Щоб розпочати війну, не потрібні бомби. Все, що вам потрібно, це вдалий фейк

Joanna Mosiej: I would like to begin our conversation with your family history, because on many levels it serves as a metaphor for our Polish-Ukrainian relations. I am referring to your ancestors, the Szeptycki brothers. Roman (Andrey Sheptytsky - head of the Ukrainian Greek Catholic Church, Metropolitan of Galicia, Archbishop of Lviv (1901–1944) - Edit.) converted to the Greek Catholic faith, entered a monastery, and later became Metropolitan. Another brother, Stanisław, first served in the Austrian army, and after the war became a general in the Polish army. Both were patriots, individuals deeply devoted to the countries they served. And they maintained a fraternal bond.

Professor Andrzej Szeptycki: Of the five Szeptycki brothers, two identified themselves as Ukrainians - Metropolitan Andrey Sheptytsky and Blessed Father Klymentiy - and three were Poles. I am referring to General Stanisław Szeptycki and also his brothers, Aleksander and my great-grandfather Leon. Metropolitan Andrey and Father Klymentiy regularly came on holiday to rest at the family home in Prylbichi in the Yavoriv district, where my great-grandfather Leon Szeptycki later lived. Despite their national differences, they maintained good relations with each other until the end of their lives.

They proved to us that different national identities can coexist without excluding one another.

I believe it was also very important that in the case of each of them, national identity was a significant element of life, but not the only one. In the case of Metropolitan Andrey and Father Klymentiy, their vocation and religious choices were primary as clergy. General Stanisław Szeptycki, as a soldier of that time, first served in the Austro-Hungarian and then in the Polish army and sought to serve his country well. They were certainly patriots - of each nation with which they identified. On the other hand, it is very important that they were certainly not nationalists. And this allowed them to respect different views while remaining close to one another.

Was such a legacy, a borderland identity, a value or a curse for your family? How does it define you?

During the communist period, it was somewhat of a challenge, a burden. The communist authorities viewed representatives of the former noble class negatively. In the case of the Szeptycki family, this was further combined with a very strong propaganda narrative directed against Ukrainians in Poland. And, of course, directed personally against Metropolitan Andrey, who was portrayed as a Ukrainian nationalist and spiritual father of the Ukrainian Insurgent Army. During the communist period, and even in the 1990s, relatives quite regularly heard that Szeptycki is a Banderite». Nowadays, this has practically disappeared. I experienced this myself in 2023 when I was running an election campaign. The few voter reactions to my name were generally positive. In this sense, it is a significant change.

Apart from comments on social media, of course.

Yes, there I am often called Szeptycki - a Ukrainian, a Banderite. And surely there is a portion of society that will always react in this way. Returning to how it defines me, ever since our student years, my cousins and I have quite often travelled around Ukraine.

Some of us needed only one trip, while others stayed longer, for life. My cousin moved to Lviv a few years ago at the age of 50. Another cousin established the Szeptycki Family Foundation, which became actively involved in supporting Ukraine after February 24th 2022.

How do you explain this outburst of solidarity among us in 2022?

I believe there are three important factors. Firstly, the simple human need to help. Altruism which arises when we witness the suffering of others and react without much consideration.

Secondly, the shared experience of Russian imperialism. This has always resonated with Polish society. It is worth recalling the Polish response to the war in Chechnya - the reception of refugees, the clear sympathies. Or the year 2008 and the war in Georgia. Poland does not have strong cultural or geographical ties with Georgia, yet the reaction was vivid. We remember President Lech Kaczyński’s visit to Tbilisi and his prophetic words: today Georgia, tomorrow Ukraine, the day after, perhaps the Baltic states, and then Poland. But most importantly - and in my opinion decisively - is the fact that none of this arose in a vacuum. This solidarity did not suddenly sprout in a desert, but on rather fertile ground which Poles and Ukrainians had been cultivating together over the past three decades.

