. If Trump does not like it, he will boycott it just as he ignores court rulings and anything else with which he disagrees. This complicates everything greatly.

One day he says he will impose harsh sanctions against Russia, and the next day - the opposite. So where do we stand? What game are we even playing? Nothing is clear.

I am grateful to American legislators for this initiative, but I am cautious. If Trump dislikes it, he will block it without hesitation. I should like to be mistaken, but I do not believe he will support anything that does not serve him.

Challenges on Ukraine’s path to European integration

In March, Hungary threatened to veto the extension of EU sanctions against Russia, which could have led to the unfreezing of substantial assets. Although a compromise was reached, Budapest continues to express criticism not only regarding sanctions but also concerning EU enlargement. How serious a risk is Hungary’s stance for the unity of the European Union in the context of Ukraine’s European integration? What consequences could it have for the integration process itself?

Hungary plays the role of a useful idiot in the EU - Vladimir Putin’s «Trojan horse». They are bringing others over to their side, with a certain degree of success in Slovakia, whose government has become lost in Russian falsehoods. While Ukraine is in the spotlight, the situation in the Western Balkans is even more serious.

Hungary loudly spreads nonsense about the Hungarian minority in Ukraine but quietly undermines the EU elsewhere - especially in Georgia and the Western Balkans, where Hungarian diplomats actively export Russian lies

In Bosnia and Herzegovina, Hungary is part of EUFOR (European Union Force - a military mission led by the EU in Bosnia and Herzegovina tasked with maintaining peace and stability in accordance with the Dayton Agreement - Edit.) and closely cooperates with leaders of Republika Srpska connected to Putin. They play a disgraceful role in blocking EU enlargement, parroting Russian propaganda.

The EU has realised that it must bypass Hungary, but this creates dangerous precedents. Forming a «coalition of the willing» simply to circumvent Hungary and Slovakia could undermine confidence in the rules and integrity of the EU.

Ultimately, the Hungarian people must choose change. We can only hope that the next elections will bring a new government and with it a fundamentally different position on Ukraine and the region. Until then, we must wait and be patient.

The European Parliament actively supports Ukraine’s European integration, in particular by accelerating the accession process and opening negotiation clusters. How do you assess the role of the European Parliament in this process and its influence on the decisions of the EU Council?

Parliament is a legislative body, so almost everything in the EU passes through it. However, it does not play a decisive role in enlargement, although we do influence the process.

For example, I am a member of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, and we closely monitor every country seeking to join the EU. Parliament prepares, votes on and publishes reports on the progress of each country - assessing how well they meet the accession criteria and offering recommendations.

We can also send missions for direct engagement with national partners to discuss the reforms necessary for moving closer to EU membership. But the final decision on enlargement does not rest with us.

We only provide support and guidance. The majority of Parliament supports enlargement, recognising that a larger EU is a stronger EU. Our role is to cooperate with national parliaments, not to pressure them, but to assist in carrying out the required reforms.

European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen noted that Ukraine could join the EU by 2030 if reforms continue at the current pace. How realistic do you consider this timeframe for Ukraine's accession?

I would be pleased, but much depends on when the war ends. That does not mean Ukraine should not join the EU before the war concludes - in fact, I believe it deserves a special status.

I often use the example of Puerto Rico - not a full US state, but a special territory with certain rights and responsibilities. Ukraine's situation is unique. None of the other candidate countries - Moldova, Montenegro, Albania or Serbia - have been at war since 2014. Ukraine has been at war for eleven years. We cannot treat it like an ordinary country.

It is important to set ambitious goals - they give us energy. But is 2030 realistic? Frankly, we do not even know what tomorrow will bring. When will the war end? How will it end? Will Russia keep its word?

That is why I believe a special status could be more effective and might even accelerate the process. Ukraine is being treated as if nothing has happened, and that is wrong.

Hybrid warfare and EU information security

In May 2025, Poland faced an unprecedented wave of hybrid attacks from Russia on the eve of its presidential elections. Do you believe the EU is adequately prepared for complex Russian information operations? What steps must be taken to strengthen information security in Europe?

Europe is not ready, not at all. Still, some states are more prepared than others. If you look at the Baltic and Scandinavian countries, their approach is completely different from that of Central Europe. It is strange, given our shared history. The Baltic countries were part of the Soviet Union. Czechoslovakia was occupied, but not for as long. Yet Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and Finland are now very effective in countering hybrid threats. Meanwhile, countries like Hungary and Slovakia have completely lost their bearings.

