Knowledge is our first shelter

The West had all the tools to foresee Russia's war against Ukraine - and chose to ignore them. Even before 2014, analysis reached NATO's highest offices: the annexation of Crimea, the threat to Mariupol, the Russian Federation's dominance in the Black Sea. The forecasts were accurate, but most member states opted for the illusion of partnership with the Kremlin.

Are changes still possible? What is required to achieve them? And can NATO remain an effective security alliance in a new era of threats? These and other questions were addressed in an interview with Sestry by Dr Stefanie Babst - one of the most influential security strategists in Europe, who worked at NATO for over 20 years, including as Head of the Strategic Foresight Team. Today, she is an independent analyst, the author of a book on the West's «blind spots» in its strategy toward Russia, and an active participant in international discussions on war, peace and security.

Ukraine, Russia and the strategic miscalculations of the West

Maryna Stepanenko: You led NATO's Strategic Foresight Team. How do you assess the West's ability to foresee Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine? Were there signals that were simply not heard, or perhaps deliberately ignored?

‍Stefanie Babst: There were many warnings that went unheeded. Allow me to explain. In international relations, it is crucial to accurately assess the mindset, capabilities and intentions of another actor. NATO failed to do this with Russia. As the Head of Strategic Foresight at the Alliance, I issued the first serious warning in 2013 - a few months before the annexation of Crimea. I presented an analysis outlining Russia's malicious intentions and its military preparations against Ukraine.

It was reviewed by the Secretary General and discussed with member states, but no action was taken

Some countries - the Baltic States and Poland - took the analysis seriously. Others - notably Germany, the United States and the United Kingdom - preferred to maintain the NATO-Russia partnership. From 2014 onwards, we intensified our analysis, forecasting actions such as the seizure of Mariupol, dominance in the Black Sea and the use of Donbas as a staging ground. These forecasts were presented at the highest levels, including the NATO Council, but were ultimately dismissed.

In 2015 and 2016, we broadened our focus to include China and its ties with Russia, offering future scenarios and forecasting so-called «black swans» - high-impact events that are hard to predict, seem unlikely but could have serious consequences if they occur. Again, many perceived this only as «intellectual exercises». Thus, NATO possessed the tools of foresight - and chose to ignore them. And that comes at a very high cost.

In your work, you call for a review of the West's strategy toward Russia. In your view, what «blind spots» remain in Western approaches - particularly regarding support for Ukraine?

Three years ago, I called for a powerful, multifaceted deterrence strategy to help Ukraine not just freeze the war but win it. I invoked George Kennan's Cold War approach, urging the use of all available instruments - economic, diplomatic and military - to push Russia out of Ukraine. But apart from some Baltic and Northern European countries, no one took this seriously.

NATO and the EU still lack a defined end goal. If Ukraine's victory were the objective, a corresponding strategy would have been developed

Instead, Western leaders underestimated Ukraine's resilience and failed to act decisively even after Russia crossed countless red lines. President Biden, despite his commitment to Ukraine, framed his approach around what the United States would not do: we will not provoke Russia, we will not give Ukrainians long-range weapons, we will not do this or that. This is not a strategy. Now, with Trump’s return, many European governments are passively hoping for a US-Russian agreement that merely freezes the war - something I believe is dangerous both for Ukraine and Europe.

My main criticism is the lack of political will in the West. Too many still see this as Russia's war against Ukrainians. But it is our war too

Stefanie, why do you think Europe failed to prepare effectively for Trump’s presidency?

Planning within NATO and European governments is often difficult, as politicians typically focus on short-term goals, usually only a month ahead. In times of emergency, particularly due to Washington's unpredictability, Europe must abandon crisis management mode and stop reacting to every event, such as a new tweet.

Europe must be firm with the United States, clearly communicating that their actions - including threats to countries like Canada and Denmark, withholding intelligence from Ukraine and halting cyber operations against Russia - are unacceptable. These decisions had deadly consequences, and member states should not be afraid to hold the United States accountable for violating the fundamental principles of the Washington Treaty.

Mark Rutte, the NATO Secretary General, recently visited Florida to meet President Trump, hoping to impress him with defence spending figures. He praised Trump’s leadership and even claimed that Trump had «broken the deadlock» in relations with Russia. However, this is detached from the reality of ongoing Russian attacks.

If the NATO Secretary General lacks a clear message, the best approach is silence, focusing on supporting member states and protecting them from any threat. We do not have time for empty words and political games.