From the 1990s, both sides carried out considerable work to develop interpersonal contacts. In 2022, many Poles were not helping «refugees». We were, for the most part, simply helping friends

Keeping in mind the great importance of the prior presence of Ukrainian refugees who had arrived in Poland since 2014, economic migrants from Ukraine, and the Ukrainian minority, primarily descendants of the victims of Operation Vistula.

Of course. Since the beginning of the war, that is, since 2014, or even since 2004, the Ukrainian minority in Poland has played an important role in supporting Ukraine - collecting funds, purchasing equipment, sending that equipment to the frontline. And receiving Ukrainian military refugees after February 24th 2022. Undoubtedly, the role of this community cannot be overestimated.

Precisely. You have been researching Polish-Ukrainian relations for many years. How have they changed? How has the Poles’ perception of Ukrainians changed?

It has been a long process. From the establishment of mutual contacts in the 1990s, through the Orange Revolution, the Revolution of Dignity - up to 2022. And, on the other hand, through the long-term presence in Poland of a significant group of economic migrants from Ukraine. Let us not forget that none of this would have been possible without the consistency of Poland’s Eastern policy and the legacy of the thought of the Paris-based «Kultura» and Jerzy Giedroyc personally. This belief in the importance of Ukraine, the importance of good relations, the necessity of support.

We were the first country to recognise Ukraine’s independence.

And it is worth mentioning a very important, albeit little-known, moment in Polish-Ukrainian relations on the eve of the USSR’s collapse, namely the participation of the Polish delegation of civic committees in the 1st Congress of the People’s Movement in Kyiv in 1989. The presence of representatives of the Polish civic committees, including Adam Michnik and Bogdan Borusewicz, was a symbolic gesture of support for Ukraine from Polish «Solidarity» at a time when Poland was still part of the Warsaw Pact and Ukraine still within the USSR.

And what were the subsequent milestones of our cooperation?

First and foremost, the three key events of the past two decades, which I have already mentioned: the Orange Revolution, the Revolution of Dignity, and the full-scale Russian invasion in 2022. Each of these was met in Poland with clear public interest and a broad response of solidarity.

A sense of shared destiny, the legacy of Solidarity and the struggle for independence played an important role. At times, analogies were even drawn: it was said that Ukrainians in 2022 found themselves in a situation similar to that faced by Poles during the Second World War. The exhibition «Warsaw - Mariupol: cities of ruins, cities of struggle, cities of hope» was one such attempt to draw this symbolic parallel: cities levelled to the ground, the suffering of civilians, resistance. But it was also accompanied by another, no less important conviction: that Ukrainians today are facing something we, fortunately, are not experiencing - a classic violent conflict with Russian imperialism. And this solidarity manifested itself in Polish assistance.

What can we do to ensure this unprecedented solidarity seen in 2022 is not wasted? Today, in addition to the demons of the past, such as Volyn’ and the issue of exhumations, there are pressing social and economic problems.

Firstly, it is important to realise that no surge of solidarity lasts forever. The enthusiasm for Ukrainians that erupted after the beginning of the Russian invasion has gradually waned, and we are now in a phase where tension and fatigue are beginning to accumulate.

For most of its recent history, Poland has been a country of emigration - people left in search of work, bread, a better life. The issue of immigration was virtually absent from public debate. Today, the situation has changed. Around two million Ukrainians live in Poland - both economic migrants and people who fled the war. This is an entirely new social reality and a challenge to which we must respond consciously. Other challenges, including economic ones, must also be taken into account.

The pandemic, war and inflation - all of these influence the public sentiment. When people start running out of money, their willingness to show solidarity with «new neighbours» may weaken

Especially since they are constantly exposed to populist narratives claiming that immigrants take away our social benefits and our places in the queue for doctors. And that Ukraine does not agree to exhumations.

Yes, this is precisely why Polish-Ukrainian relations are no longer merely a matter of the past, but one of the key challenges for the future of Central and Eastern Europe. It is therefore important to defuse historical disputes, such as those concerning exhumations. It is very good that an agreement has recently been reached on this issue. Even if discussions on exhumations in the short term revive the Volyn’ issue, in the long term they will help resolve it. However, it is important to recognise - and I say this quite often to both Polish and Ukrainian partners - that at present, the key issue is not history. A major challenge lies in the broad economic matters related to Ukraine’s accession to the European Union.

