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20
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Tamar Jacoby: It may become a lonely fight for Ukraine

«The war is not over. Ukrainians are still fighting, and Russia appears more threatening than ever to Ukraine and the rest of Europe» - an interview with Tamara Jacoby, an American reporter and Kyiv director of the «New Ukraine» project at the Institute for Progressive Policy

Iwona Reichardt

Tamara Jacoby, an American reporter. Photo: private archive

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IWONA REICHARDT: You were in the United States during the final stages of the presidential campaign, and you witnessed the results in Ukraine. Were they a surprise to you?

TAMAR JACOBY: I was – it was a punch in the gut. But I shouldn't have been surprised. Now that I look at the results, I think we all should have seen it coming. We told ourselves it was 50-50, but it wasn't 50-50. Trump won by a significant margin. I don't blame the polling – I don’t think that’s the main problem. I think that people just didn't want to see a Trump victory coming. I certainly didn't want to see it. Now we need to accept that Americans have embraced Donald Trump. 

It's hard to understand why exactly. Is it that voters don't believe he'll do all the crazy things he says he will do? Or is it that they really just don't like the direction that Democrats were taking the country? Why this wholehearted embrace? I’m still struggling to understand it. But clearly Americans have embraced Trump, and we are going to have to accept the choice and live with it for four years. 

Speaking of the crazy stuff you mentioned, one of Trump’s promises is to end the war in Ukraine in a day, something which seems inconceivable… 

Yes, Ukrainian social media had a field day with that in the first days after the election: “The clock is ticking. Don, where is the peace?” But jokes aside, I don't think he will be able to end the war in a day. I think he will find it harder to end than he thinks.  

The big question will be what kind of deal does he propose? I'm very concerned about some of the deals that his advisors have suggested. The second question is how will Putin react? The response from Russia in the last two or three days has not been particularly forthcoming. The third question will be how seriously will Trump stick with his proposal? If you remember his negotiations with North Korea in the first term, he gave up after just a few days of talks. 

So yes, there are many questions about his promise to end the war in 24 hours. Also, when he says he's going to walk away from Ukraine – in fact he hasn't said that exactly, but people have read his comments to mean that. We don’t know what he intends. Does he mean no new weapons from the US, or an end to all support? Or does he mean that the US will continue to provide intelligence and let the Europeans provide military aid, including by purchasing US weapons?

Bottom line: there are many versions of what could happen now, and I think people should focus on making arguments that might persuade Trump to do the right thing rather than immediately assuming he’ll do the worst

What do you think success would mean for Trump when it comes to ending the war in Ukraine? 

We don't know yet. Trump is a very reactive, emotional person. So, a lot depends on how it plays out. He won’t react well if he feels that Putin is snubbing him – that could work to Ukraine’s advantage. And he won’t like it if it looks like America has somehow failed and betrayed its ally. So we just have to see. There are many unknowns and many things that need to play out. What’s important now is to try to help Trump see Ukraine in a frame that could be positive.

Will Trump end the war and on what terms? Photo: JIM WATSON/AFP/East News

This gets us to the Trump-Putin relationship. Who is Putin for Trump? A friend or a foe? 

Unclear. But he is still definitely a foe for Ukraine and the rest of the West. And nothing suggests a change of attitude among ordinary Russians. Ukrainian social media monitors Russian social media very closely, and there’s been a lot of talk in recent days about how America is still Russia’s enemy and America will always be Russia’s enemy. One Ukrainian headline quoted a Russian saying, “Same jerk, different face” – meaning Trump is no different from Biden, And a lot of that attitude is fanned by Putin and his allies.

The big question about the negotiations is what will Trump put on the table?

If Putin walks away, I can imagine there would be consequences – I could see Trump hammering him hard. The question is, why would he walk away? If Trump proposes a freezing of the front line and a Ukrainian promise not to join NATO, why would Putin walk away? That’s my biggest concern. But again, we just don't know. 