Europeans must remain immune to American political theatre, focusing on strengthening defence capability and supporting Ukraine’s defence industry so it can resist Russian aggression

Migration and war

Germany is no longer the EU leader in asylum requests from South American and Middle Eastern refugees. At the same time, in the first quarter of 2025, applications from Ukrainians rose by 84 per cent. What does this indicate?

It is entirely understandable that many Ukrainians have chosen to leave their country for personal and professional reasons - this is natural, and no one should be blamed for it. But this migration has political consequences in Germany, particularly when far-right parties exploit it by portraying Ukrainian refugees as a burden on the social system, regardless of their skills or motivation. These sentiments are especially strong in eastern Germany, where parties like AfD and certain left-wing populist movements have gained support.

What concerns me is the lack of strong counteraction from the federal government in Berlin - clearer messaging and political leadership are needed

If more Ukrainians arrive, I hope the next government will take a positive stance, recognising that many of them can significantly contribute to the German workforce. This would mean reducing bureaucracy, accelerating integration and facilitating their employment. Whether this happens remains to be seen.

Continuing on this topic, in recent weeks, some districts in Germany have publicly declared that they can no longer accommodate Ukrainian refugees due to overburdened social systems. How do you assess these sentiments?

It is true that local communities across Germany still face difficulties in accommodating refugees - an issue that arose after Chancellor Merkel’s decision to open the borders, leading to a large influx of refugees from Syria, Afghanistan and other countries. Many municipalities remain overwhelmed by demands for housing, language training and integration support. However, Ukrainian refugees do not pose the same challenges.

Ukrainians generally integrate well, bring strong skills and education and do not contribute to social tensions

In contrast, some refugees from the Middle East struggle to adapt to liberal democratic norms, which fuels far-right narratives, particularly in eastern Germany. Parties like AfD and figures such as Sahra Wagenknecht exploit this, promoting anti-Ukrainian, pro-concession rhetoric that ignores the reality of Russian occupation.

Unfortunately, mainstream democratic parties are not doing enough to push them back. With growing support from American right-wing populists, such as those connected to Trump or Musk, this polarisation may deepen further, posing a serious threat to democratic cohesion in Europe.

Europe on the brink of war

Amid full-scale war in Ukraine, initiatives have emerged in Poland and Germany to prepare schoolchildren for emergencies. Does this indicate a deeper shift in Europe's security culture, where defence is no longer solely the army's responsibility, but that of the entire society?

Although some defence-related courses have begun in Germany, they remain insufficient, and the wider public remains largely unprepared - both mentally and physically - to play a defensive role.

Serious debates are now underway about reinstating military conscription, but surveys show that two-thirds of people aged 20 to 30 would refuse to serve, with many saying they would rather emigrate than defend the country.

This reflects a deeper issue: decades of political messaging have conditioned Germans to believe they live in peace, surrounded by allies, and need not prepare for conflict

As a result, Germany also lacks bunkers for emergencies, civil defence training and basic resilience measures for the population. Changing this mindset will require strong political leadership. Without it, the Bundeswehr will remain under-equipped and unable to contribute significantly to efforts such as a potential coalition in Ukraine.

We see civil defence becoming part of public policy, from educating children to testing alarm systems. Is Europe beginning to think seriously about its own resilience in the face of potential escalation beyond Ukraine?

Undoubtedly. Some countries, such as Finland, Sweden, Poland and the Baltic States, have prioritised both military capability and societal resilience in recent years. In cities such as Riga and Warsaw, the Russian threat is well understood. However, countries like Germany, Belgium, Portugal, France and others still view Russia’s war against Ukraine as a regional issue.

Fortunately, leaders such as Kaja Kallas are advocating for a long-term strategy against Russia. Since the start of Russia’s full-scale invasion, I have argued that we must prepare for a protracted conflict, as long as Putin’s regime remains in power, Russia will continue to pose a threat to Ukraine and the whole of Europe.

Strategic vision

Given your views on NATO's evolution and the need for a new coalition, potentially the so-called «coalition of the willing», how do you envisage its structure? What strategic or institutional frameworks will be important to effectively counter Russian aggression, considering internal challenges within NATO, particularly due to the influence of populist leaders, including Trump?

During my time at NATO, I was proud of my team’s ability to anticipate challenges before they emerged, especially regarding NATO’s enlargement. I was actively involved in the admission of new members, including the Baltic States, Slovenia and Slovakia.

One of the moments I had hoped to witness was seeing Ukraine’s flag at NATO headquarters, but I no longer believe that is a realistic goal

Instead, I believe Ukraine should focus on building a new coalition with like-minded countries, rather than pursuing NATO membership. The Alliance, particularly under the influence of destructive politics, is becoming increasingly divided.