We must recognise that Ukraine is not a failed state from which only unskilled workers or refugees come to Poland.

Despite the war, Ukraine has advantages in many areas that will pose a challenge to Poland when it joins the EU single market

Of course, Ukraine's accession to the EU is in Poland’s strategic interest. However, these are developments that we must be aware of, which we must closely observe and take action to prevent conflicts in these areas.

Therefore, at present, the real challenge is not the issue of the Volyn’ massacre, but rather how to adapt the common agricultural policy to the potential of Ukrainian agriculture. Naturally, it is also essential to prevent the escalation of social antagonism.

How does Polish-Ukrainian academic cooperation appear against this background?

Today, around 9% of students at Polish universities are international, almost half of whom are Ukrainian. The academic world, in line with its longstanding European tradition, is multinational. Universities have always been places of openness and tolerance; today, they develop programmes for support, equality and diversity. These are initiatives and responsibilities undertaken by the universities themselves.

Of course, there are always areas that can be improved. I am thinking, for example, of efforts to achieve better integration within the university. It often happens that we have two or three student communities living separately – students from Poland, English-speaking students and students from the East, mainly Ukrainians and Belarusians. We are working to ensure that these two or three communities come closer together.

You are responsible for international cooperation. In Ukraine, claims are heard that Poland is «draining» its intellectual capital. This is a well-known phenomenon here too - for years, it has been said that the best Polish academics leave for the West. What does this circulation between Poland and Ukraine look like?

Before February 24th 2022, around 500 Ukrainian academics worked in Polish universities. After the outbreak of war, this number doubled. Initially, there were special support measures - help with finding housing, work, a safe place - but quite quickly we realised that a change of perspective was needed.

Our goal is not a brain drain, but a brain circulation - a circulation of knowledge, ideas and experience

This is precisely why today, as a ministry, we support projects involving researchers and institutions from both countries. Those that build a joint research space.

A concrete example of such cooperation is the project of Vasyl Stefanyk Precarpathian National University in Ivano-Frankivsk, which, together with the Centre for East European Studies, rebuilt the pre-war university observatory «White Elephant» on Mount Pip Ivan. A functioning research station was created from ruins. Now the two universities are seeking funding for a telescope, the third stage of the project. This is an example of concrete cooperation based on partnership, not asymmetry.

Another example is Mykulychyn, a village in the Ukrainian Carpathians, where a Polish-Ukrainian youth meeting centre is being built. During my recent visit there, the first meeting took place with the participation of students from several Ukrainian universities and the University of Warsaw. It is in such places - in conversations, debates, joint projects - that the next generation of mutual understanding is born.

There is a real chance that this generation will get to know each other not through stereotypes, but through experience and culture.

Yes, but much work still lies ahead. I remember a study conducted, I believe, in 2021. Poles were asked which Ukrainian authors they knew, and Ukrainians were asked which Polish authors they knew. It turned out that 95% of Poles had never read a book by a Ukrainian author - and vice versa. What followed was even more interesting. Ukrainians associated Polish authors with Sienkiewicz and Sapkowski, while Poles named Gogol and Oksana Zabuzhko among Ukrainian authors. In terms of getting to know one another, including through culture, we still have much work to do.

But it is also important not to reduce each other to a kind of ethno-folklore, because we have much more to offer one another. We are united by common aspirations and hopes. And commonality does not always arise from similarity. It also arises from the desire to coexist despite differences and wounds.

In January, another group assembled by Russian special services was discovered in Poland. It attempted to influence Polish elections by spreading disinformation. However, Moscow exerts its influence over European countries not only through such tools. As a result, pro-Russian sentiments in Europe are strengthening, and far-right political parties are gaining increasingly strong positions.

German politician («Alliance 90/The Greens»), MEP (2004-2019) and Vice Chair of the Supervisory Board of the European Centre for Press and Media Freedom, Rebecca Harms, gave an exclusive interview to Sestry, discussing the biggest challenges the EU faces due to Russia’s actions and whether Europe is doing enough to counter them.