Also, let’s not forget about the fourth big player – Europe. You have Ukraine, you have the US, you have Russia, but you also have Europe. And Europe has to get its act together and step up. We could see a scenario where Trump backs away but says “Europe, it’s your responsibility”. Europe then has to find the money and the weapons, and step in. Europeans have been talking about these responsibilities since the war began, but they haven't really done much to increase their military capacity. Poland is spending more, but Germany is still spending almost nothing, and the German government has just collapsed. That is why I'm as concerned about what's going on in Europe as I am about what's happening in the US. 

Do you think Europe, and especially countries such as Poland or the Baltic states, should worry right now? Does Trump’s victory mean we are more at risk of war coming to our door? 

The bottom line is that Europe has to step up. No matter who is president of the United States. Even if Kamala Harris had won, Europe would need to get going. It is not enough to talk the talk – “We have to spend more”. Europeans have to allocate the money and cooperate with each other to make every dollar go as far it can. And they have to do it efficiently. There has been a lot of talk, but the train has not left the station. I understand – things take time in Brussels, and it's complicated. But come on, hurry up. People are dying in eastern Ukraine. And this war will come to Europe’s doorstep. The threats are already on your doorstep. And in this regard, I think Trump’s election might actually help – might push the Europeans to act in a way that the situation on the front line hasn’t pushed them. 

Speaking about the front line, and the overall situation in Ukraine, all the prognoses are not optimistic…

It's not good. The Russians are relying more and more heavily on glide bombs, a brutal tactic. They destroy the place they're trying to take, and then they send in men. And nobody has figured out how to counter these attacks. These are old-fashioned aerial bombs with wings, and they're huge. When they hit, they can destroy whole buildings. And that's what the Russians have done – destroyed city after city.

Photo: AA/ABACA/Abaca/East News

Meanwhile, Ukraine’s ammunition is dwindling, and the men are tired. As I understand things, this summer’s mobilization drive has largely fizzled out, and desertions are up. The Ukrainian public is still hanging in there. Opinion polls don’t show much change in attitudes toward the war over the last six months.

Life is amazingly normal in Kyiv. For me, it's great to be back. But people are tired, and I think they are waiting to see how Trump’s election will change the dynamic

Ukrainians are so tired of fighting with one hand tied behind their back, getting some American and European weaponry but not enough and not permitted to use it as they think it should be used. I lot of people are eager for  something bolder – and many think that may be Trump. Many people are worried about him, but some people are hopeful. Maybe Trump will break something – will somehow break the logjam. 

Do you feel the sense of abandonment in Ukraine? Do Ukrainians feel abandoned by the West, by Poland, by the US? 

Those countries aren’t all the same. I think most Poles understand what is going on in Ukraine – understand the existential Russian threat. Most Europeans get it. But most Americans do not get it. They don't understand the stakes or the magnitude of the threat, unfortunately. For most Americans, this war is very far away. And their view of the stakes is more transactional than existential. But even in Europe,  let’s be honest, there is more talk than action. Abandonment is a big word, but maybe it's not far from the truth. It's becoming a lonely fight for Ukraine.

People stand on the balconies of their shelled building in Odesa. Photo: OLEKSANDR GIMANOV/AFP/East News

What is America going to do now, during this period when Joe Biden is a lame duck and Donald Trump is president-elect? 

I do not think there will be another supplemental funding package from Congress. I just don't see it. Both the House and the Senate are now Republican and under Trump’s sway. Still, a few things could happen between now and January. 

We haven't spent all the money from the last supplemental, and we should rush to do that

Senator Lindsey Graham has an interesting idea: giving Ukraine the same status as Israel, opening the way to much wider access to US weapons. It's not quite NATO membership, but it's a lot better than what Ukraine has now. We should also be looking at the rules that govern how American defense contractors can cooperate with contractors in other countries.

Many of these are small things, but the point is it's way too soon to give up. There are things that can be done in the US, things that can be done in Europe. Maybe most important is what Zelenskyy and others are doing – thinking about what arguments will be most compelling to the Trump team. All of these steps can make a difference, and we have to go on. The war is not over. Ukrainians are still fighting, and Russia looks as menacing as ever, for Ukraine and the rest of Europe.