If I were advising President Zelensky, I would recommend not wasting energy on NATO accession but rather focusing on strengthening a broader, more flexible alliance to counter Russian aggression. This would allow us to move beyond the status quo and prepare for the future.

Considering the current dynamics within NATO, how long do you think the Alliance can maintain its current structure before significant changes become inevitable? Do you have a timeframe in mind?

When President Trump was elected, I predicted he would undermine the rules-based order, and we are already seeing significant damage done to NATO, especially concerning the US commitments. European countries have started discussing enhancing the European pillar within NATO, planning to prepare for a potential US withdrawal within five to ten years. However, I believe that timeframe is overly optimistic - we may have only five to ten months before we witness new disruptions.

Looking back, it is clear NATO missed the opportunity to prepare for these challenges. In 2016, I prepared a document for the Secretary General outlining potential harm Trump could cause, but it was dismissed at the time. The issues I raised remain relevant today, and NATO's bureaucracy is too risk-averse to plan for unforeseen scenarios.

If the Alliance fails to act, it risks becoming a reactive organisation that merely responds to Trump’s tweets instead of proactively working toward the future

I hope that countries such as France, the United Kingdom and Northern European states will cooperate with Ukraine to create a new joint alliance capable of better confronting future challenges.

Cover photo: MANDEL NGAN/AFP/East News

This project is co-financed by the Polish-American Freedom Foundation under the «Support Ukraine» programme, implemented by the Education for Democracy Foundation

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Negotiations in Riyadh, agreements on navigation in the Black Sea, and now the White House's attempts to achieve a truce by April 20th - all these steps create the illusion of diplomatic progress. But is this truly a step towards peace or another political manoeuvre?

Russia, despite its promises, continues to attack Ukraine’s energy infrastructure. The West, meanwhile, is considering easing sanctions against the Russian agricultural sector, even though Moscow has made no concessions. All this is happening against the backdrop of the Trump administration’s attempts to use the war for its own geopolitical game.

Does the White House have a clear strategy, or is it merely an attempt to secure a «success» before Easter? Is diplomacy turning into a tool for weakening sanctions that ultimately benefits the Kremlin? This is the subject of an exclusive interview with John Bolton - American Republican politician, diplomat and former National Security Advisor to Donald Trump (2018-2019).

The negotiation process

‍Maryna Stepanenko: Last week, we saw another round of negotiations in Riyadh. How would you assess their progress?

‍John Bolton: Certain agreements were reached regarding a ceasefire in the Black Sea in terms of the conditions under which commercial vessels may freely cross the Black Sea without being attacked. Commercial vessels must not be used for military purposes. And I believe we have generally returned to what was being discussed with Turkey back in 2022.

This may be progress, but I believe Russia is as interested in this as Ukraine, so that they can transport part of their agricultural products. I do not believe this necessarily guarantees progress in ceasing hostilities on land or towards a more comprehensive ceasefire, let alone a final settlement.

We witnessed Russia breaking its promise to stop strikes on Ukrainian energy infrastructure. Moreover, the attacks have not only continued but intensified. Now we have agreements aimed at ensuring safe navigation in the Black Sea and preventing the use of commercial vessels for military purposes. How can the United States guarantee that Russia will honour any agreements, given its history of violating international commitments?

I do not believe any guarantees exist. That is precisely why President Zelenskyy is so adamant about security guarantees - he understands Russia’s track record all too well.

An agreement can be reached on almost anything, but a Russian signature will not prevent a third invasion if Moscow decides to launch it

Many of these errors were made in 2014, ultimately leading to Russia’s second invasion. But the damage has been done, and the idea that the simple signing of a document ensures lasting peace and stability is fundamentally flawed - especially if the agreement leaves certain territories in Russian hands, making it inherently inadequate.

The United States announced its intention to support the resumption of Russian exports of agricultural products and fertilisers, including by lowering maritime insurance costs and improving access to ports and payment systems. Does this not contradict existing sanctions policy, particularly given the lack of Russian concessions toward achieving real peace?

Yes, I believe this reflects a relaxation of sanctions that provides Russia with more economic opportunities than it previously had, without any clear justification. Ukraine has been relatively successful in exporting its agricultural products from Odesa via the Dardanelles and the Bosphorus.

I am not certain it will truly benefit from this agreement. It offers certain assurances that vessels will not become targets, but ultimately, the real beneficiary of the Black Sea deal may very well be Russia.

Does this initiative not set a precedent whereby Moscow can use diplomatic negotiations as a tool to ease sanctions without altering its aggressive policies?

Russia's short-term diplomatic strategy is quite clear: to lift as many restrictions and as much pressure as possible while continuing to wage war, particularly as they believe the battlefield dynamics favour them.