Russia’s Influence in Europe

‍Maryna Stepanenko: In June, the EU banned European political parties, think tanks and other organisations from receiving funding from Russia. However, are there loopholes that still allow Moscow to extend its influence over European countries?

Rebecca Harms: We have a new example based on an investigation by German journalists and disinformation experts. We know that since November 2024, a systematic campaign against German politicians has been underway. It is linked to the Russian troll factory once run by the late Yevgeny Prigozhin. Investigators discovered that more than 100 fake websites had been created to conduct campaigns against Vice Chancellor Robert Habeck and Foreign Minister Annalena Baerbock, spreading grotesque and false information about them.

I believe something similar has been happening in most EU member states, ever since Russia decided to launch an information war and support anti-democratic and pro-Kremlin parties across the European Union

Russia is actively trying to influence countries such as Armenia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Georgia, Moldova and Serbia through economic, political and military pressure. Why is it important for them to maintain a European orientation? How can Germany and the EU strengthen their support for these countries to achieve this goal?

We do not have a magic toolkit for these countries, but much depends on whether there is a critical mass of citizens and politicians within them who can resist. Take Armenia, for example. Pro-Kremlin and authoritarian leaders lost the elections, allowing Pashinyan and his government to come to power. This demonstrates a certain resilience, and the European Union should support it, including by keeping the prospect of Armenia’s EU membership open.

You also mentioned Moldova. Partly thanks to Ukraine’s efforts, it has not only gained the prospect of EU membership but will soon begin accession negotiations. In some cases, external support matters. However, in Georgia, challenges have increased following recent elections. Nevertheless, the European Union continues to use democratic and legal mechanisms to encourage Tbilisi to return to democratic governance.

The rise of far-right sentiments in many European countries is often accompanied by pro-Russian rhetoric. How seriously does this threaten European unity and what actions can effectively counter these trends?

The European Union cannot win this battle against Russia alone.

Resilience is needed, and at times - resistance both in EU member states and in countries under pressure. At the same time, the EU can provide crucial support

We see this happening now, as the EU increases its involvement in the Balkans, as well as in Georgia and Moldova. Unfortunately, in Georgia, the EU took too long to respond adequately to the shifting priorities of the ruling party, which is controlled by a Georgian oligarch. At the same time, President Salome Zourabichvili, whom I greatly respect, also took quite some time to take a clear stance against the government.

The EU has tools to ensure fair elections, monitor voting processes and respond to cases of election fraud. We also have mechanisms to promote media freedom, institutional independence and the rule of law. These tools are stronger within the EU, but citizens of countries under Russian pressure are increasingly recognising their importance.

Take Serbia, for example. We are now witnessing a powerful public reaction against deeply rooted corruption, which is directly linked to President Vučić and his closest circle.

Russian disinformation and elections

Early elections will soon take place in Germany. Have you noticed any further attempts at interference from Moscow, apart from the campaigns initiated by «trolls»? How do they occur?

Recent investigations confirm that Russian-controlled «bot farms» and influencers are actively spreading disinformation through social networks, using both state propaganda channels, such as Ruptly, and direct online manipulation. In addition, influential politicians promote pro-Russian narratives through media appearances. Some act voluntarily, so to speak, on a public basis, while others are likely financed by industrial empires linked to Putin.

The rhetoric of these individuals questions NATO and the EU. However, the full extent of their influence will only become clear over time

Two parties in Germany - the far-right AfD and the new party of Sahra Wagenknecht (The Sahra Wagenknecht Alliance, - Author) - openly promote Kremlin propaganda not only concerning Ukraine but also against Europe and democratic institutions. It remains unclear whether they receive direct funding from Russia or only indirect support. Meanwhile, within major parties such as the SPD and CDU, remnants of the old camp of «Putin-Verstehers» (a derogatory term for German politicians and experts who sympathise with Vladimir Putin and claim that Germans should understand his position, - Author) still argue that Russia is an important partner for Europe's stability and unity. This position is based on the outdated Russlandpolitik (Germany’s policy towards Russia, - Author), yet it still holds some influence.