Cover photo: 24th Mechanised Brigade named after King Danylo of the Ukrainian Armed Forces/AFP/East News

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Deputy Editor-in-Chief of the journal New Eastern Europe. She is also a board member of the Jan Nowak-Jeziorański College of Eastern Europe and a co-founder of FemGlobal. Women in Foreign Policy - an association of female professionals working in international relations.

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The West had all the tools to foresee Russia's war against Ukraine - and chose to ignore them. Even before 2014, analysis reached NATO's highest offices: the annexation of Crimea, the threat to Mariupol, the Russian Federation's dominance in the Black Sea. The forecasts were accurate, but most member states opted for the illusion of partnership with the Kremlin.

Are changes still possible? What is required to achieve them? And can NATO remain an effective security alliance in a new era of threats? These and other questions were addressed in an interview with Sestry by Dr Stefanie Babst - one of the most influential security strategists in Europe, who worked at NATO for over 20 years, including as Head of the Strategic Foresight Team. Today, she is an independent analyst, the author of a book on the West's «blind spots» in its strategy toward Russia, and an active participant in international discussions on war, peace and security.

Ukraine, Russia and the strategic miscalculations of the West

Maryna Stepanenko: You led NATO's Strategic Foresight Team. How do you assess the West's ability to foresee Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine? Were there signals that were simply not heard, or perhaps deliberately ignored?

Stefanie Babst: There were many warnings that went unheeded. Allow me to explain. In international relations, it is crucial to accurately assess the mindset, capabilities and intentions of another actor. NATO failed to do this with Russia. As the Head of Strategic Foresight at the Alliance, I issued the first serious warning in 2013 - a few months before the annexation of Crimea. I presented an analysis outlining Russia's malicious intentions and its military preparations against Ukraine.

It was reviewed by the Secretary General and discussed with member states, but no action was taken

Some countries - the Baltic States and Poland - took the analysis seriously. Others - notably Germany, the United States and the United Kingdom - preferred to maintain the NATO-Russia partnership. From 2014 onwards, we intensified our analysis, forecasting actions such as the seizure of Mariupol, dominance in the Black Sea and the use of Donbas as a staging ground. These forecasts were presented at the highest levels, including the NATO Council, but were ultimately dismissed.

In 2015 and 2016, we broadened our focus to include China and its ties with Russia, offering future scenarios and forecasting so-called «black swans» - high-impact events that are hard to predict, seem unlikely but could have serious consequences if they occur. Again, many perceived this only as «intellectual exercises». Thus, NATO possessed the tools of foresight - and chose to ignore them. And that comes at a very high cost.

In your work, you call for a review of the West's strategy toward Russia. In your view, what «blind spots» remain in Western approaches - particularly regarding support for Ukraine?

Three years ago, I called for a powerful, multifaceted deterrence strategy to help Ukraine not just freeze the war but win it. I invoked George Kennan's Cold War approach, urging the use of all available instruments - economic, diplomatic and military - to push Russia out of Ukraine. But apart from some Baltic and Northern European countries, no one took this seriously.

NATO and the EU still lack a defined end goal. If Ukraine's victory were the objective, a corresponding strategy would have been developed

Instead, Western leaders underestimated Ukraine's resilience and failed to act decisively even after Russia crossed countless red lines. President Biden, despite his commitment to Ukraine, framed his approach around what the United States would not do: we will not provoke Russia, we will not give Ukrainians long-range weapons, we will not do this or that. This is not a strategy. Now, with Trump’s return, many European governments are passively hoping for a US-Russian agreement that merely freezes the war - something I believe is dangerous both for Ukraine and Europe.

My main criticism is the lack of political will in the West. Too many still see this as Russia's war against Ukrainians. But it is our war too

Stefanie, why do you think Europe failed to prepare effectively for Trump’s presidency?

Planning within NATO and European governments is often difficult, as politicians typically focus on short-term goals, usually only a month ahead. In times of emergency, particularly due to Washington's unpredictability, Europe must abandon crisis management mode and stop reacting to every event, such as a new tweet.

Europe must be firm with the United States, clearly communicating that their actions - including threats to countries like Canada and Denmark, withholding intelligence from Ukraine and halting cyber operations against Russia - are unacceptable. These decisions had deadly consequences, and member states should not be afraid to hold the United States accountable for violating the fundamental principles of the Washington Treaty.