Their primary objective is to ease the economic pressure they are facing. Although this pressure has not been as severe as it could have been, it is still significant enough to prompt them to seek relief

The real question is why the United States should provide such relief if Russia is not changing its behaviour. If they are not making meaningful concessions on a ceasefire or demonstrating genuine intent to end the war, then there is no justification for reducing pressure. Thus far, they have shown no signs of doing either.

Peace by Easter

The White House is seeking to broker a ceasefire agreement by April 20th, which this year coincides with Easter for both Catholics and Orthodox Christians. In your opinion, does the Trump administration have a specific strategy for this?

No, I do not believe there is a specific strategy. At best, Trump has moved from claiming he could resolve the war in a single day to postponing the timeline to April. By Easter, there may be a declaration of progress so that he can claim success, but I would be very surprised if a comprehensive ceasefire were achieved by then.

As I see it, the Kremlin does not consider a ceasefire to be in its interests. They are willing to humour Trump because they have already secured major concessions from him on long-term matters - no full restoration of Ukraine’s sovereignty and territorial integrity, no NATO membership and no NATO security guarantees. The Russians do not wish to risk losing these advantages. Therefore, while they may engage in negotiations, there is no real indication that they intend to alter their long-term objectives.

US Special Representative Steve Witkoff identified the greatest obstacle to resolving the war in Ukraine as the status of Crimea and the four regions of mainland Ukraine occupied by Russia, calling them the «elephant in the room» in peace negotiations. Are there realistic scenarios for reclaiming these territories? What diplomatic, military or economic instruments might support this aim?

I believe there are alternatives, but they will likely involve a protracted war. The key issue is whether Ukraine can continue to fight if the United States again suspends military assistance. That is the leverage Trump possesses.

As for Witkoff, I believe he is frequently influenced by Russian propaganda, and what you have just mentioned is a prime example of that

The four regions and Crimea were not some internal issue - they were the targets of unprovoked Russian aggression both in 2014 and 2022. If anything, they are Russia’s problem, not Ukraine’s.

US National Security Advisor Mike Waltz proposed the idea of beginning negotiations to freeze front lines «where they currently stand». What consequences might this have?

Well, I am very concerned. One of the main issues I have with a ceasefire is that if it is declared along the current lines of contact and negotiations begin in Geneva, Vienna or even Riyadh, that line of ceasefire could quickly become a de facto border.

The longer the negotiations drag on, the more Russia will work to consolidate its presence - establishing administrative structures, integrating the occupied territories into its governance system and treating them as though they are part of Russia.

Eventually, they will claim that returning these territories is impossible. That is why I believe a ceasefire in this context poses a serious risk for Ukraine

Trump and Putin - a reset in relations

Russia speaks frequently of resetting relations with the United States. Is this realistic? What are the long-term security implications for the United States and NATO of Trump's growing trust in Putin?

Putin manipulates Trump with remarkable ease, relying on his KGB training and clear understanding of Russia’s strategic interests. Unlike him, Trump appears not to recognise any significant American interests in this situation.

He is willing to abandon Ukraine’s position because it simply does not matter to him

Trump sees his relationship with Putin as personal, believing that if he gets along with the Russian leader, then US-Russian relations must be strong. But Putin does not view it that way. This overly simplistic and naive approach to foreign policy - where everything is reduced to personal dynamics - is precisely what Putin exploits to achieve his own goals at Ukraine’s expense.

Recently, Bild published a rather dramatic report suggesting that Russia might invade Lithuanian territory as early as this autumn. How realistic is this scenario?

From a military standpoint, Russia could attempt such an operation, perhaps to secure a corridor to the Kaliningrad exclave. However, I do not think it is likely. Putin is eyeing several other parts of the former Soviet Union - Central Asia, the Caucasus and Moldova - where he might see opportunities to reassert Russian control.

If a ceasefire were reached in Ukraine, I believe he would prioritise these regions over the far riskier step of a direct invasion of NATO territory

However, if Trump continues to weaken NATO, Putin may eventually decide the risk is worth taking.

How would a potential US retreat from active European engagement under Trump affect the regional balance of power, and could the EU compensate for this security vacuum?

I believe that a US withdrawal from NATO would be a catastrophic mistake for both the United States and Europe.

Even a significant weakening of the Alliance would have serious consequences. Putin understands this well

He knows Trump is only in office for four years, and he may see this as an opportunity. Encouraging Trump to take steps that weaken or even dismantle NATO could bring long-term benefits for Russia. But Putin also realises that this window will not last forever - he cannot count on more than four years. That is why he is trying to manipulate Trump, seeking through diplomacy and political influence to achieve what the Russian military has so far failed to accomplish in Ukraine.