Why do pro-Russian or openly anti-European candidates - such as Zoran Milanović in Croatia or Călin Georgescu in Romania - find support among the population? Is it linked to growing scepticism towards the EU or the influence of disinformation campaigns?

Through social networks and pro-Russian media, directly or indirectly supported by Russia, propagandists manage to convince people that the problems in their countries - from healthcare to migration - are the result of poor EU governance and insufficient patriotism from their governments. This is particularly evident in the case of migration. For example, it was the Russian Air Force, not just the Syrian regime, that caused the massive wave of refugees from Syria. The same is happening today with refugees from Ukraine. Russian propaganda manipulates this issue, ignoring the obvious fact: people are being forced to flee precisely because of Russian bombings.

It is astonishing how easy it is today, using uncontrolled media and social networks, to make people believe lies. Europe is facing a problem that is almost impossible to solve

These so-called «social media» are not social at all - they are a hub for spreading injustices and disinformation, which have devastating consequences. However, when they first emerged, the left-liberal camp saw them as a «promised land» of freedom and equality, so these political forces resisted any regulation.

Now, the same people are demanding stricter rules, but it is extremely difficult. Young people who, for instance, use TikTok, believe that restrictions threaten their freedom, although in reality, it is about banning blatantly foolish content. Previous attempts to establish rules for digital media failed due to the resistance of major internet companies. Now, we face one of the biggest challenges - to finally implement the necessary regulations.

Poland has long been and remains one of Ukraine’s key allies. What risks does potential Russian interference in the May elections in Poland pose, and how could it impact support for Ukraine in the region?

Not only is Poland as a whole crucial for Europe, but so is Donald Tusk specifically. As a former President of the European Council and an experienced leader, he is a clear target for Russian efforts to undermine stability. Additionally, Poland is one of Ukraine’s strongest supporters and a key advocate for strengthening the EU’s military capacity, making it a priority target for Russian interference.

However, the Polish people must know that their newly elected democratic government, formed through a complex but legitimate coalition, is well-prepared to withstand this pressure

EU energy blackmail

Ms Harms, how successful have the EU’s efforts been in reducing dependence on Russian energy resources?

Compared to 2022, dependence has decreased. At least, according to the latest data I have seen in Germany, the situation has stabilised. Yet, if we had acted more consistently regarding sanctions, the result would have been better and faster.

It outrages me that «Rosatom» has still not been sanctioned. This company was part of nuclear terror from the first days of the war: the attack on Chornobyl, assaults and occupation of the Zaporizhzhia nuclear power plant, and now - strikes on energy infrastructure, which create enormous risks for nuclear power plants in Ukraine.

That is why every time I read positive articles about the nuclear industry in France, I am surprised that those who admire it do not mention its connection with «Rosatom». For instance, EDF, the French nuclear company, is one of its key clients, and the French energy sector remains significantly dependent on imports from Russia.

How can the European Union counter Viktor Orban’s blackmail, as he attempts to use the issue of Russian gas transit to weaken sanctions against Russia?

I believe that the European Union is capable of compensating for imports from Russia through other sources. Thus, this is a problem or a challenge that can only be resolved if Orban also wishes to resolve it. However, even Hungary can survive without Russian gas.

Ukraine’s EU membership disruption and the risks of prolonging the war

What mechanisms do you believe Russia is using to sabotage Ukraine’s European integration aspirations? Is the EU doing enough to stop these attempts?

At every event concerning Ukraine’s integration into the EU, I feel that this is the best decision I have ever witnessed. Although the EU opened its doors to Ukraine too late, it has finally happened - despite Russian aggression.

It was a bold decision both for Ukraine and for the European Union. We are now in the preparatory phase for opening the first stages of negotiations

Undoubtedly, Russian interference, disinformation and other problems exist. The European integration process is already complex. However, the war itself makes meeting the requirements even more difficult. Thus, we are facing a completely new integration process, and predicting its future is challenging.