Mark Rutte, the NATO Secretary General, recently visited Florida to meet President Trump, hoping to impress him with defence spending figures. He praised Trump’s leadership and even claimed that Trump had «broken the deadlock» in relations with Russia. However, this is detached from the reality of ongoing Russian attacks.

If the NATO Secretary General lacks a clear message, the best approach is silence, focusing on supporting member states and protecting them from any threat. We do not have time for empty words and political games.

Europeans must remain immune to American political theatre, focusing on strengthening defence capability and supporting Ukraine’s defence industry so it can resist Russian aggression
Rutte: NATO wants to make Ukraine a strong state. Photo: Office of the President of Ukraine

Migration and war

Germany is no longer the EU leader in asylum requests from South American and Middle Eastern refugees. At the same time, in the first quarter of 2025, applications from Ukrainians rose by 84 per cent. What does this indicate?

It is entirely understandable that many Ukrainians have chosen to leave their country for personal and professional reasons - this is natural, and no one should be blamed for it. But this migration has political consequences in Germany, particularly when far-right parties exploit it by portraying Ukrainian refugees as a burden on the social system, regardless of their skills or motivation. These sentiments are especially strong in eastern Germany, where parties like AfD and certain left-wing populist movements have gained support.

What concerns me is the lack of strong counteraction from the federal government in Berlin - clearer messaging and political leadership are needed

If more Ukrainians arrive, I hope the next government will take a positive stance, recognising that many of them can significantly contribute to the German workforce. This would mean reducing bureaucracy, accelerating integration and facilitating their employment. Whether this happens remains to be seen.

Continuing on this topic, in recent weeks, some districts in Germany have publicly declared that they can no longer accommodate Ukrainian refugees due to overburdened social systems. How do you assess these sentiments?

It is true that local communities across Germany still face difficulties in accommodating refugees - an issue that arose after Chancellor Merkel’s decision to open the borders, leading to a large influx of refugees from Syria, Afghanistan and other countries. Many municipalities remain overwhelmed by demands for housing, language training and integration support. However, Ukrainian refugees do not pose the same challenges.

Ukrainians generally integrate well, bring strong skills and education and do not contribute to social tensions

In contrast, some refugees from the Middle East struggle to adapt to liberal democratic norms, which fuels far-right narratives, particularly in eastern Germany. Parties like AfD and figures such as Sahra Wagenknecht exploit this, promoting anti-Ukrainian, pro-concession rhetoric that ignores the reality of Russian occupation.

Unfortunately, mainstream democratic parties are not doing enough to push them back. With growing support from American right-wing populists, such as those connected to Trump or Musk, this polarisation may deepen further, posing a serious threat to democratic cohesion in Europe.

Europe on the brink of war

Amid full-scale war in Ukraine, initiatives have emerged in Poland and Germany to prepare schoolchildren for emergencies. Does this indicate a deeper shift in Europe's security culture, where defence is no longer solely the army's responsibility, but that of the entire society?

Although some defence-related courses have begun in Germany, they remain insufficient, and the wider public remains largely unprepared - both mentally and physically - to play a defensive role.

Serious debates are now underway about reinstating military conscription, but surveys show that two-thirds of people aged 20 to 30 would refuse to serve, with many saying they would rather emigrate than defend the country.

This reflects a deeper issue: decades of political messaging have conditioned Germans to believe they live in peace, surrounded by allies, and need not prepare for conflict

As a result, Germany also lacks bunkers for emergencies, civil defence training and basic resilience measures for the population. Changing this mindset will require strong political leadership. Without it, the Bundeswehr will remain under-equipped and unable to contribute significantly to efforts such as a potential coalition in Ukraine.

We see civil defence becoming part of public policy, from educating children to testing alarm systems. Is Europe beginning to think seriously about its own resilience in the face of potential escalation beyond Ukraine?