Their minds have been washed by Russian propaganda

Poland, to its credit, speaks out loudly about the problem and wants to act. But in the Czech Republic, officials appear on television and say that disinformation does not exist - this is the worst possible approach.

We are lucky that bombs are not falling on our heads, but we are in a state of information warfare. And we are losing. In Brussels, no one even talks about Russian propaganda. It is not a topic. It seems that a country’s position depends on its historical experience with Russia.

We only began acknowledging the problem because Russia continues to escalate. They blew up an ammunition depot in the Czech Republic in 2014, and all we did was expel a few diplomats. Russian officials still move freely throughout the Schengen Area. No one can stop them.

Frankly, we lack courage. We have been unable to recognise Russia as an enemy for far too long. It does not want to be our friend - it wants to defeat us and reshape the world. Europe is unprepared, it is losing, and it has no coordinated response to hybrid threats. Each country acts on its own, and Russia exploits this chaos.

Russia influences EU countries not only through cyberattacks or disinformation, but also through so-called «soft power» - pro-Russian organisations, media outlets and even economic ties. How serious do you consider this threat to be? And what can the EU do to detect and stop such influence in time?

Yes, it is a serious threat - and Europe still cannot acknowledge it. We must stop convincing ourselves that Russia cannot be that bad. It is that bad. We must take Russian propaganda at face value - they broadcast exactly what the Kremlin thinks and wants.

We must respond to the warnings of our own security services. For example, in the Czech Republic, our intelligence has long stated that Russia’s ownership of numerous real estate properties poses a threat. Yet when it comes to confiscating them, the authorities suddenly claim that it is legally impossible. This fear of Russia must end. Yes, they have nuclear weapons, but their economy is ruined. They are not capable of winning a global conflict.

Europe acts as if it has Stockholm syndrome. Russia cannot match us economically or strategically, and they are not suicidal enough to start a nuclear war

We must acknowledge that Russia is the enemy and stop legitimising people associated with it. There is no reason why, especially in Central Europe, communists and pro-Russian populists should continue to be given media platforms. This must stop.

Russian propaganda must be banned. We must be tough on everyone: individuals, companies and institutions that help Russia gain influence. Bribery, manipulation, espionage - all of this must be tracked and punished. And those who speak out against Russia must be louder, clearer and relentless in explaining the reality. Because we are still unable to tell people what is really happening - and there is no excuse for what Russia is doing. None whatsoever.

Cover photo: Associated Press/East News

This project is co-financed by the Polish-American Freedom Foundation under the «Support Ukraine» programme, implemented by the Education for Democracy Foundation

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The West had all the tools to foresee Russia's war against Ukraine - and chose to ignore them. Even before 2014, analysis reached NATO's highest offices: the annexation of Crimea, the threat to Mariupol, the Russian Federation's dominance in the Black Sea. The forecasts were accurate, but most member states opted for the illusion of partnership with the Kremlin.

Are changes still possible? What is required to achieve them? And can NATO remain an effective security alliance in a new era of threats? These and other questions were addressed in an interview with Sestry by Dr Stefanie Babst - one of the most influential security strategists in Europe, who worked at NATO for over 20 years, including as Head of the Strategic Foresight Team. Today, she is an independent analyst, the author of a book on the West's «blind spots» in its strategy toward Russia, and an active participant in international discussions on war, peace and security.

Ukraine, Russia and the strategic miscalculations of the West

Maryna Stepanenko: You led NATO's Strategic Foresight Team. How do you assess the West's ability to foresee Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine? Were there signals that were simply not heard, or perhaps deliberately ignored?

‍Stefanie Babst: There were many warnings that went unheeded. Allow me to explain. In international relations, it is crucial to accurately assess the mindset, capabilities and intentions of another actor. NATO failed to do this with Russia. As the Head of Strategic Foresight at the Alliance, I issued the first serious warning in 2013 - a few months before the annexation of Crimea. I presented an analysis outlining Russia's malicious intentions and its military preparations against Ukraine.

It was reviewed by the Secretary General and discussed with member states, but no action was taken

Some countries - the Baltic States and Poland - took the analysis seriously. Others - notably Germany, the United States and the United Kingdom - preferred to maintain the NATO-Russia partnership. From 2014 onwards, we intensified our analysis, forecasting actions such as the seizure of Mariupol, dominance in the Black Sea and the use of Donbas as a staging ground. These forecasts were presented at the highest levels, including the NATO Council, but were ultimately dismissed.

