Olga Pakosh

At the beginning of the 20th century, the newly established Ukrainian People's Republic needed brave and intelligent representatives worldwide to prove its capability as an international player, achieve recognition of the UPR as an independent state, tell the truth about Ukrainians' struggle against the Bolsheviks, and counter the fabrications of Russian propaganda.

- It needed not only male representatives but also female representatives, - says the Head of the Scientific Society of the History of Diplomacy and International Relations, Doctor of Historical Sciences, Professor Iryna Matiash. - Researching the history of Ukrainian diplomacy, I have often found that women were notable in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs or foreign missions.

«In 1917-1919, foreign missions of more than thirty countries operated in Ukrainian cities»

Olha Pakosh: You presented two of your scientific works in Krakow - «The Female Face of Ukrainian Diplomacy. Essays. Memoirs. Interviews» and «Shared Places of Memory of Ukraine and Poland. Official and Cultural Diplomacy». How did your interest in women in diplomacy begin?

Iryna Matiash: This interest arose because I have been researching the history of the diplomatic and consular service for a long time. Furthermore, I have the honour of heading the Scientific Society of the History of Diplomacy and International Relations. From 2017 (the year of 100th anniversary of the Ukrainian diplomatic service) to 2021, under the patronage of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine, we implemented the scientific and educational project «A Century of Ukrainian Diplomacy», organised youth meetings «European Values and Cultural Diplomacy» with the support of the Hanns Seidel Foundation in Ukraine, and launched, shortly before the full-scale invasion, the project «Ukraine - the World: 30 (104)».

However, the study of the history of Ukrainian diplomacy began even earlier when I was the Director of the Ukrainian Research Institute of Archival Affairs and Records Management.

In preparation for the 90th anniversary of the Ukrainian diplomatic service, we organised an exhibition of archival documents and showed foreign ambassadors in Kyiv the originals, which confirmed the presence of their countries' diplomatic representatives in Kyiv in 1918-1919. Since then, this topic has never left me.

Not everyone knew that the Ukrainian People's Republic and the Ukrainian State of Hetman Pavlo Skoropadskyi had official contacts with many countries and that during 1917-1919, foreign missions of more than thirty countries operated in Ukrainian cities.

Ukraine also sent its embassies and extraordinary diplomatic missions to various countries. The first UPR missions were sent to the signatory countries of the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk during the Central Rada period. Under the Hetmanate, embassies were established in Germany, Austria-Hungary, Turkey and Bulgaria, as well as in Switzerland and Finland, missions appeared in Romania and the Scandinavian states, and representatives were appointed to the Kuban government and the Government of the Don Cossacks.

The largest number of diplomatic missions was sent by the Directorate of the UPR

Between December 1918 and January 1919, diplomatic missions were sent to Belgium, the United Kingdom, Greece, Denmark, Estonia, Italy, Latvia, Poland, Romania, the Holy See, the USA, Hungary, Czechoslovakia, Sweden, Switzerland and the Caucasus to convey the truth about Ukraine and its struggle for independence to the international community.

The delegation to Paris was tasked with securing recognition of the UPR's independence by the participating states of the Paris Peace Conference, the withdrawal of foreign troops from Ukrainian territory and assistance in the fight against the Bolsheviks. To support this mission, the Ukrainian Republican Capella, led by Oleksandr Koshyts, was sent on a musical mission.

The diplomatic struggle for recognition of Ukraine's independence by European countries continued until 1926

This struggle lasted until the end of the final extraordinary diplomatic mission of the UPR in Hungary in 1924 and the formal closure of the UPR Embassy in Switzerland in 1926.

Meanwhile, Russians consistently tried to portray that Ukraine lacked diplomacy at that time and had no international contacts. By doing so, Russian scholars attempted to deny Ukraine’s statehood, as they did with other nations that were unfortunate enough to be part of the Soviet Union.

Our project «A Century of Ukrainian Diplomacy» aimed to honour Ukrainian diplomats of the Ukrainian Revolution of 1917-1921, conduct scientific and educational activities and refute Russian theses about the inability of the Ukrainian diplomatic service to function as a state institution.

In the second project, «Ukraine - The World 30 (104): Official and Cultural Diplomacy», we sought to demonstrate that Ukrainian diplomacy did not emerge after the restoration of Ukraine’s state independence but rather a century ago. It was crucial for us to preserve this historical connection and nurture institutional memory. We recorded interviews with the first ambassadors of independent Ukraine in the early 1990s, who deposited these interviews for preservation at the Central State Archive of Audiovisual and Electronic Documents.

Researching thousands of pages of archival documents for documentary exhibitions and monographs, I always subconsciously searched for women's names. I tried to answer questions such as: who was the first woman in the Ukrainian diplomatic service? Were women allowed into leadership positions? What challenges did diplomats' wives face? How did their lives turn out? This led to the idea of highlighting the role of women in diplomacy through the figures of career diplomats and diplomats' wives, as wives are also a formidable force in diplomacy. Thus, the project «The Female Face of Ukrainian Diplomacy» was born.