We are now hearing many statements regarding the end of the war in Ukraine. Everyone is closely watching the actions of US President Donald Trump. While we do not yet have definite outcomes, in your opinion, what risks does a prolonged war in Ukraine pose to the economic, political and military stability of the European Union?

It is not only Trump who says it would be better if the war ended. In reality, those who have suffered, who have lost their families, homes and cities, understand far better why it is crucial for the war to end as soon as possible. They know this much better than Trump.

However, on the other hand, the conditions for a ceasefire or truce must be such that they guarantee Russia will not repeat its attack on Ukraine in the future. This is crucial both for the EU and for Ukraine

Everyone wants to move on to a period of recovery and reconstruction, but we are not there yet.

In Davos, President Zelensky stated that «Europe must establish itself as a strong, global and indispensable player». Can support for Ukraine be considered the key test for Europe as a global player?

Yes, I believe so. The European Union, particularly some leading states that stood in defence of Ukraine even before February 2022, has become a much stronger player in the field of defence and security. However, significant steps still need to be taken, and this has once again become evident after Trump took office.

It is disappointing to see that, despite all the discussions before his inauguration, Europe was not truly prepared for Trump’s return to power. Although the EU has made considerable efforts since 2022, it is still far from being able to fully protect the continent. NATO is the key player here, and Europe now needs to seriously invest in the North Atlantic Alliance and its own security and defence forces.

This is one of the most urgent issues, in my opinion. Unfortunately, if you look at the German election campaign, this issue has not been given enough attention. Even after nearly three years of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, many politicians still hesitate to discuss these critical matters with their voters.

Cover photo: IMAGO/Andreas Friedrichs/Imago Stock and People/East News

The project is co-financed by the Polish-American Freedom Foundation as part of the «Support Ukraine» programme, implemented by the «Education for Democracy» Foundation

‍

‍

Together with experts in combating disinformation, Sestry analysed the most common Russian narratives found in Ukraine, Poland, Germany and Europe in general. They examined how these messages are tailored for different audiences, the platforms where Russian propaganda is most frequently encountered, how to distinguish destructive content, and whether it achieves its goals.

Constructing Reality

Propaganda always strives to construct an alternative reality and aims to make it as simple as possible, explains Doctor of Political Science and Professor at Kyiv Polytechnic Institute, Lidiia Smola:

- Let me give an example: for weeks, the idea has been spreading that Trump will prohibit the supply of weapons to Ukraine. Moreover, Trump’s extravagant statements provide grounds for various interpretations. This narrative, this framework about a ban on weapons for Ukraine, is continuously supplemented with informational messages.

This starts to destabilise society, making people think: that is it - Trump will come, and it will all end for us

The fundamental goal of Russians, continues Lidiia Smola, is to divide and demoralise:

- To demoralise the part of Ukrainian society engaged in volunteering, making them think there is no point in doing so. To demoralise those on the frontline, to sow discord with messages such as: while you are at war, those in the rear are having fun. That is, to create conflict between those fighting and those in the rear, between those who left and those still in Ukraine.

Russia is not just active, it systematically analyses all the sensitive points in Ukraine

Propaganda for Poland

When it comes to Poland, the current primary goal of Russian propaganda is to instigate fear, negative emotions and disinformation, says Director of the «Democracy and Civil Society» programme at the Institute of Public Affairs (Instytut Spraw Publicznych), Sonia Horonziak:

- This is achieved mainly through the dissemination of fake news online, styled to resemble authentic press reports. These news items predominantly concern Poland’s involvement in the war in Ukraine, the border situation, and the country’s internal affairs.

The strategic goal of Russian propaganda in Poland is to create a situation where, if not pro-Russian, at least neutral attitudes towards Russia prevail, alongside anti-American and anti-European sentiments, notes Michał Marek, head of the external threats analysis group at the National Research Institute NASK:

- Russia’s main objective is to withdraw Poland from the European Union and NATO, to ensure the absence of troops and bases of our Western partners. However, on the way to this goal, they pursue smaller objectives. For instance, they fuel anti-Ukrainian sentiments to make Poland and its government reduce support for Ukraine.