In 2015 and 2016, we broadened our focus to include China and its ties with Russia, offering future scenarios and forecasting so-called «black swans» - high-impact events that are hard to predict, seem unlikely but could have serious consequences if they occur. Again, many perceived this only as «intellectual exercises». Thus, NATO possessed the tools of foresight - and chose to ignore them. And that comes at a very high cost.

In your work, you call for a review of the West's strategy toward Russia. In your view, what «blind spots» remain in Western approaches - particularly regarding support for Ukraine?

Three years ago, I called for a powerful, multifaceted deterrence strategy to help Ukraine not just freeze the war but win it. I invoked George Kennan's Cold War approach, urging the use of all available instruments - economic, diplomatic and military - to push Russia out of Ukraine. But apart from some Baltic and Northern European countries, no one took this seriously.

NATO and the EU still lack a defined end goal. If Ukraine's victory were the objective, a corresponding strategy would have been developed

Instead, Western leaders underestimated Ukraine's resilience and failed to act decisively even after Russia crossed countless red lines. President Biden, despite his commitment to Ukraine, framed his approach around what the United States would not do: we will not provoke Russia, we will not give Ukrainians long-range weapons, we will not do this or that. This is not a strategy. Now, with Trump’s return, many European governments are passively hoping for a US-Russian agreement that merely freezes the war - something I believe is dangerous both for Ukraine and Europe.

My main criticism is the lack of political will in the West. Too many still see this as Russia's war against Ukrainians. But it is our war too

Stefanie, why do you think Europe failed to prepare effectively for Trump’s presidency?

Planning within NATO and European governments is often difficult, as politicians typically focus on short-term goals, usually only a month ahead. In times of emergency, particularly due to Washington's unpredictability, Europe must abandon crisis management mode and stop reacting to every event, such as a new tweet.

Europe must be firm with the United States, clearly communicating that their actions - including threats to countries like Canada and Denmark, withholding intelligence from Ukraine and halting cyber operations against Russia - are unacceptable. These decisions had deadly consequences, and member states should not be afraid to hold the United States accountable for violating the fundamental principles of the Washington Treaty.

Mark Rutte, the NATO Secretary General, recently visited Florida to meet President Trump, hoping to impress him with defence spending figures. He praised Trump’s leadership and even claimed that Trump had «broken the deadlock» in relations with Russia. However, this is detached from the reality of ongoing Russian attacks.

If the NATO Secretary General lacks a clear message, the best approach is silence, focusing on supporting member states and protecting them from any threat. We do not have time for empty words and political games.

Europeans must remain immune to American political theatre, focusing on strengthening defence capability and supporting Ukraine’s defence industry so it can resist Russian aggression

Migration and war

Germany is no longer the EU leader in asylum requests from South American and Middle Eastern refugees. At the same time, in the first quarter of 2025, applications from Ukrainians rose by 84 per cent. What does this indicate?

It is entirely understandable that many Ukrainians have chosen to leave their country for personal and professional reasons - this is natural, and no one should be blamed for it. But this migration has political consequences in Germany, particularly when far-right parties exploit it by portraying Ukrainian refugees as a burden on the social system, regardless of their skills or motivation. These sentiments are especially strong in eastern Germany, where parties like AfD and certain left-wing populist movements have gained support.

What concerns me is the lack of strong counteraction from the federal government in Berlin - clearer messaging and political leadership are needed

If more Ukrainians arrive, I hope the next government will take a positive stance, recognising that many of them can significantly contribute to the German workforce. This would mean reducing bureaucracy, accelerating integration and facilitating their employment. Whether this happens remains to be seen.

Continuing on this topic, in recent weeks, some districts in Germany have publicly declared that they can no longer accommodate Ukrainian refugees due to overburdened social systems. How do you assess these sentiments?

It is true that local communities across Germany still face difficulties in accommodating refugees - an issue that arose after Chancellor Merkel’s decision to open the borders, leading to a large influx of refugees from Syria, Afghanistan and other countries. Many municipalities remain overwhelmed by demands for housing, language training and integration support. However, Ukrainian refugees do not pose the same challenges.

Ukrainians generally integrate well, bring strong skills and education and do not contribute to social tensions

In contrast, some refugees from the Middle East struggle to adapt to liberal democratic norms, which fuels far-right narratives, particularly in eastern Germany. Parties like AfD and figures such as Sahra Wagenknecht exploit this, promoting anti-Ukrainian, pro-concession rhetoric that ignores the reality of Russian occupation.