Repressions against Ukrainian female diplomats

- Did this inspire you to focus on the figures of women?

- Rather, it encouraged archival searches, as information about women working in diplomatic positions is quite scattered, and memoirs often contain inaccuracies and subjective assessments.

Speaking of the beginnings of Ukrainian diplomacy, it is worth mentioning the establishment of the General Secretariat of International Affairs on December 22nd 1917. It was primarily staffed by young men, with the average age of senior officials around 30. For example, Oleksandr Shulhyn was 28 when he was appointed as the first Minister of Foreign Affairs.

The first woman to hold a leadership position in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs was Nadiia Surovtsova. She entered the diplomatic service by chance but became not only the first woman to head a structural unit of the ministry but also the first spokesperson of the MFA. She began using tools that are now well-established in public diplomacy: organising an exhibition of Ukrainian embroidery and a library of Ukrainian books for the diplomatic mission at the Paris Peace Conference. Later, she used charity concerts and Ukrainian fashion shows to raise funds to support the starving in Ukraine.

By the way, in Poland, a similar position was held by Kazimiera Iłłakowiczówna, a prominent writer, poet, translator, diplomat and personal secretary to Marshal Józef Piłsudski.

As for inspiration - that would be Kateryna Hrushevska. She was the daughter of the prominent historian and head of the Ukrainian Central Rada, Mykhailo Hrushevsky, a researcher of Ukrainian folk ballads and the mythology of the world's peoples, the youngest member of the Taras Shevchenko Scientific Society in Lviv, editor of the journal «Primitive Society», an ethnologist and a victim of the repressive Soviet regime. Kateryna became one of my main heroines, prompting me to pay special attention to the figures of women in diplomacy.

Incidentally, in her mother Maria Hrushevska’s activities as the wife of the head of state (Mykhailo Hrushevsky was the head of parliament, the position of president did not exist then), one can observe the emergence of elements of public diplomacy of the first lady. According to contemporaries, Maria Hrushevska tried to correspond to her status, including in her clothing style. She followed fashion and had an appropriate wardrobe with outfits for «evening», «visiting», «strolling» and «folk» styles for participating in various cultural and social events, gatherings and business meetings. The use of vyshyvankas for public events to promote national dress can be considered an element of fashion diplomacy.

- Returning to Nadiia Surovtsova, what specifically caught your attention in her story?

- Her story is full of unexpected twists of fate. In January 1919, Nadiia Surovtsova was sent to Paris as secretary of the information bureau of the UPR delegation to participate in the Peace Conference. The plan included creating a Ukrainian library or at least a shelf of Ukrainian books. The delegation also included Dmytro Dontsov, head of the Ukrainian Telegraph Agency and Oleksandr Shulhyn, the first Minister of Foreign Affairs of the UPR.

However, most members of the delegation did not manage to reach Paris.

Returning to Kyiv was also impossible because, in early February 1919, the Bolsheviks captured the city. Many Ukrainian diplomats remained abroad. Nadiia moved to Vienna. Fluent in French and German, she initially studied at the University of Vienna and defended her dissertation on Bohdan Khmelnytsky and the Ukrainian state idea.

Soon, a diplomatic mission of Soviet Ukraine, headed by Yurii Kotsiubynsky, was established in Vienna. Among the tasks of such missions was countering the diplomatic activities of the UPR missions, which were still active in some countries. Trusting Kotsiubynsky, Surovtsova began collaborating with Soviet diplomats, participated in various events they organised and started changing her beliefs, taking an interest in the communist movement. In the spring of 1925, Nadiia returned to Kharkiv, full of hope, but she was soon repressed and exiled to Stalin’s labour camps. In exile, she realised how tragically she had been mistaken and the true evil of Soviet propaganda. She had to endure the full horrors of the GULAG.

After her release and rehabilitation, Nadiia Surovtsova returned to Uman, engaged in community activities and wrote literary works and memoirs. In her diaries, which she began writing in exile, she rethought her experiences, candidly described her mistakes and tried to erase that time from her life. Nevertheless, her diplomatic service remained the brightest part of her life.

- How did you collect materials for this research?

- That is precisely why I began discussing Nadiia Surovtsova. While reading her memoirs, I noticed certain details or inaccuracies that could only be verified through archival documents. These are scattered across various archives. The main body of archival documents related to diplomatic history, including information about Nadiia Surovtsova, is held in the Central State Archive of Supreme Authorities and Government of Ukraine. Here, one can find collections of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the UPR, diplomatic missions, foreign diplomatic representations and consulates, diplomats’ personal documents and diplomatic passports.