Undoubtedly. Some countries, such as Finland, Sweden, Poland and the Baltic States, have prioritised both military capability and societal resilience in recent years. In cities such as Riga and Warsaw, the Russian threat is well understood. However, countries like Germany, Belgium, Portugal, France and others still view Russia’s war against Ukraine as a regional issue.

Fortunately, leaders such as Kaja Kallas are advocating for a long-term strategy against Russia. Since the start of Russia’s full-scale invasion, I have argued that we must prepare for a protracted conflict, as long as Putin’s regime remains in power, Russia will continue to pose a threat to Ukraine and the whole of Europe.

Strategic vision

Given your views on NATO's evolution and the need for a new coalition, potentially the so-called «coalition of the willing», how do you envisage its structure? What strategic or institutional frameworks will be important to effectively counter Russian aggression, considering internal challenges within NATO, particularly due to the influence of populist leaders, including Trump?

During my time at NATO, I was proud of my team’s ability to anticipate challenges before they emerged, especially regarding NATO’s enlargement. I was actively involved in the admission of new members, including the Baltic States, Slovenia and Slovakia.

One of the moments I had hoped to witness was seeing Ukraine’s flag at NATO headquarters, but I no longer believe that is a realistic goal

Instead, I believe Ukraine should focus on building a new coalition with like-minded countries, rather than pursuing NATO membership. The Alliance, particularly under the influence of destructive politics, is becoming increasingly divided.

If I were advising President Zelensky, I would recommend not wasting energy on NATO accession but rather focusing on strengthening a broader, more flexible alliance to counter Russian aggression. This would allow us to move beyond the status quo and prepare for the future.

Considering the current dynamics within NATO, how long do you think the Alliance can maintain its current structure before significant changes become inevitable? Do you have a timeframe in mind?

When President Trump was elected, I predicted he would undermine the rules-based order, and we are already seeing significant damage done to NATO, especially concerning the US commitments. European countries have started discussing enhancing the European pillar within NATO, planning to prepare for a potential US withdrawal within five to ten years. However, I believe that timeframe is overly optimistic - we may have only five to ten months before we witness new disruptions.

What lies ahead for NATO? Photo: BRENDAN SMIALOWSKI

Looking back, it is clear NATO missed the opportunity to prepare for these challenges. In 2016, I prepared a document for the Secretary General outlining potential harm Trump could cause, but it was dismissed at the time. The issues I raised remain relevant today, and NATO's bureaucracy is too risk-averse to plan for unforeseen scenarios.

If the Alliance fails to act, it risks becoming a reactive organisation that merely responds to Trump’s tweets instead of proactively working toward the future

I hope that countries such as France, the United Kingdom and Northern European states will cooperate with Ukraine to create a new joint alliance capable of better confronting future challenges.

Cover photo: MANDEL NGAN/AFP/East News

This project is co-financed by the Polish-American Freedom Foundation under the «Support Ukraine» programme, implemented by the Education for Democracy Foundation

20
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Former NATO strategist Stefanie Babst: «We predicted Donbas, Mariupol and the Black Sea - but they would not listen»

Maryna Stepanenko
subway, people, air alarm

<frame>"More knowledge, less fear" is the slogan of our new publication series. Safety is based on facts, verified information, and solid arguments. The more we know, the better we will be prepared for the future. <frame>

Is Poland ready for a crisis? In an era of geopolitical uncertainty, the war in Ukraine, and rising tensions across Europe, education and societal organisation are crucial. By welcoming over a million Ukrainian refugees, Poland has not only gained new residents but also unique knowledge and experience from people who have learned civil protection under the harshest conditions—under bombs and rocket fire. This is capital that must not be wasted. 

The new law on civil protection and civil defence, in force since January 1, is a concrete response to real threats. At the same time, it offers an opportunity for deeper integration, allowing Poles and Ukrainians living in Poland to prepare together for crises. 

Poland has learned from the tragic events of recent years. The new law emphasises three key areas: modernising and constructing shelters and hiding places, improving alarm and notification systems, and launching widespread civic education to ensure every citizen has basic knowledge of how to act during a crisis. The context of the war in Ukraine makes this even more urgent.

Many Ukrainians living in Poland have priceless experience in civil protection - whether as survivors, organisers, or leaders of evacuation and shelter operations.