Given the current tensions in relations between Canada and the US - something few could have predicted - do you believe Canada might strengthen its cooperation with Europe to form a NATO-like alliance without the United States, in order to enhance European security?

Canada may attempt to do so, but it would be a serious mistake - for Canada, for Europe and for all interested parties. If the United States withdraws from NATO or if Europe effectively pushes the United States out, it will be a major blunder. Despite the damage that Trump has already caused and may yet cause, we must take a long-term perspective. He has 46 months left in office, but security relations between Europe and the United States will endure for decades. During the Cold War, one of Russia’s key objectives was to divide the West, but it never succeeded.

We now risk doing this to ourselves. It is absolutely vital to avoid that

It will not be easy with Trump, but we must remain focused on the long-term objective.

Trump’s approval ratings and another scandal in his administration

Although Trump's approval rating is at a personal high, it still remains below the 50 per cent threshold, and a slight majority of voters (51 per cent) currently disapprove of his performance. How focused is the American public on the White House's policy regarding Ukraine? Is there potential for public pressure on Trump to continue military support for Kyiv?

I still believe that is possible. Trump's approval ratings are declining, but for years, people have noted that he has what is often referred to as a «high floor and low ceiling» - meaning his ratings tend to remain within a narrow range.

At the same time, although Trump is the newly elected president, he is also a «lame duck» president, as he cannot run for a third term. This means his approval ratings could fall even further during a second term than they did during the first.

It is unclear how events will unfold, but for now, his ratings are gradually declining. If tariff uncertainty continues to affect the economy, this trend may persist.

Mr Bolton, during Donald Trump's first term, you served as his National Security Advisor. What was your initial reaction when you learned about the scandal involving the addition of The Atlantic’s editor-in-chief Jeffrey Goldberg to a closed chat where the topic of a US military strike on Yemen was discussed? What does such a precedent signify?

It was truly shocking. I cannot imagine why anyone would even consider using an unsecured, non-government communication channel. Signal is unlikely to replace the highly secure network that the US government has spent vast sums to develop over many years. No one has offered a reasonable explanation for this - because, frankly, I do not believe one exists. This is a serious issue for the Trump administration. We shall have to wait and see whether it dissipates or not.

But one thing is clear - when high-ranking American officials act so recklessly, it only encourages America’s adversaries to intensify their espionage efforts

During our conversation, you emphasised that Trump’s time in office is limited to four years and that he will eventually leave the White House. Do you believe JD Vance might be a contender to succeed him in the future? What would such a figure in the White House mean for America, the world and global security?

It is far from certain that he will even receive the Republican nomination. His chances will largely depend on how popular the Trump administration is two to two-and-a-half years from now. If the economy slips into recession due to tariffs, it will damage anyone associated with Trump's presidency.

Meanwhile, although the Democratic Party has shown little momentum in the four months since the election, it may field a strong candidate in 2028. There are no guarantees that Vance will win the nomination or become president.

Historically, only two vice presidents have been elected president immediately after their vice-presidential terms: George H. W. Bush in 1988 and, before him, Martin Van Buren in the early 19th century. It is a rare occurrence. Some vice presidents have won presidential elections later in their careers, but direct successors to the president they served with are extremely rare.

This project is co-financed by the Polish-American Freedom Foundation under the «Support Ukraine» programme, implemented by the Education for Democracy Foundation

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At around four o’clock in the morning, the first whistle of a missile echoed over Fedorivka. It flew so low that Oleksandra’s small dacha trembled. The dogs sprang to their feet, and she immediately understood - it had begun.

The first days of the Russian invasion in this small town in the Kyiv region were shrouded in a fog of chaos. The Russians advanced, seizing more and more territory with every passing hour. They moved forward from the Belarusian border, through Chornobyl, directly towards Kyiv. People fled their homes in panic, seeking safety, though no one truly knew where safety could be found. Shops emptied of food and anything that could provide warmth.

But Sasha had only one thought - there were over three thousand dogs in the shelter that needed feeding.

- I quickly ran out of petrol, so I walked through the nearby villages in search of food. I was away for a long time. When I returned, one of the shelter workers told me in horror that the Russians had entered. They were walking between the enclosures with automatic rifles, digging in. They set up a checkpoint on the road. He forbade me from going there. But I knew that our colleague, who had recently suffered a second heart attack, was still inside the shelter. My beloved pets were there. The adrenaline hit me so hard that I simply rushed towards the Russian checkpoint.