Extremely significant for such research are also the documents of Ukrainian emigrant organisations and figures, particularly those from the so-called Prague Archive, part of which is also preserved in the Central State Archive of Public Associations and Ukrainica. This unique collection of documents was declassified in the 1990s. A separate collection dedicated to Nadiia Surovtsova is stored in the Central State Archive-Museum of Literature and Art of Ukraine. Thus, her diplomatic career was reconstructed «drop by drop».

- I can imagine the meticulous work of reviewing hundreds of documents in search of one that might summarise everything previously found or, conversely, change the narrative entirely. What discovery impressed you the most?

- It should be noted that most female diplomats of the Ukrainian Revolution of 1917-1921 were forced into exile or repressed. Therefore, in addition to Ukrainian archives, it is necessary to explore foreign archives.

Also deserving attention are the cases of repressed individuals held in the Sectoral State Archive of the Security Service of Ukraine, and partially in the Central State Archive of Public Associations and Ukrainica. Archival research is a true detective story. It is captivating! I have always encouraged my students to approach research from this perspective. Search, assemble the pieces and build logical connections. This is how the necessary data can be uncovered.

One noteworthy discovery was Kateryna Hrushevska’s diary, found in the Central State Historical Archive in Kyiv within the Hrushevsky family collection. It had not been identified as Kateryna’s diary but was bound together with Maria Hrushevska’s diary. The manuscript contains valuable descriptions of their stay in Switzerland. I published this text in the Ukrainian Historical Journal.

Among the finds in foreign archives, my favourite is «The Diplomatic History of Ukraine» by Yevhen Slabchenko (Eugène Deslaw). Thanks to the «Klio» publishing house and the «Ukrainian Book» programme, this manuscript, discovered in Winnipeg, was published in Ukraine.

Another striking find was diplomatic passports. When you least expect to find a photo of the person you are researching and stumble upon an official document...

- Whose?

- It was incredibly significant for me to find Maria Bachynska’s passport. It is also preserved in the Central State Archive of Supreme Authorities and Government of Ukraine. A delicate, refined woman with a steel character, convictions and values. However, in the diplomatic passport photo, she appears rather informal.

‍- Maria Bachynska - she was Dmytro Dontsov’s wife, correct?

- Yes. By the way, Maria Dontsova (Bachynska) was both a woman holding a diplomatic position and the wife of a diplomatic mission staff member. Dmytro Dontsov headed the Information Bureau of the UPR Embassy in Switzerland for some time, while Maria worked as a staff member of the UPR diplomatic mission in Denmark. She was fluent in several foreign languages, which was an exceptional advantage when selecting candidates for diplomatic missions. Unfortunately, we have not yet located Maria Dontsova’s grave in New Jersey. I hope we will find it someday.

Contemporary stars and key qualities of Ukrainian diplomacy

- In modern Ukraine, female diplomats are fortunately no longer a rarity. Whom would you highlight?

- In the early 1990s, female diplomats were still a great rarity. But this was not only the case in Ukraine, it was a global trend. For instance, Nina Kovalska, Tetyana Izhevska and Natalia Zarudna recall that at the beginning of the 1990s, there were only three or four women in diplomatic positions, and the idea of a woman becoming an ambassador was entirely unrealistic.

- Who was the first female ambassador in independent Ukraine?

- After regaining independence, Nina Kovalska became the first woman appointed as an ambassador, and Natalia Zarudna became the first woman in the leadership of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine, serving as Deputy State Secretary of the Ministry.

In February 1998, Nina Kovalska was appointed to Switzerland and Liechtenstein, and in July, to the Holy See (Vatican) - initially concurrently, and in 2000 as a resident ambassador.

This was an unprecedented case not only in the history of relations between Ukraine and the Holy See but also in the history of Ukrainian diplomacy as a whole, as it was the first time a woman was appointed as an ambassador to such a specific place

The embassy consisted only of her and a driver, and the entire mission operated from a single room - an incredibly modest setup. Overall, I believe that our women in diplomatic positions are people with «thirty hands and thirty heads» in the best sense: they know and can do everything. Nina Kovalska exemplified this vividly: she gave interviews, hosted students, organised the first Ukrainian-Italian conference, and made maximum efforts to prepare for Pope John Paul II's visit to Ukraine despite Russian opposition. Her work was recognised both by Ukraine and the Holy See, earning her distinctions. Nina Kovalska left the Vatican at the end of her tenure with the Grand Cross of the Order of Pius IX.

After her, another extraordinary woman, Tetyana Izhevska, was appointed ambassador to the Holy See and the first ambassador of Ukraine to the Sovereign Military Order of Malta. She served there for almost 13 years. It was Tetyana Izhevska who was called a star of diplomacy by her Polish colleague.

- Has the presence of women in diplomatic service and missions influenced the quality of diplomatic service and negotiation processes?