Do they succeed in this? Michał Marek believes not entirely. But where they do succeed, in his opinion, is in inflaming the issues that irritate both Ukrainians and Poles the most.

Propaganda Techniques

«Stop Supporting Ukraine» - this has been Russia’s main narrative in Germany for some time, notes Lea Frühwirth, Senior Research Fellow at the German Centre for Monitoring, Analysis and Strategy (CeMAS):

- This can be presented in various forms: claims about the danger posed by Ukrainian refugees or assertions that continued support for Ukraine threatens the German economy. We also frequently observe content suggesting that supporting Ukraine places Germans under a direct threat of war.

Typical markers of pro-Russian content focus primarily on Ukraine, crafting a particular image of the conflict to dissuade people from supporting Ukraine, continues Lea Frühwirth. Another emphasis seems to be on attacks against the current German government, aligning with Russia’s goal of gradually destabilising the situation in Ukraine.

In recent weeks, Russia has applied a tactic in Ukraine’s information space which might be labelled as «mental fatigue». The idea is that a psychologically and emotionally drained Ukrainian society might eventually accept a frozen conflict and agree to territorial losses, notes Doctor of Political Science and Professor at Kyiv Polytechnic Institute, Lidiia Smola. Russian propaganda attempts to place all responsibility solely on the Ukrainian authorities. While there are indeed many questions to be asked of them, the lack of effective communication, coupled with the absence of public and transparent discussions on significant issues, creates a space for Russian propaganda to act, the expert continues:

- And Russia focuses on this. Had the system of strategic communication at the governmental level operated effectively, had the media endeavoured not just to quickly fill the information space with provocative and manipulative headlines but aimed to inform society thoughtfully, the situation could have been different. Another issue is the credibility of so-called experts.

Nowadays, anyone can call themselves an expert, which completely undermines the notion of expertise

In Polish information space, false and fake news is most commonly disseminated online, especially on major social media platforms and far-right internet portals, says Sonia Horonziak, Director of the «Democracy and Civil Society» programme at the Institute of Public Affairs (Instytut Spraw Publicznych). Often, this information immediately provokes strong emotions, portrays the Polish government in an extremely negative light, and highlights events that adversely affect Polish society:

- Disseminated messages often combine partially truthful information or images but provide them with false context. Thus, we see an authentic photograph associated with a completely different past event.

Moreover, the role of artificial intelligence in creating increasingly sophisticated fake images or videos depicting certain events or individuals, often from the political world, is growing

From a structural perspective, disinformation campaigns such as «Twin» are well-studied and usually follow the same pattern, making them relatively easy to identify, notes Lea Frühwirth, Senior Research Fellow at CeMAS:

- For example, if a self-proclaimed news site appeared in my feed, resembling a well-known German newspaper but disseminating only overtly pro-Russian material, I would automatically become cautious.

Channels of Influence

There are several channels of fake communication in general, continues Lea Frühwirth. The first is the attempt to fill the information space with disinformation on topics of interest to Russia. However, it appears they focus more on the quantity of these messages than on their quality:

- To be manipulative, this content does not even need to contain outright lies. Simply highlighting one aspect of a problem while ignoring others, or pretending to be German citizens expressing concern while actually being part of a bot network, is also misleading. On the other hand, there are local pro-Russian influencers who repeat typical Kremlin talking points. Usually, we cannot determine their motivation - they might be paid or genuinely believe in it.

The war against Ukraine is one of the topics used daily by creators of fake news. This is detailed in a report by SCIENCE+, the largest journalistic network combating disinformation in Central Europe. In 2024, no new key disinformation narratives emerged, instead, existing ones were adapted to current events. The report records manipulations around the threat of war with Russia, societal divisions over positions on Ukraine, and the myth of a conflict between «the West» and «the East». These narratives became part of widespread attacks on democratic elections in Slovakia, Bulgaria, Moldova and Romania.

Young people are most frequently targeted by disinformation. Most do not engage with traditional media and instead obtain information from unreliable influencers. This contributes to a tendency among the youth to support radical or populist politicians.