Dogs of war

Animals had always surrounded Oleksandra Mezinova. It was her parents who taught her respect and love for «our lesser brethren». Not only local strays but also wild, wounded animals seeking refuge would come to her family home near Kyiv. They treated them and returned them to the forest. They helped all creatures, regardless of condition or origin. They raised puppies and kittens before finding them homes. Oleksandra clearly remembers that receiving a puppy or kitten as a gift from her mother, a respected and beloved teacher at the school, was considered an honour.

When Oleksandra grew up, she realised she wanted to create a place that could provide shelter for a greater number of animals. A systematic solution - a real shelter, one that had not yet existed in Ukraine. At the time, she did not even know what it should be called, as such places had not existed in the Soviet Union.

The long road to its creation was filled with mistakes and successes. But finally, in October 2000, «Sirius» was founded

- I really like this star - it is bright and beautiful. I love astronomy. Along with history, it was my favourite subject in school. And my mother, a history teacher, told me a beautiful legend about Sirius, Orion’s dog. His master was fatally bitten by a scorpion, and he turned into a star along with him. Today, the bright Sirius shines in the sky in the constellation of the Great Dog.

The first to arrive was Nika, a dog with a broken leg. Although everything starts with just one dog, «Sirius» grows very quickly. For the first three years, everything is funded from the family budget, with a young son also in the picture. The beginning was difficult, but Oleksandra’s persistence - inherited from her mother - carried her through. More and more animals arrived at the shelter, more volunteers joined, and the work multiplied. The first sponsors appeared, helping to build her dream - a real shelter.

At the end of 2013, the Revolution of Dignity erupted. Quite unexpectedly, in a single night, Oleksandra’s son decided to switch to the Ukrainian language, and when Maidan began, he travelled to Kyiv with his father to stand on the barricades. Sasha could not leave the shelter but tried to be an active participant by bringing food to the protesters. At that time, Oleksandra did not yet know that the events on Independence Square would have such a profound impact on her shelter for homeless animals.

When the war in Donbas began a few months later, many of Oleksandra’s friends volunteered for the army and went to the ATO zone. They turned out to be highly sensitive to the unfair situation of animals, whose numbers grew daily along the front line. The first person they turned to was Oleksandra. This marked the beginning of a chain of aid created by volunteers working in Donbas, «Sirius» shelter staff and soldiers transporting animals from frontline villages to their new, safe home in Fedorivka.

None of us believed there would be a full-scale war

Oleksandra recalls that by December 2021, there was increasing talk that war was inevitable. A real, full-scale war. But no one believed that in the 21st century, in Europe, a neighbour could be attacked with such force. On December 5th, on the occasion of International Volunteer Day, President Zelensky presented awards. Although Oleksandra received the «Order of Princess Olga», what stood out most from that evening was his tense and stressed expression.

- He said that if it happened, we would all stand together, side by side. I remember it felt dissonant. Although I did not want to believe it, it worried me, and I could not stop thinking about it. I even considered stockpiling food just in case... But people reassured me, saying that nothing would happen. And when I heard the first whistle of missiles overhead, I realised I had made a terrible mistake in trusting them and not taking precautions.

First, she heard the war. At dawn, there was the whistle of missiles flying towards Kyiv. It woke her and her ten animals - dogs and cats. Everything around them trembled, the windowpanes vibrated, and her small dacha shook. Frightened dogs huddled together, and Oleksandra had only one thought: the war had begun. Thousands of thoughts swarmed in her mind, merging with images from the Second World War. She thought of bomb shelters, of the panic that was about to begin, of missiles soon to fall on Fedorivka, of chaos, of fleeing crowds, of kilometre-long traffic jams on the roads.

- I sat on the sofa, the dogs trembled, and I thought about how to evacuate 3500 animals. And suddenly, I told myself: «Sasha, stop. Wrap up. Start making a plan immediately. Point one: food»

Early in the morning, she set out in her car to visit the nearest villages. She entered shops, asked neighbours, and loaded her car with anything the dogs could eat. But after a day and a half, powerful explosions echoed - the bridges were blown up, the Russians surrounded the village, making escape impossible for those who remained. Complete isolation began. The explosions grew louder and louder, and Oleksandra began to pray that the missiles would not strike the village or the shelter. She knew that nineteen people had remained - staff members and volunteers who had come from distant regions and had nowhere to flee. She also did not know how much time they had left or how the Russians would approach them. People said the Russians would enter the village and shoot them all on sight. She found out only hours later when a shelter worker pulled her out of her panicked thoughts - the soldiers had just entered the shelter's territory.