- This seems to be a stereotype. We have debated this topic extensively, which is why we consciously chose the term «women in diplomacy» rather than «women’s diplomacy». In our concept, the notion of «women in diplomacy» encompasses career diplomats, diplomats’ wives and leaders in the field of public diplomacy. Most successful women in ambassadorial roles respond to this question in the same way: there is no such thing as «women’s» or «men’s» diplomacy - only professionalism and a calling. To be effective in diplomacy, one must always remember the well-known three keys to diplomacy of Hennadiy Udovenko: the first is professionalism, followed by patriotism and integrity.

These qualities are not dependent on gender but on the level of education, the ability to apply knowledge in practice and self-control. Psychological resilience, language skills, negotiation ability and other factors also play a crucial role. Female diplomats emphasise that a woman’s smile is not a key argument in negotiations. The defining factor is professionalism.

Traumatised by uncertainty

Olga Pakosh: How traumatised is contemporary Ukrainian society? How would you characterise it?

Michał Bilewicz: We cannot say that the entire society suffers from PTSD. If that were the case, people would likely struggle to function normally. Let me remind you that PTSD symptoms include persistent flashbacks, intrusive thoughts about war and the inability to concentrate on anything else. Meanwhile, we see that the Ukrainian state is functioning - the economy is operating, and daily life goes on.

Ukraine increasingly resembles Israel - a society living under constant threat.

Israeli psychologist Daniel Bar-Tal described this phenomenon as an «intractable conflict», where society adapts to continuous conflict, accepting it as a natural state of affairs. He also wrote about the «ethos of conflict», referring to how societies grow accustomed to living in a state of war.

What does this look like in Israel? When I visited, I was always struck by the fact that every flat has a safe room that doubles as a bomb shelter. Residents go to this room whenever an alarm sounds. After all, the advanced Iron Dome missile defence system is not entirely foolproof - missiles occasionally hit homes.

It seems that Israeli society has adapted to living with war. On the one hand, it functions normally, but on the other, conflict is a constant presence. We are not only talking about the war in Gaza but about a phenomenon that, with some interruptions, has persisted throughout modern Israeli history. As Bar-Tal points out, this situation erodes social trust and influences attitudes towards international politics - people are reluctant to seek alliances and agreements with other nations, feeling that the world is hostile and untrustworthy.

For Ukraine, the key objective is to join European structures - the European Union and NATO - as quickly as possible. This could ensure Ukraine’s future security and stable economic functioning. However, for this to work, it is essential to avoid slipping into the mentality typical of societies accustomed to war.

Since 2014, Ukraine has been in a constant state of war, with varying levels of intensity, and this is extremely dangerous. Therefore, I would describe Ukrainian society as one that is, to some extent, adapting to life in wartime conditions.

- The war in Ukraine has opened up vast areas for research in social and clinical psychology. No doubt you have been following these studies. Have you encountered anything surprising? Have you conducted joint studies with Ukrainian institutions?

- We have conducted two studies. Together with Anna Hromova, a PhD candidate from the Institute of Social and Political Psychology at the National Academy of Pedagogical Sciences of Ukraine, we examined almost five thousand Ukrainian refugees living in Poland to study the prevalence of post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) and the degree of trauma. We also looked into how living conditions in Poland affect the development of PTSD symptoms and reflected on whether post-migration experiences might intensify trauma, and if so, in what ways.

As you may recall from the book, I was surprised by the findings of previous research, which showed that PTSD rates in Poland ranged from 20 to 30 per cent. For example, in studies conducted in Silesia after the floods, 30 per cent of the population exhibited PTSD symptoms. Even among students who visited the Auschwitz museum, 15 per cent were diagnosed with PTSD. These numbers have always been exceptionally high.

In our study of Ukrainian refugee women in Poland, we found a PTSD rate of 47 per cent. I must say, I have never seen such a result in my life. This is indeed a very high level of trauma

It is a consequence not only of the traumatic wartime experiences but also of the conditions in which the refugees find themselves after migrating.

- Could you explain why the level of trauma is so high?

- Typically, PTSD studies are conducted after a conflict ends, when peace returns. In our study, we dealt with an ongoing war, where the women surveyed continue to live in a state of uncertainty. Their husbands are often on the front lines or at risk of being called up, which adds to the stress.

The vast majority of these women face acculturation challenges (the process of mutual cultural influence, where one culture adopts aspects of another - Edit.) in the new society. Acculturation-related stress, including experiences or fears of discrimination in Poland, leads to more intense PTSD symptoms. It is harder for people to move past war trauma when they encounter discrimination in the country they have moved to. Therefore, it is crucial that Poland creates the most supportive environment possible for Ukrainian refugees, as this directly impacts their mental health and their ability to function well in Poland.

Of course, the intensity of PTSD symptoms also depends on individual characteristics. We noticed that people who struggle with uncertainty managed the worst. We remember how things were in the spring of 2022 - full of uncertainty and chaos. People with low tolerance for uncertainty were more prone to PTSD, whereas those who coped better with such situations were less likely to experience symptoms.