Unfortunately, mainstream democratic parties are not doing enough to push them back. With growing support from American right-wing populists, such as those connected to Trump or Musk, this polarisation may deepen further, posing a serious threat to democratic cohesion in Europe.

Europe on the brink of war

Amid full-scale war in Ukraine, initiatives have emerged in Poland and Germany to prepare schoolchildren for emergencies. Does this indicate a deeper shift in Europe's security culture, where defence is no longer solely the army's responsibility, but that of the entire society?

Although some defence-related courses have begun in Germany, they remain insufficient, and the wider public remains largely unprepared - both mentally and physically - to play a defensive role.

Serious debates are now underway about reinstating military conscription, but surveys show that two-thirds of people aged 20 to 30 would refuse to serve, with many saying they would rather emigrate than defend the country.

This reflects a deeper issue: decades of political messaging have conditioned Germans to believe they live in peace, surrounded by allies, and need not prepare for conflict

As a result, Germany also lacks bunkers for emergencies, civil defence training and basic resilience measures for the population. Changing this mindset will require strong political leadership. Without it, the Bundeswehr will remain under-equipped and unable to contribute significantly to efforts such as a potential coalition in Ukraine.

We see civil defence becoming part of public policy, from educating children to testing alarm systems. Is Europe beginning to think seriously about its own resilience in the face of potential escalation beyond Ukraine?

Undoubtedly. Some countries, such as Finland, Sweden, Poland and the Baltic States, have prioritised both military capability and societal resilience in recent years. In cities such as Riga and Warsaw, the Russian threat is well understood. However, countries like Germany, Belgium, Portugal, France and others still view Russia’s war against Ukraine as a regional issue.

Fortunately, leaders such as Kaja Kallas are advocating for a long-term strategy against Russia. Since the start of Russia’s full-scale invasion, I have argued that we must prepare for a protracted conflict, as long as Putin’s regime remains in power, Russia will continue to pose a threat to Ukraine and the whole of Europe.

Strategic vision

Given your views on NATO's evolution and the need for a new coalition, potentially the so-called «coalition of the willing», how do you envisage its structure? What strategic or institutional frameworks will be important to effectively counter Russian aggression, considering internal challenges within NATO, particularly due to the influence of populist leaders, including Trump?

During my time at NATO, I was proud of my team’s ability to anticipate challenges before they emerged, especially regarding NATO’s enlargement. I was actively involved in the admission of new members, including the Baltic States, Slovenia and Slovakia.

One of the moments I had hoped to witness was seeing Ukraine’s flag at NATO headquarters, but I no longer believe that is a realistic goal

Instead, I believe Ukraine should focus on building a new coalition with like-minded countries, rather than pursuing NATO membership. The Alliance, particularly under the influence of destructive politics, is becoming increasingly divided.

If I were advising President Zelensky, I would recommend not wasting energy on NATO accession but rather focusing on strengthening a broader, more flexible alliance to counter Russian aggression. This would allow us to move beyond the status quo and prepare for the future.

Considering the current dynamics within NATO, how long do you think the Alliance can maintain its current structure before significant changes become inevitable? Do you have a timeframe in mind?

When President Trump was elected, I predicted he would undermine the rules-based order, and we are already seeing significant damage done to NATO, especially concerning the US commitments. European countries have started discussing enhancing the European pillar within NATO, planning to prepare for a potential US withdrawal within five to ten years. However, I believe that timeframe is overly optimistic - we may have only five to ten months before we witness new disruptions.

Looking back, it is clear NATO missed the opportunity to prepare for these challenges. In 2016, I prepared a document for the Secretary General outlining potential harm Trump could cause, but it was dismissed at the time. The issues I raised remain relevant today, and NATO's bureaucracy is too risk-averse to plan for unforeseen scenarios.

If the Alliance fails to act, it risks becoming a reactive organisation that merely responds to Trump’s tweets instead of proactively working toward the future

I hope that countries such as France, the United Kingdom and Northern European states will cooperate with Ukraine to create a new joint alliance capable of better confronting future challenges.

Cover photo: MANDEL NGAN/AFP/East News

This project is co-financed by the Polish-American Freedom Foundation under the «Support Ukraine» programme, implemented by the Education for Democracy Foundation

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