A striking example is Romania, where the Constitutional Court annulled the results of the first round of presidential elections after President Klaus Iohannis declassified intelligence data showing that Russia had organised thousands of social media accounts to promote the radical pro-Russian politician Călin Georgescu through platforms like TikTok and Telegram. In 2025, presidential elections will be held in Poland. Russia will undoubtedly seek to exert influence, says Michał Marek, head of the external threats analysis group at the National Research Institute NASK:

- But in our current situation in Poland, the Romanian scenario is unlikely. They will not succeed in seriously influencing these elections.

Pro-Russian agents might have an impact on parliamentary elections. However, when it comes to presidential elections, I would not overestimate their ability to exert influence

Tactics, markers, and effectiveness of propaganda

Propaganda typically evokes extreme emotions, explains Sonia Horonziak, Director of the «Democracy and Civil Society» programme at the Institute of Public Affairs (Instytut Spraw Publicznych):

- You should ask yourself why you have not heard this information on public television or radio. Secondly, you should verify this information through various official sources. Most often, such information is not confirmed in any way. Some social networks also add contextual information to certain content, which can influence its perception. It is always worth searching for additional context.

Among the popular tools of Russian propaganda are aggressive rhetoric, threats, intimidation and nuclear blackmail. During the so-called year-end summary, the Russian president reiterated the claim that there are no air defence systems capable of intercepting the «Orieshnik» missile. According to Putin, even the missile defence systems in Poland and Romania would not intercept this missile. However, there is a percentage of people in Poland under the influence of Russian propaganda who might take such threats seriously and perceive other Russian narratives as real, says Michał Marek, head of the external threats analysis group at the National Research Institute NASK:

- Overall, the Polish society does not seem to fear this. It is clear that for many Poles, the war in Europe is perceived as a reality - in Europe, meaning between NATO and Russia. But the threats themselves, the «Orieshnik» topic, are not a factor widely believed by us Poles. Russians have been trying to frighten us for years - with nuclear strikes, with claims we would freeze to death without Russian gas.

So new threats are mostly viewed as just another scare tactic. The effectiveness of such Russian propaganda, frankly speaking, is not very high

Critical thinking

Anyone can fall into the trap of propaganda, says Lea Frühwirth, Senior Research Fellow at the German Centre for Monitoring, Analysis and Strategy (CeMAS):

- Human information processing is imperfect. It is not a pleasant thought, but it is the first step to awareness. We all need to establish a basic level of awareness and critical thinking. I would recommend using reliable and authoritative media outlets that adhere to journalistic standards to stay informed about what is happening in the world. Social media, on the other hand, is an information sphere where we must be prepared to encounter misleading content. If you notice something suddenly causing you excessive emotions, it is worth taking a step back and evaluating rationally to avoid contributing to the spread of fake news.

Russian propaganda typically divides the world into «black» and «white», «us» and «them», attempting to impose this division on Ukrainians. A characteristic approach is the emotional pressure - all these visualisations, publications of videos showing killed Ukrainian soldiers, notes Lidiia Smola, Doctor of Political Science and Professor at Kyiv Polytechnic Institute:

- A marker of propaganda is that you are urged to act impulsively and emotionally. For example, you go to social media and see a photo of an unfamiliar person appealing emotionally, for instance, «like this post because I am going to the frontline». And such posts then garner thousands of likes. Why? Because people want to feel part of something important. However, how these pages are used later and what is disseminated through them is rarely considered.

That is why it is crucial to critically evaluate resources and not succumb to manipulative calls for immediate action

For Ukraine, the factor of despair, constantly fuelled by hostile propagandists, is also significant. This is the narrative of an unbeatable Russia, notes Lidiia Smola:

- It works through emotional swings: from a state of sharp excitement to depression, when people write: everything is lost, we cannot win, Russia is winning. In such cases, I always ask where Russia was in 2022 with all its powerful and prepared army, and where it is now.

This project is co-funded by the Polish-American Freedom Foundation under the «Support Ukraine» programme implemented by the «Education for Democracy» Foundation

‍

‍