«During war trust in the government is essential»

- You mentioned two studies. What was the focus of the second one?

- The second study, which we conducted in collaboration with Ukrainians, was focused on Ukraine itself and examined how complex PTSD experiences influence various forms of distrust and conspiracy theories. I have been interested for some time in how these traumas can shape such attitudes. I observe this phenomenon in Poland as well:

Historical traumas cause people, even generations later, to continue viewing their surroundings as unreliable and to seek out conspiracy theories

It seems that something similar is happening in Ukraine. When I speak with Ukrainians, I often hear conspiracy theories about President Zelensky - for instance, that there are Russian agents among his close associates. This reflects a certain level of fundamental distrust towards politicians, which, in wartime, is very dangerous. The greater the social cohesion and trust in the authorities, the better it is for the country. Even if the authorities do not always act perfectly - and with issues like corruption in our part of Europe, we know this is sometimes the case - in a war situation, trust in the government is essential.

A similar issue relates to trust in science. We studied this in Ukraine, focusing on how much people trust health and medical services, particularly regarding vaccination. We found that people with stronger PTSD symptoms tend to have less trust in science. We are not yet certain in which direction this correlation moves - this is preliminary research - but we are interested in whether war experiences and trauma impact overall distrust or if people simply lose trust in various areas of life. This is a quite dangerous phenomenon, and it often arises in wartime conditions.

- How can this trust be restored? What could help Ukrainians to endure and maintain mental stability until victory?

- Certainly, restoring a sense of agency in daily life - the awareness that what one does has meaning, that one can plan something and carry it out. 

The more people feel capable, the better they will function. This is why combating corruption is so essential, as it robs people of the feeling that they have any control over their lives. They know that everything is decided for them, and they have no influence. Effective anti-corruption measures can significantly improve the mental health of society.

- Unfortunately, war poses a massive threat to that sense of agency, doesn’t it?

- War complicates this greatly, which is why it is important for people to be able to say, «Even if war hinders certain plans, at least in other areas of life, nothing can stand in my way». It is crucial to help people regain this sense, as war fundamentally destroys it, stripping away their feeling of control. It is vital that people can maintain control and agency in their daily lives.

«Poland has no right to write Ukraine’s history»

- How do you think Poles' attitudes towards Ukrainians have changed since the start of the war? How do Poles perceive Ukrainians now?

- In my book, I try to counter a fatalistic outlook, as Poles tend to complain about themselves. I think Ukrainians do the same. We do not criticise ourselves when speaking with Germans or French people, but among ourselves, we often criticise one another.

Poles tend to think of themselves as biased, inhospitable, full of stereotypes. However, what we saw in the spring of 2022 was entirely different - a huge societal mobilisation to help Ukraine. People were sending money to buy weapons, purchasing food, and bringing people from the border. One in every twenty Poles welcomed Ukrainians into their homes. These were unprecedented actions.

I do not know of any other European society that has carried out such a large-scale relief effort, organised not by the government but by ordinary citizens

Of course, this was also supported by the strong networks among Ukrainians already living in Poland. It is important to remember that there were already a million Ukrainians residing in Poland at the time, who supported their relatives and friends. This was one of the key elements that made this large-scale aid possible.

At the same time, our research indicated not only significant sympathy but also strong support for aiding Ukraine, particularly in the acceptance of refugees. This was interesting, as Poles are generally not particularly supportive of refugees. Ukrainian citizens benefitted from the fact that Poles already had experience interacting with them. When we ask Poles whether they personally know any Arabs, 80 to 90 per cent respond that they have never encountered any in their lives. A similar situation applies to Romani people, with around 80 per cent of Poles reporting they have never had contact with them. When asked about Jews, 90 per cent of Poles claim they do not personally know any. However, the responses to questions about Ukrainians yield different results: even before the war, around half of Poles personally knew some Ukrainians.

A large number of Ukrainians, particularly from Western Ukraine, have been coming to Poland for years to work. Following 2014, Ukrainians from eastern regions, including Russian-speaking individuals, also began arriving in Poland. Poles became acquainted with them and observed that they were very similar to themselves. These relationships were not superficial - they were not just with Ukrainian workers in shops, but also with colleagues, and with parents of children attending the same schools as Polish children. This prepared Poles for 2022, as these refugees were no longer strangers - they were people whom Poles knew and had relationships with.

I believe that if the situation were reversed, and war broke out in Poland, Ukrainians would similarly take in Poles. Polish-Ukrainian relations are strong and mutually supportive.

It should also be noted that, before the war, there was considerable hatred directed at Ukrainians on the internet, particularly concerning the Volyn tragedy and war crimes. However, following 2022, this topic has almost vanished. Unfortunately, it is now gradually resurfacing, although these past two years have allowed us to step back from this issue.