This is an opportunity Poland must not miss. When war strikes, no system is ever fully ready. What matters then is how effectively we can use what we already have.

What can serve as a shelter? A practical approach to civil protection begins with this question. Knowledge—that is our first "shelter"!

April 19, 2024 - Children entering a bomb shelter at the Perspectiva Gymnasium in Novovasylivka, Zaporizhzhia region, where classes are held in a hybrid format. Photo: Ukrinform/East News/Dmytro Smolienko

According to the new law, every basement, underground garage, or tunnel can serve as a hiding place. It’s worth taking a moment to look around and ask yourself, "What would I do in case of danger?" 

It’s better to know in advance than to scramble during chaos. 

Here, the experience of Ukrainians in Poland becomes invaluable. Those who have survived bomb alerts can share practical knowledge with Poles, including how to organise life in shelters, secure water and food supplies, address the psychological aspects of survival, and utilise mobile alert apps that have become critical tools in Ukraine. This is not theory. These are real-life experiences from people who face the consequences of war every single day.
Their testimony is more valuable than any textbook could be. 

Education in this field is the key to safety. Poland must harness the knowledge of Ukrainians and launch a wide educational campaign as soon as possible. 
According to the new law, local governments and fire services will play a central role in civil protection. However, in practice, the system will only function effectively if hundreds of thousands of people are involved. 

Ukrainians who have faced real threats can become instructors, educators, and leaders of this change. NGOS are already playing a significant role in organising training for both Ukrainians and Poles. 

This will benefit everyone. Polish municipalities urgently need practitioners who understand the realities of crises.

Every citizen on the front lines.

The new law places local governments in charge of implementing the civil protection system, meaning the battle for the effectiveness of this law will be fought where Poles and Ukrainians live nearby. It is essential to acknowledge that women played a vital role in Ukraine’s civil protection efforts, from rescue workers and volunteers to leaders of humanitarian organisations. They ensured survival amid chaos. 

In Poland, too, women can become the driving force behind such changes, joining local governments, NGOS, and educational teams. 

Is Poland ready for a crisis and civil protection?

Poland is better prepared today than it was a few years ago. The new law represents a significant step forward, but infrastructure alone will not be sufficient.

What will truly matter is the genuine engagement of citizens in education and crisis response, the effective application of Ukrainian experience, and practical cooperation among local governments, NGOS, and the central government.

Today, Poland is in a better situation than a few years ago. The new law is an important step, but one infrastructure is not enough. The real involvement of citizens in training and the elimination of the consequences of emergencies, the wise use of Ukrainians' experience and effective cooperation between local governments, organizations and the government will be crucial.

April 1, 2024 – Zaporizhzhia. Two workers in a new modular underground bomb shelter for 100 people, being built in the courtyard of a five-story residential building damaged by a Russian S-300 missile on October 6, 2022, now under repair. Photo: Ukrinform/East News/Dmytro Smolienko 

This isn’t a Hollywood disaster movie scenario. It’s reality—a reality we must understand and prepare for.  In the 21st century, security isn’t just about armies; it’s about conscious, organised societies. And building them starts with education—education based on facts, not fearmongering. 

Security is our shared responsibility.

It’s not just the domain of the state. It’s not something the government can "provide" like a service.  It’s something we build and give to each other.  Of course, institutions, regulations, alarm systems, and shelters are vital. But what truly determines survival during a crisis is people—their relationships, willingness to help, ability to act under stress, and the awareness that, in challenging moments, we are not alone. 
Every one of us is part of the security system—from the teacher who teaches first aid, to the neighbour who knows the nearest shelter location, to the volunteer who helps newly arrived refugees adjust to a new reality. 

The strength of a nation lies in the strength of its society—and society is strong when its members know they can count on one another. 

In the past, those who realised that the best defence wasn’t walls or bunkers, but well-prepared, united people, were the ones who prevailed.  In Ukraine, social mobilisation saved thousands of lives.  In Poland, we have a chance to learn from this experience before a crisis forces us to.

20
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Knowledge is our first shelter

Julia Boguslavska

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