- All I heard was that under no circumstances should I go there, that I had to hide. Military equipment had arrived, they were digging in, and there were many of them. They were running around the shelter with automatic rifles, while people had been herded into a tiny room guarded by a soldier with a gun. I immediately said that there was no other way, that I was running to the shelter - what about the people, what about my dogs? I heard that the Russians were aggressive and would kill me.

Sasha, together with the daughter of the manager who had recently suffered a second heart attack, set off running through the village. Adrenaline pounded in Sasha’s temples. From afar, it was already clear that the soldiers had quickly built trenches, and a camouflaged tank stood inside a dugout. There was also a checkpoint, flanked by soldiers with rifles, their barrels aimed directly at them. They slowed their pace and started walking towards them. When, twenty metres from the checkpoint, a soldier reloaded his weapon, they stopped and took their hands out of their pockets to show they were unarmed.

- I started shouting that my name was Oleksandra, that I was the director of the shelter located just beyond them, and that I needed to get there. They replied that no one was going anywhere and that we had to go home. I shouted that my people and my animals were there, but they only shook their heads in refusal. I demanded to be taken to their commander.

Something akin to madness took over her mind - she no longer cared whether or not they would start shooting. She saw her goal before her, oblivious to any obstacles. The Russians must have noticed it - her eyes burned with determination, she was furious, she was not backing down. With a nod of a gun barrel, they signalled her to follow them.

The commander was aggressive, but Sasha ignored it. She started talking about the shelter, about the people, about the shortage of food. She stated outright that she intended to drive through their checkpoint several times a day as she searched the surrounding areas for food for the animals.

- At the end of my speech, he burst into laughter. He asked if I really thought I had come here to set conditions. Had I really come to an armed position, stood before him, counted on my fingers what I needed, and expected him to give it to me? He had never seen anything like it before. And perhaps, that is exactly what worked.

He agreed but noted that any vehicle passing through would be inspected each time and that he would personally visit the shelter to check whether she was telling the truth. As we left him and walked towards the shelter, I felt a tingling sensation in my spine - I was almost certain that I would be shot in the back.

When they reached the shelter, they saw terrified staff. The Russians had lined them up and ordered them to surrender their phones so that no one could contact the outside world or relay any information to the Ukrainian army. Not everyone obeyed. When they found a hidden phone, they threw the previously confiscated ones onto the ground and demonstratively shot at them, nearly hitting the workers’ feet.

The vanishing voices

When someone enters the shelter and walks along the rows of enclosures, whether they come to adopt a pet or bring food, the residents erupt in noise. Dogs bark, howl and exchange signals. One can only imagine the racket caused by more than three thousand dogs all at once. Oleksandra always warns visitors not to run between the rows, as it only agitates them further, and the canine uproar carries for kilometres.

- The Russian soldiers entered the shelter armed, aggressive, ready to kill. They ran between the rows and among the dogs... and the dogs fell silent. They simply froze and stared at them. To this day, I do not understand what happened, not even cynologists can explain this phenomenon. When I left the shelter and walked through the village, someone asked me: so, Sasha, did they shoot all your dogs?

At that moment, a deathly silence, unlike anything she had ever experienced before, settled into her consciousness. It was only after liberation that it became clear this reaction had saved the dogs’ lives. After de-occupation, dog owners who had lost their pets - once adopted from «Sirius» - came to the shelter searching for them. There were cases where Russian soldiers, upon hearing a dog bark, would throw a grenade over the fence. They might not have even seen the dog, but they fired blindly to silence it. Many animals were killed this way near Kyiv. But inside the shelter, the silence lasted until the occupation ended.

Sometimes, the dogs howled when they heard a missile or an aircraft flying overhead, but then they would hide in their kennels, curling up - hungry and frightened

- I had a habit with the dogs where I would extend my hand through the fence, and they would push their nose or paw through, and that is how we greeted each other. During the occupation, I also had to walk around the shelter often, checking if everything was all right. I did not want to do it - I could not bear to look at the dogs. Then I learned not to look them in the eyes because, a few times, I extended my hand as always, but they did not understand. They were so hungry, and I was offering them an empty hand... I saw the question in their eyes: where is the food? Why are you treating us like this? The pain tore my heart apart. Today, I think that was the most terrifying and difficult task for me. Even speaking with the Russians was not such a nightmare.

But encounters with Russian army soldiers were far from pleasant. What did it matter that, thanks to the commander, they were allowed to cross the checkpoints daily if the soldiers emerged with raised guns and fury in their eyes? The moment the car window rolled down was a daily test of psychological endurance. One never knew what might set them off that day. Over time, the Russians became increasingly bitter, as their «three-day special military operation» was not going as planned. The soldiers started drinking, taking drugs, and often tormenting people without reason-causing both moral and physical harm.