In terms of Poles’ attitudes towards Ukrainians, enthusiasm for assistance has somewhat declined, yet the majority of Poles still believe that Ukrainian refugees should be supported and that Poland must continue backing Ukraine in the ongoing conflict. Well over half of Poles hold this view, so it cannot be said that Polish society has turned away from Ukraine and its people. We are still a long way from that.

- This is good news. However, the subject of Volyn has resurfaced, this time through the voice of the Prime Minister. Donald Tusk stated that until all details surrounding the Volyn tragedy are clarified and exhumations conducted, Poland will not support Ukraine’s path to the European Union...

- I believe this was a reaction to certain events. After Dmytro Kuleba ceased to be minister, the issue somewhat subsided. It was indeed an unfortunate comment. On one hand, I believe that Minister Kuleba spoke the truth, but as a diplomat, he ought not to have said it at that moment and in response to such a question. However, the time will come when Poles will need to raise the issue of Operation «Vistula» and earnestly confront it.

Of course, it can be argued that the actions were those of the communists, not the Polish people, that it was the communist government of a state that no longer exists. However, it is essential to remember the complex interwar politics of Poland, which discriminated against Ukrainians. I know this well, as I myself come from Ukraine. My grandmother was from Kolomyia, and my grandfather from Ivano-Frankivsk, so I am aware of what happened there before the war and of Poland’s discriminatory policies towards Ukrainians.

- How can the issue of the Volyn tragedy be resolved on both historical and political levels so that it is no longer a burden on Polish-Ukrainian relations? You summarised it well in your book: «to talk about history, but not live in it».

- Vadym Vasyutynsky of the Institute of Social and Political Psychology at the National Academy of Pedagogical Sciences of Ukraine conducted an interesting study, which he began before the full-scale war and continued afterwards. As far as I recall, he asked Ukrainians, in a large sample, whether Ukrainians caused more harm or good to Poles throughout their shared history.

After 2022, the number of people acknowledging that there were also negative events, including crimes, in these relations increased. This indicates that Ukrainians are becoming more open to discussing challenging moments in their shared history with Poles.

I pondered over why this might be. Perhaps, after 2022, Ukrainians realised just how important good relations with Poland and the West are? Politically, we see that, for example, former President Viktor Yushchenko referred to the traditions of the UPA, even highlighting some of the more controversial aspects of history, including the forces that collaborated with the Germans during the war. In contrast, Volodymyr Zelensky tends to avoid this. It seems to me that there has been a noticeable shift from Yushchenko to Zelensky in terms of which aspects of history are suitable and necessary to highlight, such as the Carpathian Sich…

- Am I correct in understanding that you suggest celebrating other stages of Ukrainian history, rather than those that may be painful for Poland?

- Exactly. When considering our history, one can always choose different elements to promote and to build one’s identity upon. Some elements damage our relations - both Polish and Ukrainian ones. If Poles were to build their identity on the history of Jeremi Wiśniowiecki, who killed Cossacks, it would not be beneficial for relations with Ukraine, would it?

I believe there are excellent periods in our history worth highlighting. For instance, Ivan Franko, or figures like Petliura, who, despite mixed views among Ukrainians, is well-regarded by Poles.

Of course, Poland does not have the right to write Ukraine’s history. Please do not ask me about this, as it is a question for Ukrainians. Likewise, Ukrainians do not have the right to write Poland’s history.

However, I can express my dissatisfaction when Poles avoid taking a clear stance on Operation «Vistula» and fail to say: «Yes, a terrible wrong was committed, with masses of people forcibly relocated, deprived of land on which they had lived for generations.» It was wrong, just like the pacification of Ukrainian villages before the war, the destruction of the «Maslosoyuz» cooperative and Ukrainian cooperatives, and the imprisonment and torture of Ukrainian politicians by the authorities of the Second Polish Republic. Poland needs to acknowledge this, to learn to speak about it, and to engage in dialogue with Ukrainians.

As for Ukraine, this is a matter for Ukrainian historians - how they propose to present their history. My ideal scenario would be what Poland eventually achieved with Germany after many years: the creation of a joint commission to prepare textbooks.

Historians and educators, both Polish and Ukrainian, could collaborate on a joint textbook to teach Polish-Ukrainian history. This would be incredibly valuable, even if the textbook did not become the primary one used in all schools

It is essential to create spaces where we can collectively discuss how to present this history. It is not about idealising everything but rather about speaking openly, even about the difficult moments. However, it is also important to remember that the situation was asymmetrical: Poland was a coloniser, while Ukraine was a colonised country. This is not a matter of equal responsibility on both sides.

Understanding this context allows for a deeper comprehension of how the events in Volyn occurred. It is also necessary to conduct exhumations and to openly acknowledge that what happened was horrific and should never have taken place.

- It appears there is much work ahead to achieve understanding between Poles and Ukrainians, but with Russians… Is there even a possibility of ever reaching an understanding with them? How do you view this from the perspective of social psychology? Will we ever be able to forgive?

- When we attempt to reconcile nations that have experienced brutal wars, we typically start with moral exemplars. We try to show that even in dark times, people can act morally. For instance, we tell the story of a Russian schoolgirl who had the courage to protest against the war. We are not speaking about an adult, but a young person who not only faces persecution herself but whose entire family suffers as a result of her protest. Such individual acts of defiance demonstrate that even within Russia, one can find people with moral convictions.

This is reminiscent of the situation with Germany after the Second World War. Reconciliation with Germany was made possible because we recognised that, despite much of society supporting Hitler, there were Germans who were persecuted and imprisoned in concentration camps, such as Buchenwald. These were Germans who wished to appeal to a different history. I believe similar individuals can be found in Russia. However, the problem is that, at present, Russia is a country where, on the one hand, the war enjoys substantial support, and on the other, no opinion polls or surveys can be trusted, as people are intimidated.

It resembles living in a state run by a gang

- How much time will need to pass before this topic can be approached?

- Let’s discuss this once the war is over. I think, at this moment, no one in Ukraine wants to hear about it or hear the Russian language - this is entirely understandable, and Ukrainians have an absolute right to feel this way. It depends on the situation and on what Russia looks like post-war. The key will be whether Russians can rebuild their state on a different foundation and set of principles.

Panels of experts discussed the technological innovations developed in Ukraine at the "Berkeley - Ukraine: Innovative Startup Hub"; conference at the University of California.

Technologies that will be useful during the war, as well as after it ends. No country has had a similar experience in building a special hub where scientists and entrepreneurs come together to create new technologies in a war-torn country. Thanks to the collaboration between the University of California, the Bakar BioEnginuity Hub (BBH), and scientists and economists from the National University of Kyiv-Mohyla Academy (NaUKMA), Ukraine has had this opportunity.

Anastasia Fedyk, one of the initiators of this project, Professor of Finance at the Haas School of Business at the University of California, Berkeley, Chief Economist of the AI for Good Foundation, and co-founder of the charitable foundation Economists for Ukraine, talked with Sestry about the prospects for an innovative hub to grow in Ukraine and what impact it will have on the development of science and modern technologies.

When Scientists and Businesspeople Collaborate

This initiative started last year when the National University of Kyiv-Mohyla Academy signed a cooperation agreement with the University of California to carry out joint projects. At this year's meeting, other scientists and entrepreneurs from Ukraine joined the initiative, explains Anastasia Fedyk.

Mr. Serhiy Kvit, the NaUKMA President attended the meeting, as well as, Mr.Tymofiy Mylovanov, President of the Kyiv School of Economics. The University of California was represented by the newly appointed Chancellor Mr. Richard Lyons, Professor of Economics Yuriy Gorodnichenko, and myself. From the American side, Ms. Janet Napolitano, former President of the University of California, Berkeley, and now a member of the Advisory Board for Intelligence under the President of the USA, was also present.

There were founders of startups and operating businesses among the guests as well. For example, a British entrepreneur developing gliders (a type of hypersonic weapon) that can play a vital role in the war in Ukraine.

In Ukraine, we want more innovations like gliders to appear

Is this hub a place for collaboration among scientists from different countries? A scientific laboratory? A technological innovation center?

It's about the collaboration between scientists and businesses. It's no coincidence that our conference began with an introductory tour of the BBH, as this center operates on the principle of such cooperation. In our case, scientists develop a concept needed by businesses so it is easily commercialized, and thus, not only ready for implementation but practically immediately implemented. At BBH, this works as follows: a professor with a group of scientists develops a technology, which receives funding from a private company. It still is academic work, as they know how their technology will be used. It is not theoretical science (which without practical application does not have much impact), it is a readily available technology.

The ownership of intellectual property rights is clearly defined — what specifically belongs to the university and what to the company.

In BBH, this collaboration between business and science works like this. In Ukraine—given the circumstances—it might look a bit different, but there is a strong interest in creating an innovation center with this principle of operation. At BBH, the focus is on biotechnology, pharmaceuticals, and neurotechnology.

In Ukraine the focus could be on the development of military or digital technologies.

Will the innovative hub in Ukraine only conduct scientific and business activities? Are there any other options for the development of science and technology?

At the conference, there was a panel where Mr.Yuriy Gorodnichenko, Mr.James Hodson, founder of the AI for Good Foundation, and I discussed what the activities of the Innovative Hub might look like. We also identified three levels of its operations.

The first is what we mentioned earlier: the collaboration between scientists and businesspeople to create and implement new technologies needed in the country. Such collaboration is possible in the center that will be set up in Kyiv, and perhaps later in Lviv and Kharkiv.

The second level is programs: courses, training, seminars, workshops, and events where people can meet. We practice this in Berkeley: meetings of scientists from different universities with business representatives.