A particularly difficult moment came when He stood at the checkpoint. Always masked, mysterious, and often reeking of alcohol. Someone in the village had told him that Oleksandra sang beautifully, and since then, he would not leave her alone. He liked her as a woman, making checkpoint crossings a psychological nightmare for her.

- He started calling me Prima Donna. Today, I laugh about it, but it was horrifying. Whenever he saw me in the car, he would bow deeply and say: «Prima Donna, please, please, you are most welcome». Then he decided they would organise a concert where I would sing.

Sasha was to sing for the Russian soldiers. A concert for them in the occupied territory. She immediately understood that ultimately, she could not refuse him because if she did, it might be the last decision she ever made. Though she had struggled with sleep since the invasion began, by then, she was no longer sleeping at all. She constantly had headaches, a racing heartbeat, and dark spots before her eyes. She started thinking about escaping through the forest, knowing that the «boys from the ATO» were there. But if she ran, she would never return here, the animals would starve to death, and everything she had done so far would be lost and wasted. And in that moment, too, she heard growling. Her voice became low, her throat tightened so much that she could barely speak.

She was like a sleepwalker in a nightmare that refused to end. Sasha tried to explain to the masked soldier that her voice was hoarse, that the stress had robbed her of it entirely, and that she could not sing

- One day, I told him: you are not a fool. I am Ukrainian - how can I possibly give you a concert? And in response, he once again invited me for champagne. He insisted that I was so understanding and that he could talk to me about interesting things. That champagne of theirs had likely been stolen from some shop. They were drinking expensive French champagne while occupying my city. I was afraid that one day, this could end very badly for me - when he got drunk, and I refused him again. I started avoiding confrontation in the evenings, hiding in the darkness in the back seat of the car.

In isolation

Information from the outside world rarely reached Fedorivka. Sometimes, text messages came through - even strangers would ask Oleksandra if she was still alive. The local residents knew little about what was happening in the country, about what was happening on the frontline. To contact relatives meant taking a deadly risk. There were only a few places in the village where a radio signal could be found. Sometimes, just sending a simple «I am alive» message was enough, but occasionally, it was even possible to make a brief phone call. The Russians must have received information from someone in the village because they quickly found these locations and began setting up ambushes. They would arrive in civilian cars when no one expected them, jumping out with weapons. One time, even Sasha was caught.

- I was standing with a friend, and there was another woman talking to her son on the phone. When I saw them approaching, I hid mine in my shoe. But one of them noticed. He knew who I was, of course. I was incredibly lucky because he pretended not to see anything. The woman, on the other hand, had her phone confiscated, and she fell into hysterics. She began shouting that it was her only way to contact her son, who... was serving in our army.

One of the soldiers immediately reloaded his weapon, convinced that she was passing on secret information to the Ukrainian Armed Forces. The woman's hysteria irritated them even more. Oleksandra sensed that a tragedy was about to unfold. She decided to approach them and, in a calm voice, said: «Look at her. She is just a simple village woman. What could she possibly know? She is only talking to her child. Does a mother not worry about you?» Then, by some miracle, her life was spared, but Oleksandra never saw her again.

Nor did she ever see the soldier who had lied, pretending he had not seen her hide the phone in her shoe. One morning, at dawn, she drove up to the checkpoint and saw the Russians hurriedly loading all their belongings into vehicles. They were clearly racing against time.

- I stopped, rolled down the window, and asked: «Where are you going, boys? Finally heading home?» I said it mockingly, as I always liked to provoke them a little. But they replied that they were going to Donbas. They were furious.

When the Russians fled and the occupation ended, volunteers from all over the world, including Poland, arrived in Fedorivka and the surrounding villages. Although Oleksandra welcomed them, gave interviews, and showed many people the shelter, something strange was happening in her mind. She understood that the occupation was over, but her body, her thoughts, her behaviour were still trapped there. Sasha even stopped at the checkpoints that no longer existed. She lived in this tension for another three months while the world's attention was still focused on this region - after all, Bucha and Irpin, less than fifty kilometres away, were making headlines in newspapers around the world. Volunteers and journalists were already on-site, and local residents were returning.

One morning, Oleksandra woke up and realised that today she had nowhere to go. No interviews, no need to run for food for the animals. And suddenly - all the commotion disappeared. In one second, she realised that she was finally free. Only one thing did not return to its place. Oleksandra cleared her throat loudly.

- I do not know, maybe one day my voice will come back to me. Maybe one day I will sing again, because I love singing. Maybe that will happen when the occupation ends - but across my entire country.