The third direction is business-oriented activities. These are investments in Ukrainian startups aggregated in this hub. If, for example, American investors want to invest in demining (a relevant topic in Ukraine now), then developing new methods such as using robots is the way to go. In the future, this might become of interest to other countries as well.

Are foreign investors interested in Ukrainian startups?

We have ready solutions for this type of collaboration, that’s why we can act as managers of these processes. Our reputation encourages and attracts foreign investors to Ukraine. Some investors might want to invest in Ukrainian companies or ideas but don't know how to do it or where to start.

If we take a centralized approach and, for example, they invest in us as they do in Berkeley, taking into consideration our experience working with Ukraine, we can propose investments in the joint hub—this will be both convenient and interesting for them.

Can we already be certain that American investors are willing to operate in Ukraine?

Yes.

At our conference there was an investor who admitted he was interested in opening a fund and investing in Ukraine.

I would like to mention that hubs flourish due to cooperation between investment and business. That is also level three of the hub’s operations. How was it with BBH? They first opened the hub. They received grants and facilities. Currently, there are 35 partner companies (since these are neuro- and biotechnologies, these are mainly laboratories). And there is already investor interest in putting funds into these companies. They are indeed cherry-picked. They cooperate with scientists, and businesspeople want to invest in them.

In my opinion, this combination works best: having infrastructure, programs that help businesses grow and expand, and the ability to invest in this business—it is the definition of sustainable.

As for investors, we plan to involve the International Monetary Fund, USAID, the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, and the Center for Private Enterprise in this hub because their representatives expressed high interest in the entire initiative.

“We want to provide Ukraine with as many resources as possible”

Should the investments come mostly during or after the war?

Why should we wait for the war to end? Innovations are needed now. For example, what startups in the USA come up with in the field of mine clearance is not cutting edge anymore. Someone has already come up with something better in Mykolaiv.
Demining and drones are developing best in eastern Ukraine. I think that within a year, such a hub will appear in Kyiv.

You have been researching this for years. Are there enough scientists now to develop and implement such innovations? How severely has the war impacted this sector of science?

We are keen to support Ukrainian scientists. During the conference, we talked about the scholarships that Ukrainian researchers have received. The way I see it, inviting Ukrainian scientists to the USA for a year or more is not very effective. First, they fall out of their environment, and second, they often decide to stay here to work and live. Our goal is to help Ukrainian scientists develop in Ukraine and make scientific discoveries for Ukraine. We aim to provide your country with as many resources as possible. Various kinds.

Many scientists have left Ukraine: they found remote jobs or moved within the country, from Kharkiv to Kyiv or Lviv. But those who stayed are working very effectively. Compared to how the system usually works—in times of peace, when
everyone feels pretty comfortable and calm, and innovation might come at slower paces—now that need is quite dire. For example, the destruction of the energy system in Ukraine. It's not just a matter of rebuilding;—it can potentially lead to creating new, state-of-the-art, energy-saving, eco-friendly technologies.

There are such people in Ukraine—a select few for now, but they are effective and impressive in what they do

If Ukrainians want to win this war, they need to start doing things they have never done before...

We noticed this in the first months of the war when everyone was already working on something and had lots of ideas.

Isn’t it how the Economists for Ukraine Fund was created? You raised $1.6 million for various aid programs in Ukraine over the past two years.

Yes. My friends, my husband, and I couldn't just read the news about what was happening in Ukraine—we have relatives, acquaintances, and friends there, so we had to start this initiative, which is now growing. We are still finding new areas where we could do something more.

Your fund is involved in a wide variety of activities....

We couldn't choose just one type. We can help people in many different ways.
For example, the LifeForce platform, which brought together the efforts of many people with a wide spectrum of capabilities to meet real-time needs: food, shelter, medicine, and transportation. People fled from bombings, arrived in cities where they didn't know anyone, had never been before, and had to organize their lives and secure their basic needs. And someone living in that city knows where to rent a room or an apartment, find food for children, or even deliver medical equipment—and on our platform, these people met, exchanged necessary items, and helped each other.

Then financial donors appeared, who paid for the delivery of medicine to the elderly or disabled, single mothers, bought necessary items, and distributed them through a network of volunteers.
Let’s not forget about Svidok.org. This platform preserves the living memories of Ukrainians about the war. Anyone can go online and leave their story—anonymously or not. It is important to preserve these stories for the future, for historians, psychologists, and researchers who will work with the materials from this war. The stories of people from occupied territories are particularly moving. It is pain, horror, and at the same time, courage to talk about it.
This is a unique experience. For example, participants and survivors of WWII were mostly written after the war. But on Svidok.org, anyone can write in real time. Our feelings and memories change. Over time, they either become less intense, embellished, or entirely fade away. We want to preserve these impressions as they are now.

Photo: Tetiana Rudenko